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Preface 
 
 
The topic of Catholic institutional identity in higher education is a fascinating 
one, and can be approached from numerous angles, drawing insights from various 
disciplines. This dissertation represents a contribution from theology, and will necessarily 
cover a great deal of ground as it argues for an intentional retrieval of the virtue of 
hospitality and application to the Catholic intellectual life broadly but also Catholic 
higher education in particular. 
Chapter One will set the stage for what follows by examining the challenge of 
Catholic institutional identity in light of developments of the past half century within the 
life of the Church, with particular attention given to the buildup to, content of, and impact 
following the promulgation of Pope John Paul II’s Ex Corde Ecclesiae in 1990. The 
chapter will also note instances when hospitality has been given as a justification for a 
number of decisions, sometimes controversial, on Catholic campuses. 
Chapter Two will follow with an investigation of hospitality as a virtue. The 
Scriptural testimony and early Christian witness to the practice of hospitality will be 
explored. Efforts in the past four decades to retrieve hospitality will also be surveyed 
with the hope of constructing some notion of what Catholic hospitality might entail in the 
intellectual life. Additionally, the relationship of hospitality and friendship will be 
examined with the intention of further clarifying the nature of hospitality, but also in an 
effort to prepare for at least one of the three practitioners of Catholic intellectual 
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hospitality to be covered later in the dissertation, who uses friendship as a term for how 
he understood his practice of hospitality. 
That thinker, Thomas Merton, is the subject of Chapter Three, which studies the 
apostolate of friendship which Merton pursued in the final decade of his life. The chapter 
will seek to understand exactly how Merton’s commitment to Catholicism impacted that 
apostolate. 
Chapter Four suggests there is a kind of hospitality latent within the Catholic 
tradition’s tendency to seek a synthesis of knowledge, even if that hospitality did not 
always surface clearly in practice. The place of the neo-Scholastic synthesis in Catholic 
higher education in the early to mid-20th century will be described before the chapter 
moves toward its primary focus, the intellectual hospitality of Bernard Lonergan. In 
particular, the chapter will look to Lonergan’s work on human cognition to find a basis 
for a new path toward greater hospitality among the disciplines. 
Chapter Five will explore the work of the third and final practitioner of Catholic 
intellectual hospitality, John S. Dunne. Dunne’s unique method of theological reflection, 
which he called passing over, will be shown to be a clear demonstration of precisely the 
kind of hospitality that this dissertation contends can move the discussion on Catholic 
identity forward. 
Chapter Six concludes the dissertation with a series of recommendations, 
predominantly modest in nature, for Catholic universities seeking to cultivate hospitality 
on campus. The intention is not so much to advocate a brand new approach to Catholic 
higher education so much as to invite institutions, and even the individuals who work 
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within them, to consider how the things they are already doing might be reflections of the 
hospitality which is, rightly understood, a virtue. 
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ABSTRACT 
Catholic Intellectual Hospitality: An Application to Catholic Higher Education 
by Paul Schweigl, directed by Br. Michael J. McGinniss, FSC 
 
 
Catholic higher education has been the focus of discussion concerning 
institutional identity in the face of contemporary challenges. This discussion has been 
especially vibrant since the promulgation of Ex Corde Ecclesiae in 1990. Faculty hiring 
and invitations to guest speakers have been perceived as challenges to identity, despite a 
growing awareness that Catholic universities are called to practice a distinctive welcome 
to people of various backgrounds and worldviews. This dissertation will contend that 
hospitality is crucial to the successful orientation of a Catholic university, as well as to 
the integrity of the Catholic intellectual life. 
The nature of Catholic intellectual hospitality will be examined from biblical and 
historical (Chapter 2) perspectives. To practice hospitality requires openness to the other, 
but it also requires a home. The difficulties associated with practicing hospitality directly 
parallel the ongoing debates regarding the legitimate role of Catholic higher education 
and the Catholic intellectual life. Namely, Catholic individuals and communities seeking 
to practice hospitality have always struggled to strike a balance between remaining rooted 
in the Catholic tradition while being open to the needs of the other. 
The modern perspectives on intellectual hospitality will primarily come from 
three highly-regarded writers who exemplify that virtue, Thomas Merton, Bernard 
Lonergan, and John S. Dunne. All three of these thinkers were able to remain faithful to 
their Catholic grounding while engaging persons from outside Catholicism. Merton’s 
vii 
 
 
apostolate of friendship (Chapter 3), Lonergan’s theory of cognition (Chapter 4), and 
Dunne’s method of passing over (Chapter 5) will each be examined and surveyed for 
insights into the nature of intellectual hospitality that might be applicable to Catholic 
higher education. The dissertation will conclude with recommendations for how 
institutions might cultivate hospitality in the campus community. These 
recommendations will be modest in that they will align closely with regular university 
practices, but could prove effective strategies in helping a Catholic university remain 
grounded in its Catholic identity while also pursuing the critical engagement with all 
ideas that is proper to a university 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
Chapter 1: Catholic Higher Education and a Place for Hospitality 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to explore the reasons behind the current need for greater 
understanding of, and emphasis on, hospitality in the Catholic intellectual life. While 
such an endeavor could likely treat with the vocation of the Catholic intellectual in 
general, the focus here will instead be on trajectories in Catholic higher education. While 
there certainly are many Catholic scholars doing fine work in non-Catholic institutions 
(or even outside an institution altogether), an assumption of this chapter will be that 
Catholic universities are especially responsible for the stewardship of Catholic 
intellectual life. As the role of the Catholic university vis-à-vis the Church has evolved or 
the past half a century, what the Church requires of Catholic intellectuals has similarly 
developed and perhaps even expanded. Though Catholic scholars today are, much like 
their forebears, engaged in the work of teaching, researching, and writing, there is an 
entirely distinct ecclesiological function of the Church’s intellectual life today. 
Unquestionably, the Second Vatican Council did much to signal, encourage, and define 
this ecclesiological shift, which will be described below. Even the past three decades, 
though, have witnessed intensive discussion on the obligations of the Catholic 
intellectual. 
This is largely because the proper role of Catholic intellectual life is an integral 
part of the debate over Catholic institutional identity in Catholic higher education. In 
1990, Pope John Paul II promulgated the apostolic constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 
which intended to clearly define the nature and mission of Catholic higher education 
1 
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throughout the world. This document set off a flurry of discussion, particularly in the 
United States, where the majority of the world’s Catholic institutions are located. 
Initially, this centered on issues of particular concern to American academics; namely, 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom. The middle of the 20th century was a 
tumultuous time in American history generally, but particularly so in the history of 
American Catholic higher education. Ex Corde Ecclesiae was the culmination of decades 
of dialogue, and has done much to bring order to what could easily have become chaos. 
The Catholic university represents the setting wherein the content of the Catholic 
intellectual tradition is brought into conversation with the content of human culture more 
comprehensively and critically than anywhere else. 
Church and the Modern World 
 
Wrestling with the nature of a contemplative vocation in the midst of a troubled 
society, Thomas Merton warned that “It is all too easy to retire into an ivory tower of 
private spirituality and let the world blow itself to pieces.”1 For Merton, the 
contemplative perspective was necessary for making sense of the way human history had 
progressed in God’s world, but the solitude necessary to acquire that perspective could be 
dangerous. If isolation became an absolute, a goal in and of itself, it was little more than 
an immoral abdication of responsibility. In Matthew’s Gospel, the final task Christ gives 
his followers, the Great Commission, exhorts the church to “Go therefore and make 
disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of 
 
 
1. David J. O’Brien, From the Heart of the American Church: Catholic Higher Education and 
American Culture (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1994), 32. 
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the Holy Spirit…”2 Clearly, the church is intended to look beyond itself, always with an 
eye toward sharing its wisdom and capacity for unity in Christ with the rest of the world. 
The Roman Catholic Church into which Merton converted, however, had an approach to 
this task predicated on the idea that it, as a perfect society, possessed the means to 
facilitate salvation by encouraging in its members a proper response to God’s grace. 
Dialogue, then, in the pre-Vatican II church, required non-Catholic participants to 
approach a Catholicism that had, in many ways, become the very kind of ivory tower 
against which Merton warned. Christianity, with its eschatological vision of the Kingdom 
of God, has had to struggle against contempt of ‘the world’ in any context. The 
Reformation of the 16th century had initiated a defensive posture in Roman Catholicism, 
and that mentality was given fresh energy in the church’s conflict with modernism in the 
19th and 20th centuries. Merton’s lifetime, however, would witness a drastic reorientation  
of Catholic perspectives, embodied most substantially in the Second Vatican Council. 
In an earlier era, the Catholic university was able to exist and operate as an 
extension of the church as ‘perfect society.’ Operating under the assumptions that the 
Roman Catholic church possessed all that it needed to complete its mission and that it 
was, by and large, a visible institution, Catholic higher education was often held in low 
regard by non-Catholic observers of academe (think of the quip, often attributed to 
George Bernard Shaw, that the very notion of a Catholic university was an oxymoron). 
Though intensive instruction in neo-Scholastic philosophy may well have provided 
students an academically rigorous experience, there was rarely much call for active 
 
2. Matthew 28:19 (New Revised Standard Version). 
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engagement with contemporary cultures of the world that were not distinctively Catholic. 
With Tridentine ecclesiology still holding sway throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, Catholic university campuses were often places where the handing on of 
tradition was the primary (and perhaps sometimes the only) concern. 
The Second Vatican Council rendered such an orientation of Catholic higher 
education not only unhelpful, but also untenable. Vatican II represents, amongst other 
things, a clarion call for Catholic universities to redouble their efforts in helping the 
church learn in addition to helping it teach. As Stephen Bevans has observed, Pope John 
XXIII “called for aggiornamento in the church, but not for its own sake. Any renewal the 
council would bring was for the sake of a more intelligible and effective preaching of the 
Gospel.”3 Though the Roman Curia may well have sought initially to minimize the 
 
potential for anything groundbreaking to occur at the Council, a clear indication of the 
Council’s ecclesiological direction was to take place early on in the first session: Cardinal 
Lienart’s famous call for additional time for the Council Fathers to reconsider a list of 
names provided them by the Curia for voting on members of each of the council’s ten 
commissions. Archbishop John Quinn has highlighted the importance of Lienart’s 
intervention: “What might, otherwise, have seemed a secondary moment, was, in fact, a 
moment of great significance. It was a turning point, marking the world episcopate as 
conscious of its collegial role.”4 
 
 
 
 
3. Stephen Bevans, SVD, “Beyond the New Evangelization: Toward a Missionary Ecclesiology 
for the Twenty-First Century,” in A Church with Open Doors ed. Richard R. Gaillardetz and Edward P. 
Hahnenberg (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2015), 5. 
4. Archbishop John R. Quinn, Ever Ancient, Ever New (New York: Paulist Press, 2013), 41 
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Thomas Rausch points to a suggestion made by Cardinal Suenens as having 
possibly even a greater impact on the ecclesiology set forth by the Council. Rather than 
following the somewhat frenetic proposal provided by the Council’s Theological 
Commission for a document on the church, Suenens proposed a two-pronged approach 
that would eventually yield two separate documents: “First, (the Council) should look at 
the Church in its inner life. This would allow a treatment of the Church as the mystery of 
Christ living in his mystical body, as well as of its missionary, sacramental, and worship 
life. The second statement should address the Church in its relations with the outside 
world.”5 
The first part of Suenens’ proposal, dealing with the church’s inner life, 
culminated in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium. In this 
document the Council Fathers “gave unprecedented attention to defining the role of the 
laity, opening the door to previously unheard of levels of participation in the ministries of 
the church by laypersons. Rather than defining the laity negatively (as people who are not 
ordained), the Council gave a powerful affirmation of the lay claim to be “sharers in the 
priestly, prophetic, and kingly functions of Christ.”6 Lumen Gentium made significant use 
 
of the ‘people of God’ image of the church, while also emphasizing the sacramental 
nature of the church. This marked a significant departure from the emphasis on the 
external structures of the church favored in much of pre-Conciliar ecclesiology. 
 
 
 
 
5. Thomas P. Rausch, Towards a Truly Catholic Church (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2005), 16. 
6. The Second Vatican Council, “Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,” in The Documents of 
Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Guild Press, 1966), 57. 
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The second part of the vision put forth by Cardinal Suenens, a consideration of 
the church’s relationship to the rest of the world, would culminate in the Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church and the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes. While he notes the 
contribution of Suenens, Rausch gives “ultimate credit” to Pope John XXIII for the 
development of the document.7 Regardless, it is safe to conclude that Gaudium et Spes 
was a culmination of numerous forces at work within the church that were pressing for a 
different kind of engagement with the world than that with which Catholicism had 
recently been accustomed. Rausch also notes that part of the discussion of the document 
by the Council Fathers occurred while Pope Paul VI addressed the General Assembly of 
the United Nations in New York. Rausch contends that the Pope’s speech and appearance 
were “widely understood as symbolic of a reforming Church’s desire to put itself at the 
service of the world it had so long described only in negative tones.”8 
This document continues to be a major force in Catholic thinking on the mission 
of the church. In particular, Gaudium et Spes demonstrates a profound awareness on the 
part of the Council of the importance of culture. Noting Christ’s linkage of love for God 
and love for neighbor, the Council Fathers recognized the social nature of all people and 
sought to devote more of the church’s attention to the common good. Instead of 
attempting to co-opt culture through an imposition of Catholic thinking, Gaudium et Spes 
admits instead that the church “‘does not always have a ready answer to every question,’ 
but ‘is eager to associate the light of revelation with the experience of humanity in trying 
 
 
 
7. Rausch, 34. 
8. Ibid, 35. 
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to clarify the course upon which it has recently entered.’”9 The church was never robbed 
of its supernatural functions by the Council, especially considering its continued 
willingness to use language such as Mystical Body and sacrament in thinking of the 
church. Nevertheless, Gaudium et Spes makes it clear that the church was no longer 
content thinking of itself as separate from the world in the same way that it once had; the 
world was capable of being redeemed by God and this demanded a different posture on 
the part of God’s church. The inductive approach of the pastoral constitution, in 
particular, serves as a reminder that the church was a pilgrim alongside the rest of 
humanity. The church wrestled with many of the same issues that non-members did, and 
asked many of the same questions. The church could never again be complacent with its 
own isolation. 
Gaudium et Spes defined culture as “all those things which go to the refining and 
developing of humanity’s diverse mental and physical endowments.”10 This definition, in 
Vincent Miller’s interpretation of the document, “unites the developmental understanding 
of culture with Catholic theological notions of creation, nature, and grace. Humankind 
‘can achieve true and full humanity only by means of culture, that is through the 
cultivations of the goods and values of nature’ understood here both as human nature and 
the broader natural world in which we live.”11 While the Council was cognizant that 
culture could sometimes exist in tension with theology, there was in Gaudium et Spes a 
call to strengthen and make more efficient both the study of theology and the 
9. Ibid, 38. 
10. Ibid, 40. 
11. Vincent Miller, “Ecclesiology Cultural Change, and the Changing Nature of Culture,” in A 
Church with Open Doors ed. Richard R. Gaillardetz and Edward P. Hahnenberg (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press, 2015), 67. 
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communication of doctrine. With the church rather suddenly very eager to learn and a 
world with which it was eager to engage, the need for Catholic universities of high 
quality was perhaps never felt more acutely. As Miller summarizes, the Council’s “vision 
of engagement with culture is grounded in the bedrock dogmatic principles of creation, 
incarnation, and soteriology.”  The confidence with which the Council believed the 
church could work toward a new Catholic synthesis in the midst of “the modern 
proliferation of knowledge” was “ultimately rooted in faith that God’s saving presence is 
at work in human history in a way that makes the historical and ethnographic diversity of 
culture both intelligible and redeemable.”12 
Gaudium et Spes seemed almost an about-face from church policy of the pre- 
Council era. This document strongly identified the “joys and the hopes, the griefs and the 
anxieties of the men of this age” with the “joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the 
followers of Christ.”13 Indeed, the previously taken for granted distinction between the 
church and ‘the world’ seemed to be drastically diminished by the Council’s call to 
transform the world. As Yves Congar notes in a commentary on Gaudium et Spes, “The 
‘world’ is not simply the power of the State, it is mankind at work; it is capable of 
becoming Church…”14 There have been widely-divergent schools of thought regarding 
the interpretation and application of the Council, but there is no contesting that the church 
could no longer downplay the Great Commission’s demand for dialogue and 
evangelization befitting the 20th century. As Congar observes, the Council “several times 
 
12. Ibid, 70, 71. 
13. The Second Vatican Council, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” in 
The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Guild Press, 1966), 199-200. 
14. Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in the Modern World,” in Commentary on the 
Documents of Vatican II vol. 5, ed. Herbert Vorgrimmler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 212. 
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states that our eschatological vocation in no way diverts people from their earthly tasks 
but rather imposes an obligation on them to perform them”15 Echoing the Council, Joseph 
Komonchak has pointed out that the decision to follow Christ is “a distinctive way of 
being in the world…But this distinctiveness should not be purchased at the price of a 
withdrawal from the world, but should rather be a distinctive way of being in and for the 
sake of the world.”16 
Ecclesiological Justification for Catholic Higher Education 
 
It is, perhaps, a bit ironic that the Second Vatican Council advocated a position 
that made the Catholic university a vital setting for the Church’s dialogue with the world 
just as those same institutions were experiencing something of an identity crisis. Even a 
decade before the Council, it would have seemed exceedingly peculiar to ask questions 
about the Catholic identity of a Catholic college or university in the first place. Indeed, 
into the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, Catholic identity was 
something that was for all intents and purposes taken for granted. With plenty of vowed 
religious filling faculties and administrations, well-defined juridical relationships 
between schools and the hierarchy, and a robust (though not uniform) Catholic sub- 
culture throughout the country, there was ample reason not to question whether the 
institutions of higher learning that claimed to be Catholic actually were. While much 
could be said to describe how the situation changed throughout the middle of the century, 
it is sufficient for the purposes of this chapter to note that the complacency regarding 
 
15. Ibid, 206. 
16. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Mission and Identity in Catholic Universities,” in Theological 
Education in the Catholic Tradition, ed. Patrick W. Carey and Earl C. Muller (New York: Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 1997), 40. 
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Catholic identity was in no small part a function of complacency regarding ecclesiology. 
Up until shortly before the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church’s understanding 
of itself was still dominated by the ecclesiology of the Council of Trent (or the Catholic 
Reformation as a whole), and Vatican I. Given that both of these councils took place in 
times of unease and pessimism regarding the broader world, Catholic thinking on the 
church tended to promote the notion of the church as a fortress providing shelter (and 
eventually salvation) from the fallen aspects of human culture gone awry. 
Avery Dulles suggests an ecclesiological definition from Robert Bellarmine as 
indicative of this earlier Catholic mindset: “The one and true Church is the community of 
men brought together by the profession of the same Christian faith conjoined in the 
communion of the same sacraments, under the government of the legitimate pastors and 
especially the one vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman pontiff.”17 Clearly, Bellarmine’s 
preoccupation with opposing Protestantism led him to concentrate on visible delineations 
 
for where the Church ended and the rest of the world began. Indeed, it is not difficult to 
see how a Catholic university operating under such an ecclesiological perspective might 
similarly rely on visible criteria for demonstrating its Catholic identity. While such an 
ecclesiology might support at least the illusion of certainty, Dulles hastens to point out 
that “This clarity…was bought at a price. It tended to lower the Church to the same plane 
as other human communities and to neglect the most important thing about the Church: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 16. 
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the presence in it of the God who calls the members to himself, sustains them by his 
grace, and works through them as they carry out the mission of the Church.”18 
For his part, Dulles relied heavily on the notion that “The Church never fully 
achieves itself as Church, at least not in the conditions of this world. It is true Church to 
the extent that it is tending to become more truly Church.”19 This striving on the part of 
the church must be seen as reliant on God’s grace, but it can also be expressed only 
within the concrete realm of history. To be set within history implies a need for the 
church—and the intellectual tradition it safeguards and seeks constantly to develop—to 
engage with culture in whatever forms and contexts it finds itself. Miller concurs when he 
posits that “The relationship of religion and culture is unavoidable for Catholicism 
because of its understanding of the communal, ecclesial nature of salvation.”20 
Historical Background 
 
Though the Council clearly affirmed Catholic higher education, it did not create 
it. Within the United States alone, there were well over 200 Catholic institutions before 
the Council, which were, in some ways, extremely diverse. Catholic institutions of higher 
learning included universities, colleges, schools founded by religious orders, diocesan 
schools, or even, in one case, a school founded by Pontifical charter. Despite this 
diversity (which was certainly not superficial), Alice Gallin has asserted that they 
nevertheless had a “common culture. Their mission statements were almost 
interchangeable, and their commitment to liberal arts, character formation, and a sense of 
 
 
18. Ibid 16-17. 
19. Ibid, 71. 
20. Miller, 64. 
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campus community…was openly proclaimed as rooted in their Catholic faith.”21 
Academic freedom, already a highly-cherished virtue for secular American academics, 
meant something decidedly more restrictive in Catholic institutions before the Council; 
namely, freedom to teach and learn the truth. Illustrative of this point of view is a faculty 
handbook from Duquesne University, published in 1940, which claimed that “no man is 
free to teach objective falsehood simply because subjectively he fancies it to be the truth. 
In questions of fact there is no such thing as academic freedom.”22 
The curriculum at many Catholic institutions, then, was confidently based on the 
idea that the Catholic tradition had already thought things through, and students were to 
be brought up to speed with what the church already knew. The bedrock of this 
confidence was the neo-Scholastic revival which had been underway since the middle of 
the 19th century. Drawing heavily from the thought of Aquinas (as well as, to varying 
degrees, the other schoolmen), neo-Scholasticism offered a synthesis of faith and reason 
that was part philosophical and part theological in its orientation. Asserting that God’s 
existence was provable by reason and that the human mind was fully capable of 
“(arriving) at objective truth through the direct intuitions of the intellect and the exercise 
of discursive reason,” the quasi-official status of neo-Scholasticism ensured that Catholic 
higher education would often seem (especially to outsiders) to be little more than 
indoctrination.23 Rather than promoting innovation, the general approach to education by 
 
Catholic scholars “in the first half of the twentieth century was one of apologetics; every 
 
21. Alice Gallin, O.S.U., Negotiating Identity: Catholic Higher Education since 1960 (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 1. 
22. Ibid, 5. 
23. Philip Gleason, Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 118. 
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new scientific or literary discovery had to be reconciled with an already defined 
‘truth.’”24 
The 1960’s, however, saw both a new understanding of freedom as well as the 
collapse of the neo-Scholastic synthesis on Catholic campuses. This collapse, described 
by Walter Kasper as “the outstanding event in the Catholic theology of our century,” was, 
in retrospect, inevitable.25 Though there had been, in various intervals, a good deal of 
criticism leveled against Catholic institutions for the prevalence of neo-Scholasticism on 
its campuses, Philip Gleason argues that “The changes that mattered most were internal 
to the Catholic subculture…”26 Such changes were no doubt accelerated at least in part 
due to the significant increase in the accessibility of a college education for Catholics 
welcomed home from the Second World War by the G.I. Bill. Already in the 1950’s, 
Catholic dissatisfaction with the synthesis steadily rose. Gleason lists “the way Neo- 
Scholasticism was taught; tensions arising from the diversity of Neo-Scholastic schools 
of thought; and increasing discontent at ecclesiastical authoritarianism” as the factors that 
led to the collapse.27 
This last factor was not limited to dissatisfaction with neo-Scholasticism. Gleason 
 
rightly posits that “freedom became the central theme in American Catholic higher 
education in the early 1960s.”28 Catholic scholars in many disciplines brought their 
understanding of academic freedom, gained at the (probably) secular institutions where 
24. Gallin, 3. 
25. Robert Imbelli, “Theologians and Bishops,” in Theological Education in the Catholic 
Tradition, ed. Patrick W. Carey and Earl C. Muller (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997), 
223. 
26. Gleason, 298. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid, 305. 
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they earned their advanced degrees, to the Catholic campuses where they taught. Truly, 
freedom was very much a theme of the 1960s in general, as demonstrated by the potency 
of the Civil Rights Movement in that decade. Combine this emphasis with the anti- 
authoritarian sentiment that was helped along significantly by American involvement in 
Vietnam, and it is easy to see looking back that many of the elements needed for a shift, 
or even a showdown of sorts, were in place. The opening of windows initiated by Pope 
John XXIII at Vatican II seemed to many to be an official sanctioning of a new 
understanding of freedom by the very top echelons of the Church. 
Though there was no single moment in the 1960s that represented the end or 
beginning of a new era, it is nevertheless possible to trace a series of events that are 
representative of the changing climate on Catholic campuses. One of the key turning 
points was no doubt the decision made in 1963 by the rector of Catholic University of 
America, Monsignor William J. McDonald, to restrict four liberal theologians from 
speaking on campus. In a short period of time, McDonald received criticism from within 
and without the Church. There was already in 1963, then, a growing expectation on 
Catholic campuses that decisions affecting freedom on campus would not be made 
behind closed doors, whether administrators were clergy or not.29 
Faculty concerns regarding their perceived lack of influence over institutional 
decision-making (which seemed contrary to the spirit and letter of Vatican II) came to a 
head in several highly-publicized encounters, notably at St. John’s University in 1965 and 
at Catholic University of America in 1967. The case at Catholic University revolved 
 
29. Ibid, 306. 
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around the moral theologian Charles Curran, whose contract would be allowed to lapse in 
August of that year as a result of a vote by the board of trustees. In what has been 
described as a coup, the various faculties of Catholic University (except the School of 
Education) refused to teach until Curran’s contract was renewed. In a move 
inconceivable even a decade earlier, the board of trustees, which consisted entirely of 
bishops, relented, reinstated Curran, and even promoted him to the rank of associate 
professor.30 Unquestionably, Catholic higher education had entered something of an 
identity crisis. Booming enrollments, energy that was high as a result of the Second 
Vatican Council, and subsequent efforts to increase lay participation in the governance of 
Catholic universities all contributed to it. 
Also in 1967 were the first steps taken to lessen the influence of the religious 
orders that had founded many of the Catholic institutions in the United States. As 
enrollments grew and administrative challenges increased, it became apparent that these 
challenges often required talent and experience that many of the religious orders could 
not provide. Only by increasing the number of laypersons on boards of trustees, 
laypersons with significant track records in business, law, and other professional 
disciplines, could these schools hope to secure a brighter future. Any canonical 
complications with this process were bypassed (or ignored) due to the persuasiveness of 
John McGrath, a canon lawyer at Catholic University, who asserted that religious 
communities were not the legal owners of the properties and other assets of the colleges. 
Since these things were held in trust by the boards of trustees, these institutions were 
30. Peter M. Mitchell, The Coup at Catholic University: The 1968 Revolution in American 
Catholic Education (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2015), 55. 
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simply not ecclesiastical property.31 Armed with the so-called ‘McGrath Thesis,’ Notre 
Dame and St. Louis each initiated the process of separate incorporation, thereby limiting 
the influence of their founding congregations, in January 1967.32 
Such innovations were undoubtedly demonstrations of a strong lay commitment 
to Catholic higher education, and the decrease in clergy and religious on boards of 
trustees made it easier for Catholic institutions to justify their reception of federal aid, 
without which many Catholic schools may have disappeared in the leaner years of the 
early 1970s. They were also, however, causes of consternation to those who questioned 
an institution’s ability to maintain a vibrant Catholic identity with laypersons at the helm 
(though many schools maintained roles, sometimes prominent ones, for their sponsoring 
communities). Additionally, there were also more basic questions of whether the term 
Catholic could be a meaningful descriptor for an institution of higher learning in the first 
place. Such questions had been raised often enough by non-Catholics and could therefore 
be shrugged off as the products of anti-Catholic prejudice, but it was much harder to 
ignore these questions when the people asking them were Catholic themselves. In 1967, 
John Cogley questioned the future, and perhaps even the legitimacy of a Catholic 
university, claiming that a day would come when they would “seem as anachronistic as 
the papal states.”33 Acting along similar assumptions but unwilling to passively let 
 
Catholics secularize in due course, Sister Jacqueline Grennan, S.L., president of Webster 
College, not only handed control of the college to a lay board of trustees, but left her 
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religious order so as to focus on running the “secular or semi-secular institution.”34 With 
such perspectives being circulated publicly, if not popularly, steps needed to be taken in 
order to discover what a Catholic institution might be in a post-Council, post-separate 
incorporation context. 
Build-up to Ex Corde Ecclesiae 
That a pope in the late 20th century should write an apostolic constitution on 
Catholic Higher Education should hardly be surprising, given what has been described 
above. Indeed, what would eventually be Pope John Paul II’s Ex Corde Ecclesiae (Ex 
Corde) can be seen as the culmination of more than two decades of dialogue among those 
interested in and responsible for the Catholic identity of Catholic higher learning, within 
the American context but also everywhere else. The American contribution to the 
discussion was never monolithic, but an excellent place to begin surveying the history is 
the Land O’Lakes Statement of 1967. Meeting at a property owned by Notre Dame in 
northern Wisconsin were “twenty-six persons representing nine major Catholic 
universities, members of the episcopacy, and well-known scholars and leaders of 
religious communities.”35 The statement released by those present is famous for its claim 
 
that “institutional autonomy and academic freedom are essential conditions of life and 
growth and indeed of survival for Catholic universities as for all universities.”36 Just as 
Vatican II blurred the boundary between the church and ‘the world,’ Land O’Lakes did 
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something to lessen the distinctions between Catholic and secular higher learning. 
Gleason has described it as “a declaration of independence from the hierarchy…”37 The 
Land O’Lakes Statement gave assurances that the Catholic university would remain 
“specifically Catholic in profound and creative ways for the service of society and the 
people of God,” but this brief document certainly raised as many questions as it 
answered.38 
The 1968 meeting of the International Federation of Catholic Universities in 
Kinshasa can be seen as a foreshadowing of the tensions to come between the American 
experience and the desire of Catholics elsewhere (including but not limited to Rome) for 
a clearly-defined, juridical relationship between Catholic institutions and the church 
hierarchy. Whereas Kinshasa echoed Land O’Lakes in its emphasis on the importance of 
theology, noticeably absent were any mention of autonomy or academic freedom.39 A 
 
subsequent meeting in Rome the following year, hosted by the Congregation for Catholic 
Education, explored the very issues of freedom and autonomy left open by Land O’Lakes 
and ignored by Kinshasa. This meeting had a significant impact on the dialogue up to and 
including Ex Corde, and in the discussions “we can almost hear the American delegates 
trying to explain the independence of their institutions, newly reflected in the transfer of 
governance to boards of trustees no longer directly linked to the authority of the religious 
community.”40 Though the American insistence on autonomy and freedom no doubt 
 
sounded dangerous to Rome, and the Roman insistence on straightforward definitions of 
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juridical clarity may have sounded like little more than a power grab to Americans, the 
vigorous dialogue taking place certainly indicates some willingness to learn on both 
sides. 
Making it difficult to speak of a clear division between the American and Roman 
‘sides’ of the conversation, however, was the lack of uniformity behind what is meant by 
both ‘American’ and ‘Roman.’ Though an organization like the National Catholic 
Education Association might legitimately represent the mainstream of American Catholic 
thinking, equally articulate voices took a very different perspective, which ensured that, 
oftentimes, “Rome received contradictory messages from these two groups.”41 Similarly, 
 
‘Rome’ cannot be reduced to any single office or Congregation, either. The face-to-face 
conversations between church delegates and American educators were often warm and 
productive, but these delegates may not have had any more influence over official church 
positions than canon lawyers, who might fairly be expected to insist on stricter definitions 
of the relationship between religious orders and institutional governance, bishops and 
theologians, etc. 
Another meeting held in Rome, this time in 1972, under both the Congregation 
for Catholic Education as well as the International Federation of Catholic Universities, 
did much to relieve American concerns, acknowledging the great diversity amongst 
institutions of Catholic higher learning throughout the world, as well as the importance of 
both autonomy and academic freedom. Realizing a particular sticking point was 
theologians’ academic freedom, this meeting’s final document, “The Catholic University 
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in the Modern World,” quoted Paul VI: “The Magisterium knows that without the help of 
theology it could no doubt preserve and teach the faith, but it would hardly attain to that 
degree of richness and depth which it needs in order to accomplish its task fully.”42 
Perhaps even more importantly, this document also gave a powerful affirmation of the 
freedom of theologians, saying that they “must be free to question, to develop their 
hypotheses, to search for more adequate interpretations and formulations, to publish and 
defend their views on a scholarly level, and to study theological sources, including 
pronouncements of the teaching Church, with the full freedom of scholarly research.”43 
As Monika Hellwig has observed, “no subsequent official document has explicitly 
acknowledged such a clear statement of the academic freedom of the theologian.”44 Also 
examined at this meeting were when and how a local bishop might challenge the work of 
an individual theologian. Any intervention on the part of “ecclesiastical authority should 
respect the statutes and regulations of the institution as well as accepted academic 
procedures.”45 It seems occasionally, at least, America and Rome could reach an 
understanding. 
Such moments of mutual respect and understanding, however, seemed destined to 
be temporary. In 1974 Cardinal Garrone of the Congregation for Catholic Education 
wrote a letter to the American bishops, expressing concern over the trend toward separate 
incorporation amongst American Catholic institutions, asking why these schools were 
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being ‘given away,’ and whether their lay boards of trustees meant that they were, in fact, 
not Catholic anymore. After the conference in Rome in 1972, this letter was insulting to 
some American Catholic educators.46 For others, any scrutiny of American Catholic 
higher education was a welcome development. Individuals such as Dr. S. Thomas 
Greenburg of the Institute for Catholic Higher Education “believed that the Catholic 
colleges were indeed on the way to the loss of their Catholic identity and had absorbed 
the secularist philosophy surrounding them in American higher education.”47 The 
formation of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars in 1977 similarly signaled the existence 
of a significant bloc of Catholic thinkers who dissented from the NCEA’s optimistic 
assessment of the situation (regarding Catholic identity) on Catholic campuses. 
Therefore, the dialogue continued, alternating between periods of respectful productivity 
and stalemate driven by suspicion. 
Pope John Paul II, elected in 1978, determined early in his papacy to bring clarity 
to the discussion through the issuing of an official papal document on Catholic higher 
education. In 1980, the Congregation for Catholic Education began the project that would 
culminate a decade later with Ex Corde Ecclesiae. The pope’s own career as a university 
professor gave him a good understanding of the issues being discussed, but the 1985 
schema sent to Catholic professors, presidents, and bishops nevertheless sparked 
significant discussion. Gallin asserts that the high number of norms proposed in this early 
version of the apostolic constitution (49 separate injunctions) “indicated the overriding 
concern of the Roman hierarchy for particular ways that bishops could control the life of 
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the university.”48 An additional draft, circulated in 1988, was highly touted by many in 
American Catholic higher education. Hellwig states simply that “There was nothing in 
this draft that would be unworkable in the US context.” In particular, noticeably absent 
was any mention whatsoever of the canonical requirement for teachers of theology to 
receive a mandate from the local bishop. Interestingly, by the finished product of Ex 
Corde in 1990, this 1988 draft had “disappeared without a trace.”49 
In the meantime, the pope had certainly given American Catholic academics 
reason for optimism regarding the impending apostolic constitution. In September 1987, 
Pope John Paul II had addressed a gathering of leaders of Catholic higher education at 
Xavier University of Louisiana, expressing a profound respect and admiration for the 
work being done in American Catholic institutions. Especially noteworthy was the pope’s 
praise of American Catholic universities specifically in the area of Catholic identity: 
“…let us be thankful for the special strengths of your schools—for their Catholic identity, 
for their service of truth, and for their role in helping to make the Church’s presence felt 
in the world of culture and science. And let us be thankful above all for the men and 
women committed to this mission…”50 The pope’s gratitude and his apparent 
 
understanding of the uniqueness of the American context did much to allay fears 
regarding the upcoming apostolic exhortation. 
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Ex Corde Ecclesiae 
The long-anticipated apostolic constitution was promulgated in 1990, after years 
of build-up. The document is divided into two parts, with the first being a description of 
and reflection on the nature and importance of Catholic higher education. Rejecting the 
idea that Catholic universities are inherently hampered by any claims to unique access to 
truth that the church might make, John Paul II asserted that “a Catholic University is 
distinguished by its free search for the whole truth about nature, man and God.”51 In a 
similar vein, though much closer to the questions about freedom that many American 
Catholics were asking, was the pope’s promise that a Catholic university “possesses 
institutional autonomy necessary to perform its functions effectively and guarantees its 
members academic freedom,” with the understanding this freedom must necessarily be 
understood in the “confines of the truth and the common good.”52 
The initial reaction to Ex Corde was decidedly positive. In her initial response to 
the constitution, Gallin stated that “There are no surprises. We were not anxiously 
looking for any document, but if there had to be one, this is as good as we could get.”53 
At the very least it is clear that Ex Corde did much to stimulate discussion on Catholic 
higher education, despite the vibrant dialogue that had taken place on precisely that 
subject since at least the Second Vatican Council. As Hellwig notes, in the wake of the 
promulgation, “conferences were held about the Constitution, lectures were given, groups 
studied it, all with considerable enthusiasm...The general consensus was that the 
philosophy of Catholic higher education and of the research potential of the institutions 
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as presented in Part I was very positive and inspirational and would be helpful...There 
was also an optimistic sense that the General Norms posed no threat to the 
institutions….”54 
The misgivings that remained were focused primarily on the second part of the 
apostolic constitution, the General Norms. Particularly troubling was the cautionary 
statement that “Catholic theologians, aware that they fulfil a mandate received from the 
Church, are to be faithful to the Magisterium of the Church as the authentic interpreter of 
Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition.”55 The notion of a mandate (or mandatum) as a 
requirement for Catholic theologians teaching Catholic theology in Catholic institutions 
 
became law for the universal church only as recently as 1983, when a revised edition of 
canon law stipulated that “It is necessary that those who teach theological disciplines in 
any institute of higher studies have a mandate from the competent ecclesiastical 
authority.”56 Though the concept of the mandate had already evolved throughout the 
process of the canon law revision as well as the drafting period of Ex Corde itself, it 
remained unclear exactly how well it would mesh with the American Academy’s 
cherished value of academic freedom. Overall, however, the stipulation in the General 
Norms that all of the norms “be applied concretely at the local and regional levels by 
Episcopal Conferences and other Assemblies of Catholic Hierarchy…”seemed to account 
for the uniqueness of the American context.57 
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Ex Corde in America 
With the responsibility for implementing Ex Corde in America squarely on the 
shoulders of the American bishops, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops set up a 
committee consisting of bishops and college presidents to create a list of guidelines to be 
voted on by the NCCB general assembly, and subsequently sent to Rome for final 
approval. David O’Brien suggests that “the sigh of relief” immediately following the 
promulgation of Ex Corde “was followed by renewed alarm,” however, significant efforts 
were made to bring bishops and administrators of local Catholic institutions together.58 
Such meetings, Hellwig observes, “seemed to add warmth and reduce the tension…”59 
Though there were legitimate reasons for uncertainty regarding the mandate, the 
 
American bishops have oftentimes demonstrated a keen understanding of Catholic higher 
education in America as it is distinctive from Catholic higher education elsewhere. It is 
hard to find any serious indication that an episcopal takeover of Catholic institutions was 
forthcoming. O’Brien relates how, at a 1994 discussion at a meeting of presidents, Bishop 
John Leibrecht (Springfield-Cape Girardeau) “reported that the bishops had no desire to 
interfere in the internal governance of the schools. They hoped to preserve the ‘informal 
and dialogical’ relationship of the recent past.”60 This sentiment is far more a nod to the 
 
status quo than it is an example of the bishops’ unwillingness to fight over Ex Corde. 
Even in the dynamic era of the Council American bishops had recognized a level of 
autonomy in Catholic institutions. 
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In 1963, Francis Cardinal Spellman began an argument with the Sacred 
Congregation in Rome over the awarding of honorary degrees that would take two years 
to resolve. Spellman affirmed the Catholic identity of institutions in the United States 
while simultaneously acknowledging that “they should be free to follow their own 
traditions and in common with other universities, govern their institutions in accordance 
with their own rules.”61 Even in the midst of a relatively highly-publicized inquiry 
regarding possible heresy in the philosophy department at the University of Dayton, 
“ecclesiastical authority did not intrude into the working of the structures within the 
university.”62 With such precedents in mind it is easier to understand that, when the 
bishops overwhelmingly approved a draft of ordinances in 1996 that tabled the mandate 
for further discussion, they were, by and large, recognizing legitimate concerns of 
American Catholic institutions. The passing of the 1996 draft was celebrated as a 
“conclusion of the process in a manner that would not prejudice the standing and survival 
of the US Catholic institutions.”63 
The back and forth between Rome and America, however, was not finished. 
 
Rome’s response, which came to the NCCB in the summer of 1997, was critical of the 
American ordinances, largely for not being juridical enough. The issue of the mandate 
was, again, center stage. With mounting pressure from Rome, the American bishops set 
up a committee to explore “how the Roman requirements might best be met with the least 
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damage to the status of the US schools.”64 Despite O’Brien’s observation that “the 
American hierarchy was changing as Pope John Paul appointed more conservative men to 
key sees,”65 the bishops’ reception of the committee’s proposal again showed great 
sensitivity to the specifics of the American context. The American bishops, it seemed, 
were required to find some synthesis of the Roman and American positions. 
In November of 1999, the NCCB approved The Application of Ex Corde 
Ecclesiae for the United States, with the expectation that it would become law in May of 
2001. This approval came after a full year of spirited discussion, both within and without 
the Bishops Conference. A proposal discussed by the bishops the previous November had 
been heavily criticized, with Bishops D’Arcy (Fort Wayne-South Bend), Weakland 
(Milwaukee), and Quinn (San Francisco) all among the notable advocates of a less 
juridical, more informal approach with an eye on maintaining the status quo in terms of 
the relationship between bishops and university administrators. Some university 
presidents, similarly, had voiced strong opposition to the current proposal. Edward 
Malloy, president of Notre Dame, and J. Donald Monan, S.J., former president of Boston 
College, proudly stated that “so many productive activities are taking place on Catholic 
campuses today and in dialogue with local bishops,” but lamented that “it would be 
tragic” if the proposal “were to result in driving (the church and the universities) apart.”66 
Malloy and Monan claimed the bishops had ignored the prescription of Ex Corde 
 
to “(take) into account the Statutes of each University or Institute and, as far as possible 
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and appropriate, civil law.”67 The resistance of these two prominent leaders of American 
Catholic higher education rested on what they saw as a grave challenge to academic 
freedom, namely, the mandate. Regardless of how the bishops defined the mandate, 
Malloy and Monan saw it as little more than “an instrument, however ineffective, to 
control what is taught and written.”68 
The bishops were clearly in a difficult position. On one hand, they recognized 
 
they each had a pastoral responsibility for the authenticity of Catholic teaching within his 
diocese. On the other, there was also a clear desire to preserve the best of what was 
distinctive about American universities: autonomy and freedom. In “The Application for 
Ex Corde Ecclesiae for the United States,” the bishops affirmed that “Academic freedom 
is an essential component of a Catholic university.” More strikingly, the integrity of that 
freedom on Catholic campuses was made a direct responsibility of the bishops 
themselves: “…the diocesan bishop has the duty to recognize and promote the rightful 
academic freedom of professors in Catholic universities in their search for truth.”69 Later 
in the “Application,” the bishops nevertheless included the requirement for the mandate, 
going to great lengths to minimize the potential outcry. In the hope of making it as 
palatable as possible, the bishops declared that the mandate “should not be construed as 
an appointment, authorization, delegation, or approbation of one’s teaching by Church 
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authorities. Those who have received a mandatum teach in their own name…not in the 
name of the Bishop or of the Church’s magisterium.”70 
Despite the bishops’ significant softening of the language regarding the mandate 
found in canon law and Ex Corde, some in American Catholic theology were not pleased. 
Controversial theologian Daniel Maguire wrote in an open letter to Archbishop Rembert 
Weakland that he simply “will not request either a mandate or an ecclesial blessing…”71 
Believing the process for granting the mandatum required a level of theological 
competence that many bishops simply did not possess, Maguire characterized the “spirit 
and purpose” of Ex Corde as an attempt “to reverse the freedom that came to Catholic 
theology before and during the Second Vatican Council.”72 Preferring the oversight of 
academic peers to that of theologically amateurish bishops, Maguire, in a rhetorical 
flourish, claimed that Ex Corde “slips into magic, implying as it does that nontheologian 
bishops will be miraculously endowed with divine inspiration to make up for their lack of 
expertise…”73 
Moving Forward on the Mandate 
 
Maguire, in making the claim that theologians represent a kind of parallel 
magisterium, focusing on the academic while the bishops focus only on the pastoral, 
overlooks whatever pastoral responsibility the bishops might have for Catholic students 
attending Catholic campuses. At the very least, Joseph Bellacosa is on the right track 
when he argues that, despite the varied areas of expertise of the bishops, they are 
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“entitled…to a presumption of respect for intellectual, honest and conscientious exertion 
in the fulfillment of their responsibilities and ministries.”74 Admittedly, there may well be 
an inherent tension between theologians and bishops, regardless of the loyalty of the 
individual theologian. Robert Imbelli has argued that, insofar as the bishops are 
responsible for “a concern not to adulterate sound teaching with merely human fantasies 
and fables,” and theologians are charged with promoting “the ongoing appropriation of 
faith’s understanding that can lead the whole Church to authentic doctrinal development,” 
it is not surprising that “bishops embody a more conservative interest and theologians a 
more progressive one.”75 
Though Imbelli confirms that there is, nevertheless, overlap between the functions 
 
of bishops and theologians, he is in very good company in his rejection of the idea that 
the office of the bishop somehow overshadows or dominates that of the theologian. No 
less prominent a theologian than Joseph Ratzinger declares that “Theology is not simply 
and exclusively an ancillary function of the Magisterium…”76 Regarding the tension that 
necessarily exists between the hierarchy and theologians, Ratzinger, with no small 
measure of hopefulness, rightly asserts that “These tensions…can be productive, 
provided that each side sustains them in the recognition that its function is intrinsically 
ordered to that of the other.”77 
 
 
 
74. Joseph W. Bellacosa, “Ex Corde Ecclesiae: Reflections, Perspectives, and Proposals,” The 
Catholic Lawyer 40 (Spring 2001), 315. 
75. Imbelli, 231. 
76. Joseph Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 
104. 
77. Ibid, 106. 
31 
 
 
 
Where does this leave the American church regarding the mandate? It is important 
to have a theory of what the co-existence of bishops and theologians for the betterment of 
the church should be like. The potential problems regarding the mandate, however, will 
only prove solvable or insurmountable in the context of fruitful or dismal relationships 
between real people. As Ratzinger noted, the “problems lie in the concrete.”78 As the 
American bishops discovered from their vantage point between the Vatican and the 
American academy, the post-Ex Corde concrete includes the mandate. James Heft 
recalled the Archbishop of Cincinnati telling the faculty at the University of Dayton, 
quite simply, that “There is no debate as to whether or not we will have the mandatum. 
The question we are now facing is ‘how best can we make it work?’”79 Heft was very 
hopeful that the incorporation of the mandate into the life of the Catholic university will 
have multiple positive results. Heft believed Catholic theologians need to be reminded 
“theology is not exactly like most other disciplines, and that a genuine…relationship to 
the faith of the larger Church articulated by the bishops constitutes an integral part 
of…Catholic theology.”80 Additionally, Heft was hopeful that the implementation of the 
 
mandate requirement may very well improve Catholic understanding of due process, 
which would no doubt ultimately do much to protect the rights of theologians. 
Understanding the mandate as “a statement of personal relationship between the 
bishop and the individual theologian” and a sign the individual theologian is in full 
communion with the church, Heft believed, fairly, that one of the crucial requirements on 
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the part of theologians is an awareness of the pastoral implications of their work. 
Ultimately, Catholic theologians “should not want to teach Catholic theology except in 
communion with the Church, with or without a mandatum.”81 All things considered, 
though the theologian is free to present any of a number of points of view in her 
classroom, she is nevertheless required by her mandate merely “to present as Catholic 
teaching what is Catholic teaching…”82 That this is a decidedly reasonable expectation, 
and would not be the catalyst of any major crackdown on American theologians seems to 
be confirmed by experience. In June 2012, in their assessment of the implementation of 
Ex Corde over the previous ten years, the bishops acknowledged that, thought there was 
still work to be done, “our institutions have made definite progress in advancing Catholic 
identity.”83 The mandatum was not mentioned once. 
The Continuation of Debate 
 
For some, it may be tempting to conclude that the spirited debates surrounding the 
implementation of Ex Corde Ecclesiae have finally died down after reaching some kind 
of equilibrium. For others, however, the quieting of the storm is due less to a finding of 
equilibrium than it is to one ‘side’ being wearied by a never-ending series of setbacks. As 
conservative Catholic scholar Anne Hendershott proclaims, “The contentious battles that 
once surrounded the release of Pope John Paul’s 1990 apostolic constitution on Catholic 
higher education have ended as college presidents quietly refused to implement it, and 
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many of the bishops were reluctant to require it. Most seem to have abandoned the 
fight.”84 For Hendershott, the last half century has been a bleak chapter in the history of 
American Catholic higher education, marked by an ever increasing lack of interest in 
authentic Catholic identity. As she sees it, Catholic institutions have largely been single- 
minded in their desire to emulate the elite amongst their secular peers. As a result, 
distinctive Catholic identity has been crushed under the weight of trendier academic 
currents that have been, often enough, downright antagonistic toward the Church and its 
teaching. As Hendershott sees it, “The students have paid the highest price.”85 While they 
should have been guaranteed the chance to engage with Catholic doctrine during their 
time on a Catholic campus, Hendershott fears instead that those who should have been 
most responsible for handing on the Catholic tradition have given pupils a watered down 
education marred by relativism, materialism, and otherwise immoral perspectives. 
Hendershott is a credentialed scholar who publishes well-documented work. It 
can be, though, easy to dismiss a good deal of what she writes as reactionary or 
unrealistic. For instance, Hendershott believes that the Church is not so much in conflict 
with ‘the world’ as it is in a fight for its very survival with a fifth column dedicated to its 
destruction, or at least its radical redefinition. She points to “a war between those who are 
dedicated to the negation of the authority of scripture and the hierarchy of the Church, 
and those who are proposing a renaissance of the Catholic intellect and a renewed 
appreciation for the continued contributions of the Catholic Church itself.86 As a 
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sociologist, Hendershott can be forgiven for having only a layman’s grasp of the diversity 
of legitimate ecclesiological perspectives in today’s Church. And yet, when she accuses 
thinkers such as retired Archbishop John R. Quinn of having made suggestions which 
“would bring the Catholic Church in line with most Protestant denominations and 
radically weaken the papacy” simply for advocating “decreased papal authority, 
decentralization, more control granted to bishops, and parishioner involvement in the 
selection of bishops,” it seems Hendershott is after distinctiveness for the sake of 
distinctiveness instead of a distinctive Catholicity.87 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that a scholar like Hendershott is 
entirely missing the mark in her criticisms of the Catholic higher education. She is on 
some solid footing when she questions the dedication of many Catholic institutions to 
offering opportunities for remedial religious instruction for their undergraduates. 
Additionally, she is right to laud a sentiment expressed by Gerald Bradley on the question 
of balancing a search for truth with the conviction that truth is something that had already 
been revealed: “Is it not intuitively more likely and does not experience confirm that 
where there is no truth there is more likely to be manipulation? Where there is no truth 
there can be no genuine common good. There can only be shifting consensus about this 
or that, implying that ‘right’ and wrong’ manifest not things as they are, but interpersonal 
power relations. This field is ripe for indoctrination.”88 
 
That there is more work to be done in the area of Catholic institutional identity is 
made clearer still by the very public uproars prompted in the past decade by the presence 
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of controversial speakers on Catholic campuses. After President Barack Obama gave the 
commencement address at the University of Notre Dame and was also honored with an 
honorary degree, significant criticism was leveled against the University due largely to 
Obama’s pro-choice position on abortion. Charles E. Rice, professor emeritus of law at 
Notre Dame, wrote an entire book complaining that Obama’s honor represented an 
abdication of the University’s responsibility to uphold Church teaching. For Rice, this 
was not an isolated, poor decision but rather the latest in a long descent away from 
Catholic identity and toward blatant secularization: “The Obama Commencement was a 
culmination of the autonomy process begun at Land O’Lakes in 1967.” For the local 
episcopal authority (Bishop D’Arcy of Fort Wayne-South Bend), the event marked the 
opening of a “terrible breach which has taken place between Notre Dame and the 
Church.”89 
In 2016, Notre Dame courted controversy again when Vice President Joseph 
Biden and former House Speaker John Boehner were jointly awarded the University’s 
prestigious Laetare Medal for their public service, commitment to civility in public 
discourse, and willingness to engage with the party across the aisle from themselves. 
Whereas an opinion piece in The Washington Post hailed the decision a means of 
honoring “political civility,”90 many from within the American Church were less pleased. 
 
National Catholic Register complained that the decision was a “whispered…profession 
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of Notre Dame’s pro-choice creed.”91 Again, the local Bishop, Kevin C. Rhoades of Fort 
Wayne-South Bend, advised the University not to honor Biden, who is pro-choice. 
Catholic News Service noted that many Catholics had reservations about awarding 
Boehner and/or Biden.92 
Even institutions without the national reputation of Notre Dame have provoked 
the ire of many Catholics through their decisions to host certain speakers. Wisconsin’s St. 
Norbert College has invited two speakers just in the past few years who have proven 
controversial to a national Catholic audience. In 2015, noted feminist activist and author 
Gloria Steinem was invited to campus for a public dialogue with author bell hooks. In 
2016, then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump was given a campus venue for a 
campaign speech. Though the College has typically declared that such invitations are 
simply a manifestation of ‘radical Norbertine hospitality,’ many in the American Church 
were appalled. While op-eds were written both in favor and in opposition to each 
speaker’s presence on a Catholic campus, the petitions circulated online to stop each 
event indicate deep-seated disagreement over the proper role of a Catholic 
college/university. Reflecting on the Trump visit, St. Norbert President Tom Kunkel 
posited that “Our hospitality does not mean we endorse a given candidate or his or her 
views. We simply see our role as helping facilitate these important exercises in 
democracy….Trump’s visit has sparked countless meaty conversations and mobilized 
hundreds of students, as everyone used the occasion to deeply appraise the leading 
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Republican candidate and his views. And that, I think, is a big part of what a college is 
supposed to do.”93 Prior to the Steinem visit, however, the organization TFP Student 
Action launched an online protest, claiming that “This issue is not about academic 
freedom. This issue is all about being faithful to God. About being true to our baptismal 
vows.”94 
Similar examples could easily be noted. What should be clear is that there is, even 
nearly three decades since Ex Corde’s promulgation, no consensus on the proper 
orientation of a Catholic university between the Church and world that has permeated all 
levels of the American Church itself. Even if a vast majority of Catholics in the Academy 
are agreed that the Catholic university needs to be a place of dialogue with the broader 
culture for the benefit of both the Church and the world, it is also clear that those same 
Catholic academics have an obligation to consider the impact on the Catholic faithful of 
Catholic universities. All Catholic universities would list alumni, students, parents, 
faculty, staff, members of the board, and the founding religious congregations among 
their stakeholders. It is important that the Body of Christ—the Church in all its variety— 
not be left off that list. What is needed, here, is a final consideration of what the Church 
needs its universities to be. From there, it will be clearer what the role of the Catholic 
scholar has to be. Then, and only then, will it be possible to consider how (or even 
whether) such a scholar can be hospitable toward perspectives outside—or even 
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antagonistic toward—the Church while remaining rooted in the Church’s tradition at the 
same time. 
The Church’s Need for Hospitable Catholic Universities 
 
The story of the first Christian Pentecost has long been suggested as the beginning 
of the church. The story of a crowd made up of speakers of various foreign tongues, 
united miraculously through their ability to understand the preaching of the Gospel 
offered by the disciples, points decisively toward the unifying impact the Good News of 
Christ is intended to have on the world. Read as an inversion of the Tower of Babel story 
from Genesis 11, one might see that the church is indeed charged with working to 
overcome the disruptive impacts of sin that have hampered humanity since Eden. Such 
conclusions about the church’s intended, unifying impact on the whole of humanity have 
cast a long shadow over the theology of the past. Without question, a significant portion 
of the church’s history has been dominated by theological reflection that sought to 
emphasize the faith’s ability to transcend any and all human boundaries. As Edward 
Schillebeeckx posits, “Previously, one almost took for granted that the theology of the 
Western churches was supraregional and was, precisely in its Western form, universal 
and therefore directly accessible for persons from other cultures.”95 
Unfortunately, any theology generated in an exclusively Western context proved 
ultimately incapable of being truly universal in its appeal. These earlier, universal 
reflections simply did not “take up the issues that were the most pressing in many local 
circumstances: the burden of poverty and oppression, the struggle to create a new identity 
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after a colonial past, or the question of how to meet the challenge of modernization and 
the commodification of the economy in traditional culture and village life.” Instead, “The 
universal theologies were preoccupied with issues not even being raised in local 
situations, such as the problem of atheism or secularization.” Any attempts at imposing 
such theologies on the entirety of the universal church as normative were destined to fail: 
“In each case the universal theology turned out to be less than universal…”96 
The church was in dire need, then, of substantial local theologies that might help 
it fulfill its evangelical mission within the various cultural contexts that had proven 
resistant (for whatever reason) to these earlier universal theologies. Not surprisingly, the 
initial efforts by some theologians to address this need were not always well-received. As 
Robert Schreiter recalls, “The fledgling contextual theologies were frequently dismissed 
in Western academic settings as feeble and immature steps on the way to the 
development of a real theology, that is, a critical, rational theology that rose above the 
immediate situation to speak universally of God and God’s action in history.”97 
There is good reason to be optimistic about the continued/future potential for the 
development of local theologies through continued Catholic attention to the engagement 
between culture and church. Rausch believes that “The Roman Catholic Church offers an 
example of a world communion with the structures necessary to maintain and express the 
communion of a world Church as a communion of communions that would be truly 
catholic. The challenge is maintaining the proper relationship between the local and the 
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global, the particular and the universal.”98 This is true enough, and the historical 
experience of the church ought to provide many helpful precedents as this process 
continues. As Richard Gaillardetz helpfully suggests, “One should recall that for the first 
two centuries of Christianity, there was no universally agreed upon canon of Scripture, no 
developed creed, no universally accepted organizational structures, no standard liturgical 
books. Yet in the midst of this widespread diversity, Christians still believed themselves 
to be united in faith.”99 In more recent history, Yves Congar has noted the relatively 
significant differences between Eastern and Western ‘modes of theologizing: “The East 
takes its stand on the Fathers and the Ecumenical Councils, which have stated the 
essentials. Philosophy and reasoning serve for training theologians and for discussion; 
not, as in Latin Scholasticism, to extend doctrine by new conclusions. Furthermore, there 
is little or no reference to a central magisterium…” Nevertheless, Congar still concludes 
with confidence that after “More than fifty years of careful study, numerous contacts and 
a good deal of reading,” “at the sacramental level, i.e. where the supernatural mystery is 
expressed in our world, East and West are the same Church.”100 
At all times, though, the broad sweep of the Catholic tradition cannot be seen as 
secondary to the development of local theologies. Robert Schreiter has argued strongly 
on precisely this point: “Any local theology that is truly Christian has to be engaged with 
the tradition, however a church might understand that tradition: the Scriptures, great 
conciliar and confessional statements, the magisterium. Without that engagement, there is 
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no guarantee of being part of the Christian heritage.”101 The Catholic university needs to 
contribute to this engagement. A university by its very definition attempts to bring all 
domains of the human knowledge into conversation with one another. The various 
departments on a Catholic university campus can contribute mightily to the engagement 
with cultures required to develop local theologies, while simultaneously safeguarding the 
integrity of the Catholic tradition that needs to challenge and be challenged by that 
engagement. 
Catholic Intellectual Life 
 
At this point, having seen the ecclesiological need for universities capable of 
assisting the Church in its post-Vatican II mission, it is possible and worthwhile to make 
several remarks on the origin, nature, and significance of the Catholic intellectual life. 
First, both Scripture and the historical experiences of Christians testify to the need for a 
vibrant intellectual component in the life of the Church. In Matthew’s Gospel, Christ 
instructs the Pharisees that a part of the ‘Greatest Commandment’ is the need to love God 
“with all your mind.”102 Far more recently, Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Fides et Ratio 
has pointed to the divine origin of humanity’s desire to know, which is (in the words of 
Paula Powell Sapienza) “a gift that comes from God’s own desire to be known.”103 The 
Gospel according to John, in its identification of Christ with the divine Logos, in turn, 
supports the notion of Christ as a kind of ultimate ground of all knowing.104 
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While teaching is certainly a vital task of the Church and of the Catholic 
intellectual, Sapienza rightly contends that that is, at best, only half of the story. The 
Catholic intellectual life is, for her, “a vocation discerned in prayer, rooted in humility, 
and based in dialogue that answers God’s call to behold and interpret God’s action in the 
world. Catholic intellectual life, therefore, is an opportunity for the church (in the 
broadest sense of the word) to learn….”105 It is the foundational Christian belief in the 
Incarnation that supports what many have described as the sacramental principle of 
Catholic thought. This principle, according to Richard T. Hughes, “points to the fact that 
the natural world and even elements of human culture can serve as vehicles by which the 
grace of God is mediated to human beings. This conviction allows Catholic educators to 
take the world seriously on its own terms and to interact with the world as it is.”106 
Regardless of academic discipline, then, the Catholic scholar is charged with discovering 
the sacramental presence of God within their particular area of study. As Michael J. 
Himes asserts, “…anything that awakens, enlivens, and expands the imagination, opens 
the vision, and enriches the sensitivity of any human being is a religious act. Although we 
may not use this language, education is or can be training in sacramental beholding.”107 
Though all of the disciplines have the capacity to mediate a sacramental 
 
worldview, this is not to suggest that there is little need for explicitly Catholic content in 
either a Catholic university curriculum or in the scholarship of an individual academic. It 
is important to note, however, that even the ‘classics’ of the Catholic intellectual can 
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crush students and scholars alike while also making a mockery of the Catholic 
intellectual vocation. Richard Liddy notes that there “can be a Catholic fundamentalism 
of an ideal past that ‘had all the answers,’ leaving us with the sole responsibility of 
mindlessly passing on that tradition to the future.”108 Instead of contenting ourselves with 
reading the likes of Augustine, Aquinas, and Dante, Liddy argues that “if we truly 
understand the meaning of these writers, we will find ourselves invited to do in our 
culture what they did in theirs. The point of any authentic tradition is to change us in the 
present so that we can articulate the authentic meanings of the tradition into the 
future.”109 As such, there is a need for Catholic intellectuals to help their Church engage 
with all of the various philosophies, religions, and worldviews of the present. 
Obviously, this engagement will enable the Church to learn, but it is equally 
obvious that the Church must necessarily counteract those perspectives it considers 
harmful. For the Catholic university, this suggests a need for both formative experiences 
within the Catholic tradition as well as opportunities to engage the ‘other.’ For the 
Catholic intellectual, there appears to be a necessary kind of balancing act. On the one 
hand, there must be a grounding in one’s own Catholic intellectual tradition. 
Simultaneously, though, one must also carry the riches of that tradition into a critical 
encounter with whomever—and whatever—one finds as a result of their scholarship.  
 
 
 
 
 
108. Liddy, Richard M, “The Catholic Intellectual Tradition: Achievement and Challenge,” in As 
Leaven in the World, ed. Thomas m. Landy (Franklin, Wisconsin: Sheed & Ward, 2001, 4. 
109. Ibid, 5-6. 
44 
 
 
 
 
       Conclusion 
Questions over the Catholic identity of Catholic institutions of higher learning 
came to the foreground in the 1960’s, and they have hardly surrendered their place in the 
decades since. Pope John Paul II’s apostolic constitution on Catholic higher education, Ex 
Corde Ecclesiae, was itself a result of decades of dialogue, and it sparked several decades 
more. In the American context, institutional autonomy and academic freedom are 
hallowed virtues. Not surprisingly, much of the debate in the years after Ex Corde was 
preoccupied with the question of the mandate for theologians. While it might be tempting 
to argue that Catholic higher education has found an equilibrium of sorts, there remain 
high-profile instances when debate over Catholic identity can quickly turn mean-spirited; 
oftentimes, these cases involve speakers and awards, but even something as regular as a 
review of the core curriculum can quickly be swallowed up by a broader debate over the 
proper place of the Catholic university in the Church and in the world. 
How might a theologian help chart a course forward? There are significant 
questions that need answering, and the theologian’s perspective must be considered 
alongside those of other Catholic intellectuals from other disciplines. How best to ground 
a meaningful approach to building a bridge across the divide that often seems to exist 
between those advocating open inquiry and those concerned primarily with fidelity to the 
Catholic tradition? How to ensure room for freedom of academics while also ensuring a 
bishop his ability to be the bishop within a diocese that might include a Catholic 
university campus? How can an institution help the Church by exploring new 
ecclesiologies, while also supporting the tradition which must serve as the measuring rod 
of any ecclesiology in the final analysis? How can an institution welcome people and 
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perspectives on campus without compromising the faithfulness of Catholic scholars and, 
perhaps more pressingly, Catholic undergraduates? 
Ultimately, this dissertation aims to show that in order for a Catholic university to 
be truly hospitable (open to the outside while faithful to its own tradition), it requires the 
presence of Catholic intellectuals who are truly hospitable. Three notable thinkers who 
have pulled this off will be profiled. First, however, there must be a survey of what, 
precisely, is meant by hospitality. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Christian Hospitality, Past and Present 
 
 
 
Introduction 
To argue, as this dissertation does, that hospitality is a vital key for advancing 
debates over identity in Catholic higher education is made difficult by the baggage that 
the term hospitality has taken on in popular usage. For many, the word hospitality no 
doubt conjures up images of the so-called ‘hospitality industry.’ Wikipedia deftly defines 
this ‘industry’ as “a broad category of fields within the service industry that includes 
lodging, event planning, theme parks, transportation, cruise line, and additional fields 
within the tourism industry,” which no doubt conforms to a very popular notion of what 
hospitality is.1 For many people, therefore, hospitality can be reduced to commerce which 
capitalizes on the desire for entertainment, first and foremost, and perhaps on comfort 
secondarily. Only slightly better is that understanding of hospitality which would define 
it as the entertaining of friends and family. What is missing in this popular conception of 
hospitality is its function throughout the Christian tradition as a virtue. Unfortunately, as 
Christine Pohl has noted, even “most Christians have lost touch with the amazingly rich 
and complex tradition of hospitality.”2 
In the current cultural climate of the West, it may well be the case that the need 
 
for a widespread retrieval of hospitality—extending far beyond the borders of Catholic 
higher education—is desperately clear. Pohl believes that “We…find ourselves in a 
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fragmented and multicultural society that yearns for relationships, identity, and meaning. 
Our mobile and self-oriented society is characterized by disturbing levels of loneliness, 
alienation, and estrangement.”3 Clearly, a virtue that is capable of encouraging a strong 
sense of identity without losing compassion or charity for the other and capable of 
respecting clear distinctions without setting ironclad boundaries has the potential to 
mitigate the possible ill effects of the current milieu. 
Happily, the Christian world has been retrieving its ancient conception of 
hospitality over the past several decades. Amy Oden observes that “Conversations, 
scholarship, and conferences on hospitality in the last few years have brought attention to 
the ways a developed notion of hospitality might contribute to Christian community and 
identity, as well as to mission, spiritual growth, and even contemporary worship.”4 While 
Pohl’s work has done much to ground this retrieval of the Christian virtue of hospitality, 
a great deal of credit must also be given to Henri Nouwen. In particular, his book, 
Reaching Out, continues to undergird much of the contemporary discussion of 
hospitality. In that work, Nouwen identified three poles “between which our lives 
vacillate and are held in tension.”5 These three poles concern one’s relationship with the 
self, with others, and with God. For Nouwen, the second pole is that between which 
hostility can be transformed into hospitality. Such hospitality, then, “means primarily the 
creation of a free space where the stranger can enter and become a friend instead of an 
enemy. Hospitality is not to change people, but to offer them space where change can 
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take place.”6 This hospitality requires charity, therefore, but also no small measure of 
integrity. “When we want to be really hospitable we not only have to receive strangers 
but also to confront them by an unambiguous presence, not hiding ourselves behind 
neutrality but showing our ideas, opinions and life style clearly and distinctly. No real 
dialogue is possible between somebody and nobody.”7 Even Nouwen’s pioneering 
reflection on hospitality demonstrates how the Catholic intellectual life ought to be 
guided in no small part by hospitality, especially if that intellectual life is lived in the 
context of a Catholic university. 
A real strength of Christian hospitality lies in its ability to serve as “a bridge 
which connects our theology with daily life and concerns.”8 As will be seen, hospitality 
has sparked a great deal of theological reflection throughout the tradition, and it has also 
proven to be a practice necessary for authentic Christian witness. In short, this virtue has 
the intellectual substance to pass muster in the academy while also captivating the 
imagination of those who labor in the groves of all of the Church’s ministries. For this 
chapter of this dissertation, however, particular attention will be given to the potential 
impact of hospitality in Catholic higher education. This chapter will begin by exploring 
the Scriptural and traditional testimony on hospitality in order to understand what, 
exactly, Christian hospitality entails. A consideration of the theology of hospitality will 
follow. From there it will be possible to begin examining intellectual hospitality in 
particular. Closely allied with this section will be a linking of hospitality with friendship, 
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which this dissertation will contend is a necessary linkage due to the circular relationship 
between those two virtues. Then, the proper limits of Christian hospitality will be 
described before the chapter ends with more explicit consideration of the ramifications of 
hospitality for Catholic higher education. Then, and only then, will this dissertation be 
able to proceed to an exploration of how intellectual hospitality (and/or friendship) 
represented a vital orientation for the engagement with non-Catholic perspectives 
undertaken by Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne. 
Hospitality and the Old Testament 
 
Despite the absence of the word hospitality in the Hebrew Scriptures, these texts 
have nevertheless cast a long shadow on the Church’s understanding of hospitality 
because the practice of hospitality is prevalent enough. Understandably, commentary on 
hospitality in the Old Testament focuses a good deal of effort on the social customs of 
ancient Israel. Indeed, throughout the ancient world, hospitality was often considered a 
basic and essential moral practice. Hospitality by the ancients, Pohl asserts, “assured 
strangers at least a minimum of provision, protection, and connection with the larger 
community. It also sustained the normal network of relationships on which a community 
depended, enriching moral and social bonds among family, friends, and neighbors.”9 In 
the Greek and Roman view, hospitality was undertaken in a manner which “stressed 
formal reciprocal obligations between benefactor and recipient.”10 The Israelite practice 
of hospitality was conducted less with an expectation of future reciprocity than with a 
certain gratitude for hospitality proffered them in the past. As Oden highlights, the 
9. Ibid, 17. 
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ancient Israelites “understood themselves to be outsiders in Pharaoh’s Egypt, wanderers 
in the wilderness, and settlers in the Promised Land. Their corporate identity was deeply 
rooted in a sense of being strangers, even though they also understood themselves to be 
God’s chosen people.”11 
Genesis is the foundational text in any examination of hospitality in the Old 
Testament. First and foremost, one finds there the account of God’s creation, and the 
charge given to humanity to play the role of caretaker in God’s world. As Pohl states, 
“the theological and moral foundations for Old Testament hospitality were tied closely to 
Israel’s special relationship of dependence on and gratitude to God.”12 Perhaps of equal 
importance, however, may well be the extended reflection that Genesis provides on 
Election: God’s special choosing of Israel as His people. Certainly, throughout the 
account of the foundation of the covenant between God and Israel, it is clear that God has 
 
lofty plans for Abraham’s descendants. It is in the four sibling rivalry stories of Genesis, 
however, that one might see most clearly the dynamic at work in Israelite hospitality. The 
stories of Cain and Abel (Genesis 4:1-16), Isaac and Ishmael (Genesis 16, 21), Jacob and 
Esau (Genesis 25:19-34; 27-33), and Joseph and his brothers (Genesis 37-50) all indicate 
something of how the Elect and non-Elect relate to God. Even a superficial reading of 
Genesis makes it clear that God is concerned also with the non-Elect. Cain, Ishmael, 
Esau, and Joseph’s brothers each receive notable blessings of various kinds from God, 
and Genesis leaves no doubt that those blessings do, indeed, come from God. Similarly, 
one cannot read Genesis and come away believing that to be God’s Elect is to be granted 
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a life of ceaseless privilege. To the contrary, Abel dies, and Isaac is nearly sacrificed 
before ultimately having his plan for his sons usurped. Jacob is exiled for an extended 
period of time, is taken advantage of by his uncle Laban, and eventually has to face a 
potentially murderously angry older brother. In the most well-developed of the sibling 
stories, Joseph experiences something of his own passion narrative before finally being 
exalted once and for all in the context of his own family. 
Therefore it is hardly a startling claim that each of the four stories also indicates 
something of how the Elect and the non-Elect are to relate to one another. Cain’s murder 
of Abel provides no blueprint for a relationship between Elect and non-Elect, nor does 
the lack of substantial interaction between Isaac and Ishmael. The partial reconciliation of 
Jacob and Esau at the end of that narrative is at least an improvement from the previous 
two stories, but it is really in the Joseph story that the impact of God’s Election on all 
peoples can be best understood. Joseph’s ample blessings are not intended to justify a 
sense of superiority on his part. Instead, his gifts are to be employed for the benefit of all. 
Election seems to impart responsibility, then, rather than privilege. As such, the Israelites 
are charged with witnessing to God’s universal sovereignty and God’s will. Election in 
the Old Testament foreshadows, or perhaps even establishes, the tension involved in any 
act of hospitality. On the one hand, Election sets the Israelites apart from all other 
peoples. On the other, Election made real demands regarding how the Israelites interacted 
with others. As Pohl puts it, “Embedded within the covenant between God and Israel was 
Israel’s identity as an alien and its related responsibility to sojourners and strangers.”13 
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In terms of specific instances of hospitality in the Old Testament, the story of 
Abraham’s welcome of three guests in Genesis 18 has had “a persistent formative role in 
the instruction and motivation of the people of God.”14In his commentary on Genesis 18, 
Lee Roy Martin has rightly noted that the Old Testament practice of hospitality is simply 
“not sufficient as a contemporary model for hospitality…” Nevertheless, Martin does 
note that the Hebrew Scriptures do indeed reveal “a number of theological assertions that 
can undergird a contemporary Christian theology of hospitality.”15 In particular, the 
Imago Dei, the fundamental relational nature of all humans, human dependence upon 
each other, and the notion of all people as sojourners hosted by God are listed by Martin 
as potential Old Testament building blocks for a contemporary theological reflection on 
hospitality. Martin is rightly suspicious of any theology of hospitality which rules out 
vigorous engagement with those outside his own tradition. The challenges posed by 
pluralism in the 21st century rightly weigh heavily on Martin’s Old Testament 
commentary. Where Martin misses the mark, however, is precisely in the absence of 
Election on his list of salvageable theological assertions. As Pohl has noticed, “It appears 
that Israelite response to strangers as inclusion or separation hinged, at least in part, on 
the capacity of the stranger to threaten Israel’s identity and unity.”16 The Church, like 
Israel, is similarly called to straddle the line between distinctiveness as God’s people and 
engagement with the world. The Church is called to convert the world, not to become the 
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world indiscriminately. Obviously, however, the Church’s hospitality must also draw 
deeply from New Testament insights if it is to hold true to Christ’s Good News. 
Hospitality and the New Testament 
Unlike the Old Testament, the New Testament includes several explicit references 
to hospitality. In a typical example from Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Paul “urged fellow 
Christians to welcome one another as Christ had welcomed them. He challenged the early 
believers to ‘pursue’ hospitality; in fact hospitality was a qualification for leadership in 
the early Christian communities.” Truly, as Pohl notes, hospitality came to be regarded 
by Christians “as a fundamental expression of the Gospel.”17 While the word hospitality 
does not appear in any of the four canonical Gospels themselves, hospitality’s 
prominence in early Christian practice was nevertheless dependent largely on stories of 
Christ or lessons taught by Christ. 
Just as Genesis looms large in the Old Testament conception of hospitality, Luke 
14 and Matthew 25 are especially influential in the New Testament contribution. In Luke 
14, Christ gives clear teaching on inviting people to banquets. Simply put, “hosts who 
anticipated the hospitality of God’s Kingdom welcomed the poor, lame, crippled, and 
blind, those who were dependent and lived on the margins of the community. While such 
hosts expected no immediate benefit, they would ultimately experience God’s repayment 
at the resurrection.”18 In the famous passage from Matthew 25 in which the Son of Man 
 
separates the ‘sheep’ from the ‘goats,’ Christ takes a drastic step beyond any of the 
ancient Israelite prophets’ calls for just living by identifying Himself with the poor and 
17. Ibid, 5. 
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downtrodden: “I tell you solemnly, in so far as you neglected to do this to one of the least 
of these, you neglected to do it to me.”19 As Pohl describes it, “This passage sets up a 
fundamental identification of Jesus with ‘the least of these’ and personally and 
powerfully connects hospitality toward human beings with care for Jesus.”20 
Jesus not only functions as a teacher exhorting His followers to be hospitable, 
therefore; He also represents an embodiment of the very hospitality of God. In Pohl’s 
words, “Jesus’ gracious and sacrificial hospitality—expressed in his life, ministry, and 
death—undergirds the hospitality of his followers.”21Intriguingly, however, Jesus 
oftentimes communicates the hospitality of God by playing the role not of the host, but 
the guest. As Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong observes, “Jesus characterizes the 
hospitality of God in part as the exemplary recipient of hospitality. From his conception 
in Mary’s womb by the power of the Holy Spirit to his birth in a manger through to his 
burial, Jesus was dependent on the welcome of others.”22 For Yong, the story of the risen 
Christ on the Road to Emmaus is helpfully illustrative of this dynamic at work. Christ is 
clearly invited by the two disciples traveling alongside Him to be their guest, but it is 
nevertheless Christ who blesses and breaks the bread, an act which sparks their 
recognition that they “had been guests in the presence of the divine all along. Similarly, 
throughout his public ministry, Jesus as the recipient of hospitality is at the same time the 
one who heralds and personifies the redemptive hospitality of God.” The very people 
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who welcome Christ into their homes, it seems, “become…guests of the redemptive 
hospitality of God.” 23 
It is necessary, also, in this consideration of the place of hospitality in the Gospels 
to mention the table fellowship that was such a major pillar of Christ’s public ministry. 
The joys that the Christian reader of the New Testament can glean from reading the 
various stories of Jesus dining with renowned sinners, however, can pale in comparison 
to the joy that comes from participating in the ritual meal instituted during Christ’s final 
meal with His disciples. It is the Eucharist, after all, which “most fundamentally connects 
the hospitality with God because it anticipates and reveals the ‘heavenly table of the 
Lord.’” For any participant in the sacramental life of the Church, then, it will be easy to 
assent to Pohl’s claim that “A shared meal is the activity most closely tied to the reality 
of God’s Kingdom, just as it is the most basic expression of hospitality.”24 Before moving 
 
on to explore the place of hospitality in early Christian thought and practice, however, it 
will be worth noting, as Pohl does, that it would be insufficient to reduce the power of a 
shared meal (as a glimpse of the hospitality of the Kingdom) to the physical need that is 
being satisfied. “Within acts of hospitality, needs are met, but hospitality is truncated if it 
does not go beyond physical needs. Part of hospitality includes recognizing and valuing 
the stranger or guest.”25 Absent this, it hardly seems possible for the guest to become a 
 
friend, or for any lasting communion to be forged. 
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The Early Church Experience of Hospitality 
As is the case in Scripture, the early tradition of the Church is sparing in its 
explicit references to hospitality. Nevertheless, Oden finds that hospitality is a prominent 
topic in early Christian sources: “There is not so much explicit reflection by these early 
Christians on the idea of hospitality as there is tacit expectation and practice of 
hospitality.”26 Early Christian hospitality extended, as noted above, well beyond the 
physical needs of the beneficiary to include social and spiritual needs as well. 
Additionally, just as Christ Himself offered hospitality even while a guest in others’ 
homes, the early Christian testimony suggests an awareness that hosts had needs that 
might very often be addressed by the hospitality of their guests. It is also worth pointing 
out that early Christians did not think of hospitality as a checklist of possible, isolated 
actions. The hospitality of the early Church, according to Oden, was “not so much a 
singular act of welcome as it is…an orientation that attends to otherness, listening and 
learning, valuing and honoring. The hospitable one looks for God’s redemptive presence 
in the other, confident it is there, if one only has eyes to see and ears to hear. Hospitality, 
then, is always a spiritual discipline of opening one’s own life to God’s life and 
revelation.”27 
 
The ‘location’ of early Christian hospitality was in the “overlap of household and 
church.” It was the early Christian notion of Church as a people gathered in a homelike 
setting that “was responsible for imitating God’s hospitable and gracious character. God’s 
household represented the welcome of Gentiles into the inheritance together with Israel, 
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and relations within this new household explicitly transcended ethnic boundaries.”28 
Nevertheless, there are indications that the early Church, like ancient Israel before it, was 
aware of certain tensions—and perhaps even limits—necessary to any practice of 
hospitality. As Bretherton observes, “We see in the Didache a tension within the 
Christian tradition of hospitality that surfaces time and again; that is, the prudential 
consideration of discriminating between deserving and undeserving strangers.”29 As 
Bretherton rightly concludes, however, “the very existence of documents that attempt to 
address the problem of the abuse of hospitality points to how, in the early church at least, 
hospitality was considered a normative and necessary practice.”30 
This clear willingness on the part of early Christians to run the risks of offering 
 
hospitality makes it unsurprising to find that this orientation to welcoming and caring for 
the needs of various outsiders became something of a hallmark of Christian identity. As 
Oden describes, Christians became known for extending hospitality to the sick, the poor, 
travelers and pilgrims, widows and orphans, and also slaves and prisoners.31 Indeed, 
Christian hospitality was apparently so pronounced and widely admired that some 
opponents of the faith sought to combat its spread by emulating its practice. In the fourth 
century, Julian the Apostate observed that it was from Christians’ “benevolence to 
strangers, their care for the graves of the dead and the pretended holiness of their lives” 
that Christianity had gained much of its momentum. Seeing also that Hellenic paganism 
had a correspondingly poor track record when it came to hospitality, Julian worried that 
28. Pohl, 42. 
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“all men see that our people lack aid from us.” What was needed, then, was for pagan 
priests to “Teach those of the Hellenic faith to contribute to public service of this sort.”32 
What propelled this distinction that, even in the eyes of the church’s opponents, 
set Christians apart? The Old Testament idea of God’s people on sojourn in this world 
resonated strongly in the early church. With the Kingdom of God encompassing both 
present and future dimensions in Christ’s teaching, it is not surprising that His early 
followers took some sojourning cues from their Israelite forebears. The early Christian 
voices, Oden notes, “reflect the profound conviction that Christian identity is rooted in 
otherness. Before one can truly offer hospitality, one must understand one’s own 
marginal position.”33 For Chrysostom, this marginality was close to the heart of the 
Christian moral life: “The first virtue, indeed, the whole of virtue, is to be a stranger to 
this world, and a sojourner, to have nothing in common with things here and let go of 
them, as we would from anything strange to us.”34 Augustine pushes the implications of 
this sojourning specifically in the direction of hospitality: “You take in some stranger, 
whose companion in the way you yourself also are, for we are all strangers. This person 
is a Christian who, even in his own house and in his own country, acknowledges himself 
to be a stranger.”35 
Even with an awareness of their own status as sojourners, the early Christians no 
doubt found hospitality difficult to execute. As already seen, Christ encourages His 
disciples to see Him in the stranger, the poor, and the marginalized. Nevertheless, “To 
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recognize Christ in the guest at the door is not easy. It is rarely the Christ we expect or 
the Christ of our imaginings.”36 The identification of the other with Christ, coupled with 
the Old Testament insight that all people are created in the Imago Dei made the stakes 
high when it came to hospitality in a Christian’s life. Indeed, some early Christian 
thinkers went so far as to equate hospitality to true worship of God. As one early third 
century source puts it, “Whoever wishes to be pious towards God does good to humans, 
because the body of a person bears the image of God.”37 Interestingly, this dedication to 
reverencing the Image of God was central enough to early Christian practice that it 
covered even hospitality extended to the dead. As Lactantius exhorted his listeners, 
“…we will not tolerate the image and workmanship of God to lie exposed as a prey to 
beasts and birds. Instead, we will restore it to the earth, from which it had its origin.”38In 
her work on early Christian hospitality, Oden detects four distinct stages in its practice. 
These stages include the welcoming of the guest, the restoration of the guest through 
attention to their needs (physical or otherwise), a stage characterized by dwelling together 
in common life, and then a sending forth of the guest. This final stage, as Oden notes, 
“suggests that hospitality does not create systems of dependence, but empowers the other 
to move on.”39 
The early church was also careful not to allow very normal human desires to 
 
interfere with Christians’ hospitable work. Chrysostom encouraged his congregation to 
refrain from a practice of hospitality that was constrained by conditions: “…don’t busy 
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yourself with people’s lives and doings. For this is the very extreme of stinginess, to nit 
pick about a person’s entire life to avoid giving them one loaf of bread…And yet your 
Master causes even the sun to rise upon him! And do you judge him unworthy of food 
even for a day!”40 Ambrose, similarly, advocated for liberality in hospitality, but also 
cautioned against extravagance: “It is a mark of liberality to receive the stranger, to 
clothe the naked, to redeem the captives, to help the needy. It is wasteful to spend money 
on expensive banquets and a lot of wine…It is wasteful to spend one’s own wealth 
merely for the sake of gaining the favor of the people.”41 The monastic rule of Basil 
addresses the same concern in the section on “The rule to be followed in serving meals to 
guests.” According to Basil, “the desire to please men, and acting for display are strictly 
forbidden to Christians under all circumstances, because even a man who observes the 
precept but does it for the purpose of being seen and glorified by men loses the reward 
for that observance.”42 In the West, hospitality would similarly come to play a substantial 
role in its monastic traditions. The Rule of St. Benedict, for instance—which would 
eventually inform the Cistercian lifestyle of Thomas Merton—has a section on the 
reception of guests as well as exceptions to some of the other rules if made necessary in 
the offering of hospitality. 
The monastic context of hospitality indicates an evolution in the practice of 
Christian hospitality that began in the early fourth century. With the legalization and 
subsequent exaltation of Christianity throughout the Roman world, hospitality became 
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less of a face-to-face encounter and more of an institutionalized process of directing 
resources to those who needed them. While some of this institutionalization had already 
begun before Constantine’s conversion, the fourth century saw instances wherein “hostels 
provided care for strangers, hospitals were established for the sick, the poor, and 
strangers, and monasteries welcomed pilgrims.”43 On the one hand, it is easy to see the 
creation of such institutions as a step forward. As Pohl rightly observes, “The increasing 
dependence on differentiated and specialized institutions of care was a response to the 
increasing scale of need, to the increasing availability of resources given to the church, 
and to the church’s related responsibility to the larger population.”44 On the other hand, 
though, one has to ask whether anything was lost in the process. In a memorable homily, 
Gregory of Nyssa railed against the possibility that Christian hospitality might become 
something impersonal: “Let no one say that it is sufficient to send food to people not 
involved in our lives. This does not reveal mercy but an outward show in order to remove 
such persons from our presence.”45 This homily hints at one of the symptoms of the 
institutionalizing of hospitality. The poor were cared for at a distance, while “personal 
hospitality was increasingly reserved for visiting dignitaries.”46 With hospitality to the 
poor becoming less and less personal, and further removed from households, some of the 
core values of the practice of hospitality weakened considerably. As Pohl puts it, 
“Commitments to respect and recognition often fade when needy persons are segregated 
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out, grouped together, and hidden from view. Such populations are easily overlooked and 
quickly forgotten.”47 
Theology of Christian Hospitality 
Having outlined the place of hospitality in Scripture and also in the early tradition 
of the church, it is necessary to make some general theological assertions about the nature 
of Christian hospitality before moving on to a consideration of what intellectual 
hospitality might entail in a Christian context. At its center, Christian hospitality is built 
on the foundational belief that God “delights in us and desires that we receive the joy and 
pleasure of God’s own communion.” Hospitality, then, rests on this “overflowing 
communion rather than in a scientific rationality or an understanding of an abstract 
‘Real.’”48 By virtue of God’s Creation, then, it is possible to say that God offers 
hospitality to humanity by giving humanity a place to call home. Because Christian 
hospitality is dependent on what Amos Yong calls this “magnanimous hospitality of 
God,” it is therefore “founded on the incarnational and Pentecostal logic of abundance 
rather than that of human economies of exchange and scarcity.”49 
The essential homelessness of Christians, which was one of many keen insights 
(noted above) the early Christians had regarding hospitality, seems to outline a clear 
tension, if not an outright contradiction. How can one claim that people are given a home 
by God while also claiming that Christians are homeless? For Elizabeth Newman, the 
resolution of this tension comes from noting that Christians are homeless “only in a 
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sense. We are displaced from locating our identity in our nation, our family, or our 
position in society, in order to locate it more fully before God.”50 It remains possible, 
therefore, for Christians to revel in—and be grateful for—the loving hospitality of God 
while also experiencing something of the marginality which often seems to make 
hospitality more genuine. As Pohl claims, “the best hosts are people who recognize their 
own frailties and weaknesses.”51 
For Bretherton, Christian hospitality as a practice is inherently eschatological in 
nature and was inaugurated at Pentecost. It is both “inspired and empowered by the Holy 
Spirit, who enables the church to host the life of its neighbours without the church being 
assimilated to, colonized by, or having to withdraw from its neighbours.”52 Hospitality, 
therefore, is the virtue which guides the church’s engagement with that which is not 
church, while simultaneously preserving the integrity of the church throughout that 
engagement. It is impossible, therefore, to claim that the entertainment of friends or the 
visiting with family are sufficient manifestations of Christian hospitality. As Pohl makes 
clear, “Hospitable attitudes, even a principled commitment to hospitality, do not 
challenge us or transform our loyalties in the way that actual hospitality to particular 
strangers does.”53 In effect, any theology which grounds and advocates hospitality as a 
 
necessary Christian concern must be paired with an intentional practice. To refrain from 
the practice of hospitality, furthermore, would be to potentially cut oneself off from a 
significant means of encountering God’s grace. Newman captures it well when she writes 
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that “the stranger may well be a messenger of God….Such hospitality is sustained not by 
human ingenuity but by God, who can come to us in unexpected ways and whose 
presence in the stranger might well be as discomforting as it is comforting.”54 
The practice of Christian hospitality cannot be cleanly distinguished from the 
theology that coincides with it. It certainly can be distinguished, though, from the type of 
corporate hospitality that is characteristic of the hospitality industry. Perhaps most 
startlingly different about Christian hospitality is the sheer fact that it “is not particularly 
concerned with efficiency.” Instead it is content “to be patient and vulnerable with 
others…since the aim is to be in God’s abundant time of giving and receiving rather than 
in efficient, productive time.”55 It would, admittedly, be difficult to concentrate entirely 
 
on efficiency while also allowing Christ to come in His own good time. The success of 
Christian hospitality, then, depends less on hours logged or people helped than it does on 
“the degree to which one offers one’s genuine presence with another, to fully enter 
another’s world and dwell with another.”56 
It is with this in mind that the importance of recognition to hospitality can be most 
 
clearly seen. Recognition, Pohl finds, “involves respecting the dignity and equal worth of 
every person and valuing their contributions, or at least their potential contributions, to 
the larger community.” When people think of hospitality as something quaint or tame, 
Pohl argues, it is at least “partly because they do not understand the power of 
recognition.”57 For hospitality to be complete, however, this respect which is so essential 
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to recognition must be coupled with care. In addition to the dignity of the other, one must 
also be aware of his/her need. And who is this other to whom the Christian must be 
respectful and caring? Though hospitality may well help one to navigate the tension 
between church and world, it also challenges practitioners to expand their notion of 
exactly who their neighbor might be. For Pohl, “The twin moves of universalizing the 
neighbor and personalizing the stranger are at the core of hospitality.”58 
Hospitality and Worship 
 
As noted above, early Christians wasted little time in connecting authentic piety 
with the practice of hospitality. The awareness of the Imago Dei in other people made 
this connection an intuitive one. Unsurprisingly, then, Christians have long noted a 
connection between hospitality and worship. Given the sophistication of some of the 
most recent theological work done on this connection, it is important to at least briefly 
survey it before moving into an exploration of intellectual hospitality. 
Paul Wadell begins one of his books on Christian friendship with a compelling 
line of questions: “What does worship do for us? If we find ourselves in communities of 
worship week after week, has it made a difference in our lives? Has it changed us? Has it 
made us see the world differently?”59 In Wadell’s thinking, worship is an integral part of 
a life of discipleship. Worship and morality, for Wadell, have the same goal: “Both want 
to initiate us into the truth of Jesus so we can become as much like God as we possibly 
can, so resplendent in holiness and goodness that we walk the earth no longer as strangers 
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or foes of God but as the loyal faithful friends of God…”60 Seen in this light, worship has 
a transformative impact on the Christian person. Wadell argues that worship “works to 
achieve in us exactly the radical, total conformity of the self to Christ”61 that God desires 
from His people, but it seems clear enough that this transformation is not facilitated by 
worship simply because of worship’s capacity to be educative. Newman has argued that 
worship might best be understood as our “participation in divine hospitality,” just as 
hospitality “names our participation in the life of God…”62 
There is, then, at the very least a close relationship between worship and 
 
hospitality, as each represents a human participation in God’s own being. Interestingly, 
Newman pushes this relationship so far that she actually comes to identify worship itself 
as hospitality. Newman understands that this perspective runs contrary to popular 
perceptions: “Common assumptions regard worship as motivation for hospitality or as a 
place we might garner some useful information about hospitality. But such assumptions 
miss the mark; they make worship a means to an end, and they locate hospitality outside 
of worship.”63 Put in terms somewhat more conducive to the Catholic context, Newman 
 
argues that Eucharist and hospitality are alike in that they are both “communal acts that 
call for bodies willing to give and receive the abundance of God.”64 Newman’s 
reflections on this identification of worship as hospitality were spurred, initially, by her 
conviction that hospitality has been a much-abused and oft-misunderstood topic in 
contemporary culture. Indeed, she takes to task the perspective (which she traces back to 
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Kant) which suggests that enlightenment, or even freedom, can only be achieved by 
breaking away from any tradition or sense of dogma. Such optimism, Newman maintains, 
is unwarranted in the current cultural climate, however. “In our late modern epoch,” 
Newman rightly observes, “we can see that a self stripped of context, a ‘universal self,’ is 
at the mercy of global economic and political forces beyond its control.”65 In order to 
recover a place from which today’s Christian might extend hospitality, then, there comes 
an inevitable ecclesiological insight that sees the church as “absolutely necessary.”66 
It is when the church is gathered together in worship that it can most clearly be 
 
seen that the church is, in fact, God’s dwelling place. As the New Testament indicates, 
‘home’ is not so much a physical place as it is “a people before God.”67 Rather than 
constraining the Christian’s ability to be hospitable due to some latent intolerance of 
those who are not church, the idea of church as home actually frees the Christian to 
practice hospitality by giving her a place from which to extend welcome. If, as Newman 
argues, “church names our joining together in the household of God, then worship names 
the way we participate in God’s own hospitality.”68 Presumably, if Christians are to offer 
a specifically intellectual kind of hospitality, then they will also depend on an 
awareness—gained in part by participation in liturgy—of the church as God’s home. The 
time is now right to consider what this intellectual hospitality might be, and do. 
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Intellectual Hospitality 
 
In the current climate of American higher education, it seems likely that any 
discussion of intellectual hospitality would lead to a consideration of tolerance and 
inclusivity. Indeed, these concepts loom large on most campuses as universities struggle 
to compete for students and avoid being pilloried for being backward, exclusive, etc. 
Nevertheless, the perspective that would contrast hospitality and tolerance—rather than 
equate them—has been steadily gaining momentum. Bretherton, for instance, argues 
simply that “hospitality constitutes a better way of framing relations with strangers than 
tolerance.”69 While aware of how the language of tolerance has come to supplant that of 
hospitality, Bretherton finds tolerance inadequate for the Christian context. In part, this 
inadequacy is because hospitality simply has “more antecedents in Christian social 
practice than tolerance, but also, as a practice, it is founded on more explicitly biblical 
and theological imperatives.” Additionally, tolerance is simply ill-equipped to engage 
with contemporary diversity in moral perspectives.70 Similarly, for Newman, hospitality 
is both theologically more sophisticated as well as practically advantageous than 
tolerance: “In the practice of hospitality, exercising the virtue of love, we are to give and 
receive from the ‘other’ as Christ would. So understood, hospitality is at once more 
receptive and more active than tolerance, receptive in that it sees the other as gift and 
active in that it seeks lovingly to live, speak, and hear the truth in any given situation.”71 
In the cases of the Catholic intellectuals to be surveyed in the remainder of this 
dissertation, it is clear that their profound abilities to engage the other did not result from 
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a passive tolerance. Instead, their willingness to engage was motivated by (in all three 
cases) a Christian’s desire for truth wherever it can be found and a Christian’s yearning to 
love (and perhaps even learn from!) one’s neighbors wherever they are to be found. 
Elizabeth Newman and a Distinctively Christian Intellectual Hospitality 
So what, then, gives intellectual hospitality its potency? For Newman, much 
depends on patience. The Christian intellectual must “bear with, (and)…practice 
patience, in our conversations with our colleagues and students as we together grope 
towards the particular truths at hand.”72 Newman makes a point of mentioning 
immediately thereafter, however, that this patient awareness that all are on a similar 
journey toward truth must be balanced by a real and robust courage. Jesus never refrained 
from speaking the truth, Newman notes, regardless of context; regardless of whether he 
played the role of guest or host. The intellectual hospitality of Christians, then, must 
create “a space for Christian identity to appear as a whole way of life.” In short, then, if 
such hospitality is to be vibrant and impactful, “making distinctions and separating 
ourselves in some sense from other convictions, from ‘the world,’ are crucial…”73 
The Christian intellectual life takes place within the life of the church. This must 
be every bit as true regardless of whether a given Christian intellectual labors on the 
campus of a sectarian university. Indeed, the Christian intellectual life occurs within the 
life of the church even if it is not housed on any university campus at all. It is an 
important form of witness for the Christian intellectual to name her commitment to God 
 
 
72. Elizabeth Newman, “Hospitality and Christian Higher Education,” Christian Scholar’s Review 
33.1 (2003), 86. 
73. Ibid, 87. 
70 
 
 
 
manifested by her vocation exactly as Christian intellectual. The surroundings may 
nevertheless have an impact, obviously, on the dynamics of one’s intellectual pursuits. 
Newman sees clearly that Christian intellectual hospitality is not at all for the benefit only 
of those receiving welcome. On top of the predictable goods that come from 
academically engaging other perspectives, though, comes something else: “Christian 
hospitality gives us a vigilant place to stand to see how easily various cultural 
assumptions and practices can distort our lives.”74 Without such vigilance, Newman 
worries, the Christian intellectual might certainly be swept into unfaithfulness. 
Hospitality therefore requires training, in which the Christian intellectual learns “how to 
be steadfast in the faith while knowing how to resist that which obstructs the hospitality 
of God, a resistance that might well call for a willingness to suffer.”75 
One need not look all that closely at contemporary academe in order to find ample 
justification for such vigilance. Pluralism, it is said, serves a global economy by making 
all distinctiveness seem insignificant. Postmodernism, in the same vein, “has produced an 
ethic rooted primarily in the individual and his or her choices.”76 While this ethic might 
seem, initially, to be liberating, it actually serves to enslave one to a particularly narrow 
tradition of thought which is subject entirely to the individual’s own notion of how his 
identity ought to be created/developed. If such a tradition were to go entirely unchecked, 
how could any authentic hospitality, or even pluralism for that matter, be possible? 
Scientism, also, seems to pose a significant challenge to the faith of the Christian 
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intellectual. By neatly separating facts and values, it would seem to lead to a worldview 
entirely unrelated to the world in which anyone actually lives. Perhaps more damning is 
another effect illustrated by Newman’s consideration of the problems posed by seeing 
evolution as the description of how the world is and is intended to be. The very plenitude 
of God would be denied, and hospitality, of course, would seem to be absurd: “It would 
be better to look out for oneself and protect one’s own family and belongings.”77 
With such varying intellectual trends and schools of thought vying with one 
another in the academy, however, it is not at all difficult to see why many might see an 
equation of hospitality with tolerance as useful. Newman correctly discerns that this 
equation underwrites “the polity of our liberal democratic nation-state. By practicing such 
hospitality, Christians embrace the politics of liberalism, all the while failing to notice 
that it is a politics.”78 If the politics underlying the Christian attempt to practice 
hospitality in the American context is built on assumptions that individuals themselves 
are the ultimate (or the only) source of meaning and morality, the bar for hospitality truly 
needs only to be set as high as tolerance. As Newman notes, “Liberalism therefore is 
necessarily yoked with pluralism: there are plural understandings of the good.” It is 
undoubtedly the virtue of tolerance, then, that can provide some semblance of social 
cohesion in society with such disparate notions of morality and the proper ends of human 
life.79 Naturally, Newman is bound to recognize the clear possible good of pluralism: it 
 
allows multiple voices to be heard, and forces perspectives to be sharpened through 
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engagement with different—and potentially even hostile—outlooks. There is tremendous 
insight in her observation, however, that pluralism cannot provide the tools to make any 
grounded conclusions regarding these differences: “pluralism has absolutely no way to 
discern between the true, the good, and the beautiful and the false, the bad, and the 
ugly.”80 Pluralism, then, is no guarantor of a higher education. To the contrary, Newman 
argues that it actually “shuts down true learning. By imposing a ‘culture of choice,’ 
pluralism underwrites a market approach to education, fueled by self-interest and 
competition. Such an approach makes desiring and loving the good unlikely.”81 
Luke Bretherton and the Necessity of Tradition 
 
Newman’s work leads her to the conviction that all disciplines require a kind of 
catechesis “before there can be genuine debate.”82 What is required, it seems, is for the 
individual intellectual to have a place to stand while engaging in the push and pull of 
academic discourse. In his work on the importance of continued Christian witness in the 
midst of contemporary diversity (with its attendant relativism) of moral perspectives, 
Luke Bretherton seems to make a similar observation. Bretherton notes that Alasdair 
MacIntyre, for instance, has found that any “rational enquiry into morals is inherently 
tradition-bound and must take account of its social context.”83 While post-moderns might 
predictably bristle at any suggestion of moral standards that transcend the particularities 
of context, it is nevertheless the case that moral standards are, as such, universal. To 
engage with the standards of another, then, is really to bring one tradition into 
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conversation with another tradition. As Bretherton again summarizes MacIntyre: “It is 
traditions that are the repositories of standards of rationality, which in turn enable 
appropriate moral deliberation and action in accord with the natural law.”84 Such a 
framing of the matter makes rational moral debate possible, in MacIntyre’s view. The 
process, to be sure, is nevertheless a complex one. First, the “protagonists of each 
tradition must learn the language of their rivals’ tradition….” Second, each side must 
give “an account or history of the other in terms defined by the other, thus demonstrating 
that it properly understands the other within the other’s own criteria of evaluation.” 
Finally, each tradition must evaluate “itself in the light of its rival and (judge) whether its 
own account of the truth is inferior to that offered by its rival.”85 
Bretherton also engages with Germain Grisez’s conclusion that “all traditions, 
 
despite great variation of culture, and the problems of sin, share a general, or universal, 
ethic based on practical reason.”86 Thus for Grisez, then, there is an underlying 
consistency binding all traditions together that makes MacIntyre’s fears of fragmentation 
unfounded. Interestingly, then, Grisez would argue that there is no ultimately significant 
difference between what a disciple of Christ holds to be morally upright and the moral 
sensibilities of non-Christians. As Bretherton summarizes, “In effect, Grisez is saying 
that Christ simply republishes the moral law.”87 Whereas MacIntyre envisions any 
progress in dialogue over moral disputes between traditions to be very difficult, Grisez 
detects enough common ground stemming from practical rationality that such progress 
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could be gained relatively easily. Rather starkly, though, Bretherton himself rejects 
Grisez’s perspective as utterly unfaithful: “To resort to a general ethic to justify Christian 
moral claims demonstrates a lack of faith in Christ.”88 Christologically, Bretherton’s 
rejection of Grisez is strong. Nevertheless, one wonders if Bretherton would be better off 
considering a somewhat more inclusivist awareness that God’s Word may well cast a 
shadow far longer than even His most devoted disciples might realize. 
Bretherton is surely on more stable theological ground in his skepticism regarding 
MacIntyre. He notes, correctly, that MacIntyre allows for the possibility of one tradition 
being vindicated over and against another, but “there is always the possibility that another 
tradition might arise which can usurp the former victor.” Such insecurity, Bretherton 
contends, is incompatible with faith in the Gospel. “There is no room for slipping into 
such insecurity in Christianity: the gospel is good news precisely because the future is 
already achieved in Christ and we can now trust that goodness and justice will prevail 
against all that oppose their establishment.”89 
Instead, Bretherton relies on the ecclesiological work of Oliver O’Donovan to 
inform his conception of Christian intellectual hospitality as proper response to ethical 
disputes with non-Christians. Bretherton argues that O’Donovan provides an 
ecclesiological model which “can account for both the church’s distinctiveness from, and 
the possibility of the church sharing its life together with, its neighbours.”90 Given the 
ability of ‘the world’ to become ‘church,’ Bretherton recognizes this is a fine line to 
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walk: “In this age, no clear dividing lines can be identified between Christians and non- 
Christians; all such division will only become clear at the eschaton.”91 It is ultimately, for 
Bretherton, Christian hospitality which is necessary to straddle both distinctiveness and 
the possibility of communion: 
Importantly, the motif of hospitality maintains the key eschatological tensions of Christian 
specificity. It does not force a harmony either through abstraction: that is, the term does not 
dissolve the eschatological tension by appealing to some universal principle (love, justice, and so 
on); neither does it demand that Christians enter into relations with their neighbours on the basis 
of a rivalry between competing traditions. Rather, the motif highlights the central and substantial 
concerns already discussed; that is, it allows for Christians to retain their specific criteria for 
evaluating the veracity of moral claims, while at the level of moral practice experiencing both 
continuity and discontinuity with their neighbours.92 
 
Amos Yong and a Pneumatological Hospitality 
 
While Bretherton arrives at the importance of intellectual hospitality in 
considering ethical disputes between traditions, Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong 
comes to the same realization via his work to develop a vigorous theology of religions. 
Broadly speaking, Yong acknowledges that while “there are valid arguments for forms of 
Christian sectarianism that can serve as correctives to Christian expressions that are 
overly accommodating to cultural dynamics and fads,” he also sees clearly that “there are 
also unhealthy fundamentalisms shaped by religious convictions and forms of life that are 
immune to external criticism.” What is needed, then, is a means of facilitating 
introspection on the part of the church. Yong contends that “the space for self-reflexivity 
and criticism is opened up precisely in the hospitable encounter with the stranger, the 
alien, and even the religious other.”93 With a pneumatological emphasis befitting his 
tradition, Yong argues that “the many works and tongues of the Spirit of Pentecost open 
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up to many practices vis-à-vis the religions.”94 It is, therefore, the Spirit that animates the 
Christians’ side of any meaningful engagement with the other. “…the Christian doctrine 
of hospitality provides a rich framework to think about how the many tongues, gifts, and 
works of the Spirit enable and empower a wide range of Christian practices with regard 
to other religious traditions in general and people of other faiths in particular.”95 
Yong considers the theological suppositions of what he considers the exclusivist, 
 
inclusivist, and pluralist perspectives on the theology of religions, and proceeds then to 
examine what practices the beliefs of each seem to support.96 Yong surveys both 
Scripture and tradition in piecing together his pneumatological theology of interreligious 
engagement, and ultimately draws conclusions that sound commensurate to Bretherton’s. 
Namely, “the requisite posture is much more paradoxical in affirming both 
countercultural opposition and hospitable openness…In this case, countercultural 
opposition means maintaining a distinctively Christian communal identity, but hospitable 
openness means interacting with rather than isolating ourselves from our neighbors.”97 
Thinkers as diverse as Newman, Bretherton, and Yong have contributed much to 
 
the recent retrieval of hospitality in general, and also to a more specific defining of what 
Christian hospitality might mean in an intellectual sphere. In particular, all three would 
be wary of a crude conflation of hospitality with tolerance. For all three, hospitality 
implies a radical openness that is possible only when one knows where home is, and also 
something of what it is that makes home distinctive. It will no doubt strike the reader that 
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none of these three thinkers writes from an explicitly Catholic perspective. This absence 
of Catholic voices will not continue long into the next section of this chapter, much less 
the remainder of this dissertation as a whole. It will be seen in the chapters on Merton, 
Lonergan, and Dunne that their own journeys as Catholic intellectuals reflected an 
authentic Christian hospitality. All three were eager to engage the other, to love and to 
learn. And for all three, this hospitality was not inhibited by, but was indeed spurred by, 
the content of their own Catholic tradition. At this point, attention must be paid to another 
Christian virtue, one which has long been closely related to hospitality. 
Friendship and Hospitality 
 
It has already been noted that this modern retrieval of hospitality was sparked in 
no small part by the work of Henri Nouwen. It is worth mentioning again at this juncture 
that, in Nouwen’s definition of hospitality, it is clear that Christian hospitality is oriented 
toward the transformation of enemies into friends. Although hospitality cannot coerce a 
recipient into friendship, there is an openness to friendship which is integral to the 
practice of Christian hospitality.98 On the one hand, there is certainly reason to suspect 
 
that this connection of hospitality and friendship is detrimental to hospitality. After all, 
hospitality has clearly entailed significant risk for Christian practitioners as often as not. 
There is an obviously selfless element to it. Friendship, on the other hand, has not always 
found a home in Christian thinking, precisely because it seems to pale in comparison to 
the selfless agape of the Gospel. “In friendship we see an exclusive, preferential love 
based on what people find attractive in one another. In agape we see an inclusive, 
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universal love that goes out to anyone regardless of whether that love is returned, 
regardless of whether we find the person easy to love or not.”99 
The work of Paul Wadell on Christian friendship can add significant texture to the 
relationship between friendship and hospitality noted by Nouwen. For Wadell, though 
agape and friendship may move in different directions, it is not necessary to see them in 
opposition to one another. “As such, friendship can school us in the virtues because it 
demands getting outside ourself, it demands developing a horizon of interests and 
concerns beyond the confines of the self. Friendship enlarges the self, but only to the 
degree that it focuses on another precisely as other.”100 Indeed, for Wadell, morality itself 
can only be understood as something which happens to someone in relationship with 
others. “Morality is an implication of otherness, and this means we can only be moral 
when we learn to appreciate what is not ourselves.”101 When one is hospitable—and open 
to the prospect of friendship—there is significant exposure to risk. The world must 
necessarily become a bigger place, and there is no guarantee that one’s previous 
understandings and suppositions will continue to be tenable in precisely the way they had 
been. “It is impossible to risk such hospitality without feeling a loss of self, without an 
initial sense of disintegration, for that is exactly what happens.”102 
Wadell’s insights make it rather easier to see what exactly is at stake when 
 
Christian hospitality is being ventured. There is clearly much that can be gained from a 
hospitable encounter with those who might help one better understand himself, God’s 
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creation, or even God Himself. How much difference can be ‘absorbed’ within the 
context of Christian hospitality, however? How much broadening of horizons ought one 
risk in the interest of friendship? It is Newman, though, who articulates best the nature of 
the dilemma when it comes to intellectual hospitality: “The challenge, in terms of 
hospitality, is to discern when our differences ought to be embraced and when they need 
to be transformed.”103 Indeed, when precisely is friendship a realistic possibility when 
Christian hospitality is offered? It will be necessary to expand a bit on the relationship 
between hospitality and friendship here before considering further the importance (and 
advantages) of friendship. 
Newman examines this relationship in the midst of an overarching explanation of 
the dangers posed to Christian hospitality by individualism. “That we are created for 
communion with God and others means that we are part of a tradition in which we are 
dependent on others…to demonstrate to us what we are to be. Such a politics does not 
depend on individualism but rather on friendship.”104 An awareness of humanity’s telos, 
then, orients the Christian’s life toward the prospect of friendship, and it is this 
 
orientation which makes hospitality possible. At the same time, though, Newman also 
contends that friendship is dependent on hospitality. She sees that “hospitality involves 
taking delight in the dynamics of giving and receiving such that we become more fully 
capable of delighting in the love of God. Without such hospitality, friendship is not 
possible.”105 
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Wadell’s work confirms Newman’s suspicion that friendship and hospitality 
relate in a dynamic, clearly non-linear way. It would be too simplistic, it seems, to say 
only that hospitality leads to friendship or that friendship facilitates hospitality. As 
already seen, Wadell considers friendship to be something of a school of the moral life, in 
that it forces the human person to look beyond the self. “The plot of the moral life,” 
Wadell posits, “is to move beyond the security but hopelessness of egotism to the risk but 
enrichment of hospitality, and this is one thing friendship achieves.”106 Wadell also seems 
to suggest that the offering of friendship can simply be a part of hospitality: “There are 
people dying for attention, people silently screaming out for a moment of recognition, a 
chance to be befriended. For us to befriend them is to give them the attention of love, to 
rescue them with the gift of life sometimes only a stranger can give.”107 While there may 
well be a certain intuitive consistency to supposing that hospitality must come first with 
friendship following, the above demonstrates that there is an equally potent movement 
beginning with friendship and leading to hospitality. If, as Wadell argues, “There is a 
disintegration of the self in friendship because there is also a redefinition of self,” then it 
is exactly friendship which ought to help Christian hospitality be a great deal more than a 
means of entertaining those whom one already likes.108 
Friendship 
 
The previous chapter makes clear that this dissertation was undertaken largely out 
of concern for a Catholic university’s ability to be true both to its own Catholic identity 
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as well as to the rigorous demands of being not only a university but also a part of the 
Catholic Church’s encounter with—and even witness to—the world. This second chapter 
has followed with very little of that clear institutional orientation. As will become clearer 
in the remaining chapters, this dissertation contends that it would be utterly foolish to 
suggest that something as complex as a Catholic university can straddle the demands of 
both identity and mission if an individual Catholic scholar cannot remain faithfully 
Catholic and hospitable to the other. As such, the remaining chapters will each be 
devoted to profiling a Catholic intellectual who—to one degree or another, and in his 
own unique ways—remained rooted in the Catholic tradition while engaging with those 
outside that same tradition. As such, this second chapter’s extended consideration of 
hospitality would seem incomplete (especially given the previous section) if more time 
were not spent examining further the Christian’s need for friendship. 
In the farewell discourses of John’s Gospel, Christ makes a claim that may well 
seem to be hard to reconcile with the high Christology of that text. “I do not call you 
servants any longer, because the servant does not know what the master is doing; but I 
have called you friends, because I have made known to you everything that I have heard 
from my Father.”109 This passage has heartened Christian readers ever since, and indeed 
has occasionally informed Christian thought on humanity’s proper end. Aquinas, for 
 
instance, believed “we can, are called to be, and must be friends of God. That is what our 
life is, a life of ever-deepening friendship with a God who is our happiness…”110 For 
Wadell, God draws us into this friendship with Himself through a process in which 
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people learn to be friends with one another. When friendship with God is achieved, “we 
give ourself away, we surrender to the Spirit, and in that surrender our most exquisite 
individuality is secured, for we come to be what God in perfect love has always wanted 
us to be.”111 Longtime missionary Christopher Heuertz and Pohl put it more concisely, 
stating that “Friends of God love what and whom God loves.”112 They also provide a 
meaningful addendum to Wadell’s notion that human friendship serves as a school of 
morality in which people learn to be friends of God. Reflecting on the experience of 
trying to aid women fleeing the commercial sex industry in South Asia, Heuertz describes 
the great pain he felt when one of the women to whom his mission had offered hospitality 
betrayed and robbed them. Even in failing to cultivate friendship, however, Heuertz 
found himself ‘schooled in morality.’ “Slowly we were being reconciled to God’s vision 
of faithfulness and love. Through the pain of loss we came to realize the joy of giving 
ourselves in love and friendship.”113 
Nevertheless, it is Wadell’s contention that without friendship, life morally is not 
 
worth living. Of course, this might easily be reconciled with Heuertz’s experience. His 
earlier experiences of friendship had no doubt given him a much clearer idea of what had 
been lost when he was betrayed and robbed by a previously prospective friend. Indeed, 
even in failing in the offering of friendship, Heuertz experienced something of the 
breaking out of oneself that Wadell argues is necessary for the moral life. “It is never 
enough,” Wadell posits, “just to be ourselves, we have to grow, to be transfigured from 
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sinners into friends of God.”114 And the human person, it is worth adding, is never 
capable of effecting this transfiguration alone. God’s grace, obviously, is of paramount 
importance. Friendship with others, too, is indispensable; “there simply is no other way to 
come in touch with the goods that make us whole than through relationships with those 
who share them.”115 It is in the moral life, nurtured by friendship, that one discovers  
when she is at her best. What love will bring her to fullness? For Wadell, then, morality, 
which depends on friendship, is not simply one compartment within one’s life. Instead, 
“it is the whole of life viewed a certain way, seen as the story of how men and women 
through their beliefs, convictions, and actions, through their loves, passions, and 
attachments, together  make themselves into someone they had not been before.”116 
Given Wadell’s strong statements on the necessity of friendship for morality and 
 
the extreme significance of morality for achieving one’s telos, it is perhaps important to 
note that these insights ought not lead one to conclude that friendship is primarily about 
selfishly looking after one’s needs. American culture, however, is greatly influenced by 
both consumerism and materialism, which can distort a healthier understanding of what 
Christian friendship ought to entail. In the first place, “they seriously misunderstand what 
a good friendship is. In the ideology of consumerism, the primary purpose of any 
relationship is to fulfill our needs, but this fundamentally redefines what a friendship is.” 
Such an understanding would surely lead one ‘friend’ to manipulate another. Materialism 
and consumerism also undermine friendship in that they form “in people qualities of 
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character that are the antithesis of what good friendship requires….If we believe what we 
own matters more than who we love, we will hardly be unselfish enough to seek the good 
of another for her or his own sake or find joy in expending ourselves for their well-being, 
which is exactly what friendships require.”117 
In a very real way, friendship is a kind of sacramental encounter. The love of a 
 
friend makes real the love that God also has for a person. This sacramental nature of 
friendship, coupled with Wadell’s notion of friendship as a school of virtue, moves 
friendship to a place far more central to the Christian life than many have previously 
accorded it. Undoubtedly, friendship has a close relationship to hospitality. The Christian 
learns hospitality by being a friend, even as it is an initial gesture of hospitality that 
makes friendship possible. What, then, might the implications of this relationship be for 
the church as a whole? In Wadell’s estimation, “If the church is faithful to its identity as 
the friends of God, it should be a befriending community that not only welcomes all who 
come to it but also offers them a place where the grammar of intimacy and friendship can 
be learned.”118 As the church’s ability to be hospitable goes, so too, it would seem, goes 
its willingness to befriend. 
Limits of Hospitality 
 
Hospitality has been proposed as a vital tool that Catholic higher education ought 
to employ to more effectively navigate questions of institutional identity in a way in 
keeping with the riches of the Catholic tradition. Hospitality’s roots in both Scripture and 
the early history of the church have been explored. The nature of Christian hospitality has 
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been found to clearly contrast with the far less risky hospitality of the ‘hospitality 
industry.’ Moving closer to the central matter at hand in this dissertation, Christian 
intellectual hospitality has been considered as well, drawing from the work of three 
recent Christian scholars. Finally, the relationship of hospitality to friendship has been 
defined as a kind of circular interchange. Before concluding this chapter with a section 
linking hospitality explicitly to Catholic higher education, it is a good time to briefly 
remember that Christian hospitality—despite being inspired by the loving plenitude given 
by God and motivated by a selfless charity for fellow people as Christians continue their 
pilgrimage—does in fact brush up against very real limitations. Hospitality creates a 
space wherein communion between even erstwhile antagonists can find grounds for 
communion and friendship. In order for that space to be structurally sound, it has to be 
constructed of something real. Intellectually, it seems, hospitality must necessarily imply 
formation in a tradition of thought and some commitment to that tradition in order for any 
communion to be substantial. 
Nevertheless, a certain sadness accompanies any limitations on Christian 
hospitality. While studying Christian communities noted for their hospitality, Pohl 
discovered that most had initially resisted any idea of boundaries. Only gradually did they 
find that “certain guidelines, certain boundaries were necessary to be able to continue 
offering hospitality.” Even so, these same communities retained an obvious ambivalence 
regarding these same limitations that they had placed upon themselves. They were, at 
best, “a concession to human finiteness, and they were never imposed without regret for 
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the cost and loss involved.”119 It is hard for practitioners of Christian hospitality to square 
boundaries of any kind with the kind of gracious plenty that seems so characteristic of 
God’s love. Indeed, what limits, one might ask, did Christ place upon Himself as He 
underwent his Passion? Limiting hospitality, Pohl notes, “seems to undermine what is 
fundamental to the practice.”120 As much as a Christian might be on her guard to make 
sure she never turns Christ Himself away, and as much as that same Christian be 
desperate to incarnate something of God’s own hospitality, there is no shame—or sin—in 
remembering that she is, by nature, limited. Pohl acknowledges that “Although 
boundaries are difficult to impose and sometimes contested by hosts and guests, ignoring 
limits can be a form of arrogance, a refusal to recognize finiteness.”121 
More to the point of this dissertation is Newman’s caution regarding inclusiveness 
 
pushed too far: “Christian hospitality disappears when the distinction between church and 
world is collapsed.”122 Newman is a strong advocate of retaining a sense of discipline in 
Christian hospitality. Any practice of hospitality, Newman rightly sees, “is going to be 
exclusive in some sense. Since such practice will always be rooted in a broader tradition 
regarding the way the world is and regarding the good and the true, it is going to 
necessarily exclude other kinds of hospitality.”123 Without a disciplinary way of 
functioning as the body of Christ, Newman worries, “the church risks becoming a 
collection of individuals who might share common beliefs or common likes but who 
cease to be a visible, political body. Undisciplined hospitality easily becomes superficial, 
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often judging poorly out of false desires, such as the desire to be liked.”124 There may 
well be times, then, that even an act of rejection on the part of the Christian may well be 
an act of hospitality. While such an act of calculated rejection might be said to protect the 
integrity of the church in some way or another (depending on the reasons for the 
rejection), it seems clear that it may also protect the integrity of the rejected person’s 
freedom. Should she not have a right to freely choose, or reject, that which is, 
authentically, Christ’s church at its best and most genuine? 
Links to Catholic Higher Education 
 
Elizabeth Newman criticizes a significant swath of Christian (Catholic and 
otherwise) higher education on the question of identity. What she terms “woefully 
inadequate” ways of talking about Christian identity stem, in her thinking, from a 
“malformed theology” that rests on the conviction that faith and knowledge “are separate 
entities or exist in separate spheres.”125 In the case of particular institutions, that is a 
conviction this dissertation shares. It would, of course, be difficult to take a university’s 
Catholic identity seriously if that identity did not extend down into the part of the 
university’s life that dealt with teaching and learning. This is not simply a case of 
Catholic higher education being different for difference’s sake. As Newman puts it 
elsewhere, “The vocation given to Christian institutions is the same one given to 
Christians individually. It is, in the words of the encyclical Veritatis Splendor, a ‘vocation 
to perfect love.’”126 If this is the case, then it is surely clear that the politics of Catholic 
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higher education must run counter to the highly-individualistic politics of the time. No 
small part of this counter-cultural bent ought to be the Catholic university’s comfort with 
speaking of the proper ends of a Catholic university education. Monika Hellwig once 
suggested that “If we look at higher education in terms of Christianity, then the goal for 
students is not the moment of graduation but the moment they die. What have they done 
with their lives? The goal should be a lifetime engagement in search of the reign of 
God.”127 
Of course, such explicitly religious language certainly will make many in the 
broader academic world uncomfortable, as it will seem to be potentially exclusive of 
those who do not, for whatever reason, subscribe to that language. The true danger, 
however, may well lie in a universalist rationalism which would “(maintain) that true 
intellectual discourse requires the privatization, or even abandonment, of explicitly 
religious language.”128 It is actually this kind of a position which threatens Catholic 
institutional identity and has the potential to seriously flatten the intellectual landscape of 
American higher education as a result. Newman, in a manner not unlike this dissertation, 
believes strongly that “the practice of Christian hospitality can give us language, skills, 
and virtues that enable us to speak more truthfully about Christian higher education.”129 
Rather than contribute to more exclusion or a dumbing down of the Catholic university’s 
intellectual atmosphere by amplifying the religious language used to express its identity, 
however, exactly the opposite becomes likely. “To invoke the Christian practice of 
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hospitality,” Newman explains, “…is to call attention to a complex tradition, a story, a 
concrete place even, from which we think, come to know, engage the other, and generally 
move forward in our intellectual pursuit of truth.”130 
It is been made clear that hospitality—as the Christian tradition has always 
understood it—simply does not rely “upon a hostility to givenness. Rather, hospitality 
delights in and is even defined as the welcoming of the other as gift. To practice this kind 
of welcome, we must see our own condition as gift, as something we did not simply 
create or construct, nor as something essentially oppressive.”131 As Pohl succinctly notes, 
“Hospitality requires some material resources.”132 When it comes to intellectual 
hospitality, perhaps the most important resource is having a place to stand. That is to say, 
the most important resource for a practitioner of Christian intellectual hospitality, and 
indeed the most valuable thing that practitioner has to offer, may well be the intellectual 
tradition which makes such hospitality possible in the first place. As Newman posits, 
“making distinctions and separating ourselves in some sense from other convictions, from 
‘the world,’ are crucial if hospitality is going to be a truly vibrant practice.”133 
Oden acknowledges that “The virtue and practices of hospitality do not emerge 
automatically in most communities. They must be cultivated.”134 This would no doubt be 
the case every bit as much in a contemporary Catholic university as it ever was in a 
medieval monastery. Some of the practical steps that an institution might take will be 
addressed toward the end of this dissertation. Between now and then, however, it must be 
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shown that this idea of Christian intellectual hospitality is, in fact, workable on any level 
whatsoever. Noting the dependence that many have on institutions for imparting 
hospitality, Pohl states that while this may lessen the amount of personal investment and 
responsibility required, something important is missing: “But hospitality requires both 
personal and communal commitment, and settings which combine aspects of public and 
private life.”135 If a Catholic university has any hope of being truly hospitable, then, it 
will require the presence of dedicated Catholic intellectuals who themselves manage to be 
intellectually hospitable. What would such intellectual hospitality look like? Each of the 
next three chapters will examine the hospitality of a noted Catholic intellectual in the 
hope of drawing systematic conclusions on the nature of a specifically Catholic 
intellectual hospitality. 
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Chapter 3: Thomas Merton’s Monastic, Global Hospitality 
 
 
Introduction 
In November 1958, Trappist monk, American public intellectual, and famous 
Catholic author Thomas Merton wrote a letter to Pope John XXIII which reflected 
Merton’s developing sense of his vocation and also would serve to define much of his 
activity for the ten remaining years of his life. Ten years earlier, Merton’s spiritual 
autobiography, The Seven Storey Mountain, had been received with great acclaim, despite 
a pronounced renunciation of the world, which may actually have contributed to its 
popularity in the years immediately after the Second World War. In the interim, Merton 
had sought greater solitude in a monastery bursting with new additions to the Trappist 
order attracted in no small part by his own writing. Drawn to a contemplative vocation, 
Merton’s outlook was radically altered by the experience of being master of scholastics 
and then, several years later, master of novices. In a sequence rather reminiscent of 
Wadell’s description of friendship as a school of charity, Merton found his relationship to 
the aspiring monks as their teacher to be utterly transformative. Merton explained to the 
Pope that he had “come to see more and more what abundant apostolic opportunities the 
contemplative life offers, without even going outside the monastic cloister.”1 
 
Merton desired to share his contemplation with the world. Indeed, he desired to be 
enriched through his exchanges with various intellectuals from throughout the world, but 
he was also firmly convinced that he had something to offer them as well. Merton 
informed the Pope that he had had “the experience of seeing that this kind of 
1. William H. Shannon and Christine M. Bochen, editors, Thomas Merton: A Life in Letters (New 
York: HarperOne, 2008), 103. 
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understanding and friendly sympathy, on the part of a monk who really understands 
them, has produced striking effects among artists, writers, publishers, poets, etc., who 
have become my friends without my having to leave the cloister.”2 And it was, truly, as a 
Catholic monk that Merton engaged with an almost incredibly wide range of people with 
an equally wide range of backgrounds and perspectives. Reassuring the Pope that his 
vision for his somewhat peculiar vocation had received the approval of his superiors at 
Gethsemani Abbey and within the Cistercian order, Merton described his calling as “an 
apostolate of friendship.”3 
This chapter suggests Merton as an exemplar of precisely the kind of intellectual 
 
hospitality described at length in the previous chapter. Merton corresponded, visited, and 
was visited by friends of various faiths and friends with seemingly no faith at all. 
Throughout the entirety of his apostolate, Merton maintained his Catholic convictions 
even as he enriched them with the insights his exchanges garnered. In 1965, the heart of 
the period in which Merton was pursuing the apostolate of friendship, he wrote in 
Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander that he found in himself “not the slightest inclination 
to be anything but ‘Catholic.’ Any further question of other institutions, other 
organizations, appears to me to be totally ludicrous. I believe in the Church. I am in the 
place where Christ has put me. Amen. On the other hand, I wish I had more 
charity.”4Moreover, this chapter will contend that it was actually the content of his 
 
Catholic worldview—specifically the Christological conclusions that he would draw later 
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in life, as the previous quote just begins to suggest—that enabled his apostolate of 
intellectual friendship in the first place. In turn, this dissertation will proceed to argue that 
Merton’s example may have lessons for the Catholic intellectual life generally, and 
indeed for Catholic higher education in particular. 
In some ways, though, it may seem odd to suggest a useful connection between 
Merton and Catholic higher education. On the one hand, Thomas Del Prete has long 
argued that Thomas Merton provides an attractive foundation for a spirituality of 
education. Despite the ‘pithiness’ of Merton’s explicit references to education as such, 
“they become magnified enormously in scope and depth when set against the rich 
background of Merton’s life, his spiritual and social writing, his creative expression, and 
his Christian contemplative perspectives nurtured in the midst of the twentieth century.”5 
 
On the other hand, however, Merton has sometimes been declared an intellectual without 
the refinement characteristic of academe. G.T. Dempsey has rather strongly asserted that 
“despite being intensely bookish,” Merton himself was simply “not a scholar.”6 Dempsey 
goes back to Merton’s MA thesis at Columbia University to find early evidence of “the 
lack of the necessary knowledge in depth of the subject matter and a disregard for 
historical contextualization and causation” that “remained hallmarks of Merton’s work 
throughout his life.”7 Truly, it is not difficult to find the word impulsive used to describe 
Merton in any commentary on his life. Merton himself was well enough aware that he 
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had a habit of writing too much too soon.8 And yet, it is important to remember that what 
may have been recorded in journals or even sent in letters were not always—or even 
often—Merton’s ultimate conclusions on a given topic. Merton biographer Michael Mott 
notes that Merton had long had a habit of testing alternative perspectives by getting and 
gauging reactions from others.9 Perhaps to some extent the relationship(s) Merton was 
forming at a given time was a matter of greater urgency to him than the immediate 
consistency and lasting tenability of his assertions. 
Nevertheless, Merton’s bookishness (amateurish though it may have been), the 
development of his perspective on solitude and contemplation, and his insight regarding 
the true self have all contributed to make Merton’s writings classics—in some cases 
instantly so. While Merton may have lacked some of the polished critical analysis of a 
seasoned scholar, he nevertheless had an impressive ability “to learn from others yet 
think for himself, even as an impressionable college student.”10 Additionally, the use of 
Merton as an exemplar of sorts for academicians seems justifiable also on the grounds of 
the intellectual activity that Merton’s work has inspired in the decades since his death. 
Within a mere eleven years after his death, Elena Malits notes that there were already 
“some sixty-seven doctoral dissertations or master’s theses on Thomas Merton” either 
finished or in progress.11 As of this writing, some fifty years since Merton’s death, he 
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continues to be read, continues to inspire, and remains an exemplar of astonishing 
curiosity and literary output. It is with this in mind that this chapter proceeds. 
Friendship and the Early Merton 
Thomas Merton was born in France in January 1915, to an American mother and 
a New Zealander father. Merton’s childhood was characterized by frequent travel and 
significant autonomy, both of which resulted in part from the loss of both parents before 
he had entered college. After a disastrous year at Cambridge during which he fathered a 
child out of wedlock, Merton moved to the United States, where he would soon enroll at 
Columbia University. Over the course of the following decade, Merton’s path would lead 
him through a conversion to Catholicism, and even through discernment of a vocation to 
the Trappists. Merton’s life as a Trappist (until his death in 1968) was characterized in no 
small part by his career as a prolific author of works of Catholic spirituality, social 
commentary, and monastic witness. 
While conducting the research for his impressively comprehensive biography of 
Merton, Michael Mott found that many of the people with whom he spoke had found 
something perhaps both disarming and mesmerizing in their respective encounters with 
Merton. For many of these people, Mott relates, there was a clear sense “that when 
Merton talked to you he made you feel—at least for the time—that you were his most 
intimate confidant, that he opened himself to you and you opened yourself to him in a 
way which made it an exchange like no other, and that this friendship could not be 
duplicated by either of you with anyone else.”12 If Merton truly possessed such an intense 
 
charisma, it may go a long way toward explaining the success of the apostolate of 
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friendship which dominated his latter years. At the same time, though, Mott does also 
suggest that Merton had a peculiar ability to “(hide) himself in a blaze of self- 
revelation.”13 This is less likely an indication of consistent disingenuousness on Merton’s 
part than it is simply a clear sign that the quality of Merton’s interactions with others 
changed markedly over time. As a young man, Merton’s intensity was in no small part a 
symptom of his desire to assert himself over and above his various youthful insecurities. 
Later on, however, this intensity is a reflection of the earnestness with which he sought 
the communion of true friendship with others. 
This section of the chapter will outline some of Merton’s earlier forays into 
friendship, so as to better contextualize later on the relationships that were part of his 
apostolate of friendship, his attitude toward them, and the impact they had on him. 
Throughout The Seven Storey Mountain, Merton displays an almost incredible capacity 
for recollection. Obviously, any autobiographical work must be read critically, and it is 
clear that Merton is interpreting (sometimes decades after the fact) various events in his 
life in terms of Providence at work in the story of his conversion. In the early chapters of 
The Seven Storey Mountain, Merton paints vivid portraits of the family members who 
impacted him most greatly. Strikingly absent from his account of the young Merton’s 
life, however, are any really meaningful friendships. Of course, this could simply be part 
and parcel of Merton the monk casting judgement upon Merton the boy, as is typical 
enough in his autobiography. And yet, another factor here is that Merton the orphan 
seems to have resisted to the utmost almost anything which might have grounded him, or 
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encouraged him to look beyond himself. As Merton recounts, “The death of my father 
left me sad and depressed for a couple of months. But that eventually wore away. And 
when it did, I found myself completely stripped of everything that impeded the 
movement of my will to do as it pleased. I imagined that I was free.”14 Straight through 
the dismal experience of his single year at Cambridge, Merton does not give the reader 
much reason to believe that any of his friendships were actually lasting, or even 
substantial. 
Things would certainly change on that front in Merton’s recalling of his days at 
Columbia. It was there that Merton found friendships capable of inspiring in him 
something beyond self-interest. Nestled amidst his Columbia memories is Merton’s 
acknowledgement that “God has willed that we should all depend on one another for our 
salvation, and all strive together for our own mutual good and our own common 
salvation.”15 Thus, Merton would eventually be convinced that it was no mere accident 
that he enrolled at Columbia, nor was it simply the peculiarities of personality that held 
his social circle together: “So now is the time to tell a thing that I could not realize then, 
but which has become very clear to me: that God brought me and a half a dozen others 
together at Columbia, and made us friends, in such a ways that our friendship would 
work powerfully to rescue us from the confusion and the misery in which we had come to 
find ourselves…”16 
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The nexus of this group of friends, at least at its beginning, was the classroom of 
Professor Mark Van Doren, whom Lawrence Cunningham describes as the “most 
influential” friend from this period in Merton’s life. Van Doren, according to 
Cunningham, brought Merton “into intimate contact with the world of literature, guiding 
him through the classical tradition” and encouraging Merton’s interests in many of the 
most important literary influences of Merton’s life.17 While Van Doren receives a full 
measure of praise in The Seven Storey Mountain, even he may not have been as crucial a 
friend for Merton as Robert Lax. It would be impossible to miss the lingering love and 
even admiration that Merton the monk retained for Lax in his descriptions of him 
throughout the autobiography. When Merton describes “the secret of (Lax’s) constant 
solidity” as being “a kind of natural, instinctive spirituality, a kind of inborn direction to 
the living God,” it is clear that Lax represented something to which Merton himself 
aspired.18 Indeed, in the arena of goals and aspirations, Merton credits Lax with imparting 
to him the insight that there is only one legitimate life goal for any self-respecting 
Catholic: sainthood.19 
Wherever Merton would find himself on his peculiar path toward sainthood, he 
was apparently always able to rely on the support of his close cadre of friends from 
Columbia. Merton remained intensely loyal to them, even as they were every bit as loyal 
to him throughout extended periods characterized by a very monastic lack of 
communication. As Mott puts it, “When (Merton) turned his back on the world in 1941, 
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he made no such rejection of his friends, and his friendships survived the long silences.”20 
When Merton was ordained in 1949, several of his Columbia friends were in attendance, 
having made the trek to Kentucky. It is impossible to know how Merton’s life would 
have turned out had it not been for his decision to enroll at Columbia, or had it not been 
for the friendships he built there. What is clear, though, is that Merton had at least a 
Columbia-inspired conception of the importance of friendship when he began to 
articulate the summation of his life’s work as an apostolate of friendship by the end of the 
1950s. 
Solitude 
And yet, it would be a gross oversimplification to suggest that there is a neat 
progression from the college friendships of the 1930s to the intellectual friendships of the 
1960s. While there is undoubtedly a connection, it must be remembered that for a good 
deal of time in between Merton was quite focused on finding greater solitude, devoting 
more time to contemplation and being rather far removed from any opportunity for 
making new friends. 
Of course, much of what Merton writes indicates that monasticism—as he 
understood it—did not mean Gnosticism, and that solitude—as he experienced it—did 
not mean selfish isolation. Merton was keenly aware of the danger of making solitude 
simply a type of isolation. If isolation is the only thing solitude had to offer, it would be 
very difficult to see how solitude could ever be a legitimate means of Christian 
discipleship. After all, so much of the Gospel message relies on being in relationship to 
others. Without the chance to encounter other people created in God’s image, how could 
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one possibly learn to love like Christ? Solitude would be little more than a selfish attempt 
to retreat from the world that God created. As a result, Merton developed a much more 
sophisticated notion of solitude. Instead of forcing solitude to mean isolation, Merton felt 
that a person was solitary “at the moment when, no matter what may be his external 
surroundings, he is suddenly aware of his own inalienable solitude and sees that he will 
never be anything but solitary.”21 Indeed, Merton would eventually look upon even John 
Henry Newman as a solitary of sorts, insofar as Newman had suffered the “kind of 
rejection which liberates (solitaries) into a realm of a final perfection, a uniqueness, a 
humility, a wisdom, a silence that is definitive and contains all that they have ever 
said.”22 Far from being a rejection of people, the embrace of solitude was “not to escape 
other men but in order to find them in God.”23 
It took some time for Merton to arrive at an understanding of solitude that 
 
included room for many other people. In 1946, for example, Merton wrote that “for 
myself, I have only one desire and that is the desire for solitude—to disappear into God, 
to be submerged in His peace, to be lost in the secret of His face.”24 Read in tandem with 
some of the world-rejecting passages of The Seven Storey Mountain—which he was 
working on at the time—it is hard to escape the conclusion that Merton was not terribly 
optimistic about humanity at this point. At the very least, people were a distraction from 
cultivating a relationship with God. Of course, the end of 1946 would mark five years in 
the monastery for Merton. He would not leave Gethsemani Abbey for any reason 
21. Lawrence S. Cunningham, editor, Thomas Merton: Spiritual Master (New York: Paulist Press, 
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whatsoever until August 1948, when he left for a grand total of six hours to conduct 
business for the Order.25 It was Merton’s literary career that would eventually open up 
the lines of communication for him to conduct his apostolate of friendship. With an irony 
that has been frequently noted, however, it was precisely his literary successes that 
helped to make Gethsemani a setting wherein it was exceedingly hard for Merton to find 
the solitude he craved. He would sarcastically observe that at the monastery’s post-war 
peak there were “two hundred and seventy lovers of silence and solitude…packed into a 
building that was built for seventy.”26 
Merton had hardly become entirely misanthropic. Cut off to a considerable degree 
 
from his Columbia friends by the normal restrictions of life as a Trappist, there are clear 
instances when Merton felt very much attached to the monks of his community. He once 
seemed even a bit surprised at his own reaction when a group of his fellow monks left 
Gethsemani to start a new foundation in 1947: “I am certainly not detached enough from 
them to be immune to a little pain at the thought that I will never see them again.”27 
Overall, however, Merton’s pain here seems rather a sign of familiarity with the 
 
departing monks than friendship. Merton nonetheless found something very comforting 
in this monastic familiarity. His burgeoning career as a successful writer was forcing him 
into consistent communication with the world of publishing, and Merton did not feel 
entirely edified by these exchanges. Instead, they seem to have reinforced the conviction 
that had helped to propel Merton toward the monastery in the first place: that people are 
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depressingly petty and ceaselessly self-serving. “Even my contacts with the outside— 
with the world of writers and of people who publish and of people who insult one another 
for the sake of art—have their advantages. To see how seriously men take things and how 
little they profit by their seriousness. Their tragedy makes our mediocrity all the more 
terrible.”28 
His brief sojourn from Gethsemani in 1948 did do something to shock Merton’s 
sensibilities regarding others. Merton found himself face to face with the world, which 
was perhaps “no longer so wicked after all.” Instead, Merton “went through (Louisville), 
realizing for the first time in my life how good are all the people in the world and how 
much value they have in the sight of God.”29 Over the next few years, the newly-elected 
Abbot, James Fox, would offer Merton a number of allowances that gave him some 
limited time in solitude, either in the community’s rare book vault or even through 
 
permission to walk alone in the woods. Despite the impact that his brief time in 
Louisville had had on Merton’s assessment of people, it seems that Merton was still 
thinking of them as—at best—obstacles to his own vocational path. This assessment is 
shared by the late Anne Carr, who believed that “for the Merton of 1949, (there was) no 
genuine sense of real Christian community and its goodness or its importance in the life 
of faith. And there is certainly no sense that community can be an aid to or a genuine 
expression of one’s relation to God.”30 
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This would eventually change, and drastically so. By the time Merton was living 
full time in his hermitage on the grounds of Gethsemani, he was cognizant of how 
differently he understood solitude then compared to years earlier. “In a sense, a very true 
and solitary sense, coming to the hermitage has been a ‘return to world,’ not a return to 
the cities, but a return to direct and humble contact with God’s world.”31 Rather than 
isolation, solitude had come to mean connectedness for Merton. Indeed, Merton 
understood that his solitude could be part of an authentically Christian vocation if “it will 
help you to love not only God but also other men.”32 
Merton declared the era he lived in to be a time of anxiety. Even though a life in 
 
solitude was not by any means an attempt to become complacent with the status quo, 
there is a very strong sense in Merton’s writing that true solitude may afford the seeker 
with some level of serenity. Merton believed that true solitude would not make all of the 
problems in someone’s life go away, but they would “cease to be (problems).”33 Many of 
Merton’s contemporaries certainly did not agree with this sentiment. Especially for those 
friends involved in the peace movement of the mid-1960’s, “there was a widespread and 
lasting feeling…that Thomas Merton was in the wrong place at a critical time.”34 Paul 
Elie suggests, however, that the best evidence of the “rightness” of Merton’s hermit life is 
simply “the sudden clarity of his writing.”35 
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Merton strongly believed that solitude helped to teach him how to love. The 
spiritual life of a Christian in solitude is not intended to obliterate any problems that 
might trouble the human soul. Rather, silence helps to put those troubles in their true 
context. “We are not meant to resolve all contradictions but to live with them and rise 
above them and see them in the light of exterior and objective values which make them 
trivial by comparison.”36 Though he does not expound on what he means by objective 
values in this context, it is safe to assume that what he means includes God. 
The Christian solitary must seek to encounter God where the faithful know He is: 
within all people. It is for this reason that Merton felt that “the smoke-screen of words” 
that blurred humanity’s perspective of true reality had to be cleared away. Such an 
undertaking could only happen in solitude. As if to respond to the classic critique of the 
solitary life that monks hate the world, Merton described true reality as being something 
quite beautiful indeed: “…the nakedness of reality…is neither a matter of terror nor for 
shame. It is clothed in the friendly communion of silence, and this silence is related to 
love.” Rather than the Gnostic understanding of the created world as inherently evil, in 
solitude we are taught “to know reality by respecting it where words have defiled it.” 37 
 
Impressive as this already is, Merton felt that this new vision of reality would help 
the solitary in all relationships. “When we have really met and known the world in 
silence, words do not separate us from the world nor from other men, nor from God, nor 
from ourselves…”38It is clear that solitude is not about withdrawing into some world of 
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spiritual fluff and fantasy. Instead, it is about learning to be, in a world that is because of 
God. What had changed, for Merton? What transpired between the 1940s and the 1960s 
that developed his understanding of solitude from something that helped to preserve and 
protect an individual’s walk with God from the temptations and distractions wrought by 
other people, into something that deepened one’s sense of connectedness to, or even 
communion with, others? Even more basically: what led Merton away from his earlier 
rejection of the world and toward his later work in the apostolate of friendship, actively 
seeking out and engaging with friends throughout the world and all along the ideological 
spectrum? While there were no doubt multiple factors involved, this chapter contends 
that the single most significant was Merton’s newfound role, throughout the 1950s, as a 
teacher. 
Teaching 
With the publication of New Seeds of Contemplation—an update on the original 
Seeds of Contemplation—in 1961, Thomas Merton took time to reflect on what had 
changed for him in the twelve years since the original. In particular, Merton 
acknowledged that the original had been hampered by its own author, in that he had had 
“no experience in confronting the needs and problems of other men. The book was 
written in a kind of isolation, in which the author was alone with his own experience of 
the contemplative life.”39 What had changed was not that Merton had left solitude behind, 
 
but that his solitude had been “modified.” One of these modifications involved Merton’s 
encounter with, as he put it, “the perplexity of novices and scholastics of his monastic 
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community.”40 By the 1961 revision, Carr asserts, Merton had removed “all suggestion 
that other people represent a danger to contemplative union with God.”41 
The casual reader of Merton might begin to think of Merton’s mystical 
experience—several years before New Seeds of Contemplation but not published for 
another half-decade—at the corner of Fourth and Walnut in Louisville, during which he 
became aware of the profound proximity of all people to God and of his own deep love 
for those same people.42 And yet, as significant as that event may have been for 
propelling (or at least reflecting) a change in Merton’s orientation to the world, it seems 
 
that even that famous moment did not develop in a vacuum. Instead, Merton’s insight at 
Fourth and Walnut was made possible by his experiences as a teacher at Gethsemani. In 
1951, Merton had been appointed master of scholastics, meaning that he was to play a 
crucial role in the spiritual formation of the young monks intending to seek ordination to 
the priesthood. In 1955, Merton was appointed master of novices, a post he would fill for 
an entire decade. 
Teaching would change the course of Merton’s literary career, his vocation, and 
even his outlook on humanity in general. From the beginning, Merton found great joy in 
the building of relationships with the young monks in his charge. Merton was unsure if he 
was of much help to them, but he quickly appreciated the positive impact they had on 
him. Merton felt that he had discovered that “the kind of work I once feared because I 
thought it would interfere with ‘solitude’ is, in fact, the only true path to solitude.” Rather 
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than being a classroom full of distractions preventing Merton from being as 
contemplative as he ought to have been, the young monks were demonstrating to Merton 
precisely how a relationship—a friendship, even—can be a school of charity in precisely 
the manner Wadell describes. And Merton was perfectly aware of it. “What is my new 
desert?” Merton would ask. “The name of it is compassion. There is no wilderness so 
terrible, so beautiful, so arid and so fruitful as the wilderness of compassion.”43 Merton 
was encountering the scholastics from his vantage point as an always-aspiring Christian 
solitary, and this very perspective was well-suited to observing a profound communion— 
not only with his fellow monks, but with potentially anyone and everyone: “Now that I 
know them better, I can see something of the depths of solitude which are in every human 
person, but which most men do not know how to lay open either to themselves or to 
others or to God.”44 
Struggles of a Monastic Author 
When the Merton collection at Bellarmine College Library was opened in 1963, 
Merton’s friend and mentor Dan Walsh read a paper Merton had prepared for the 
occasion, which offered a summary of Merton’s literary output up to that point: 
“Whatever I may have written, I think it can all be reduced in the end to this one root 
truth: that God calls human persons to union with Himself and with one another in Christ, 
in the Church which is His Mystical Body.”45 The apparent serenity of that statement 
 
gives no indication of the tremendous difficulties Merton’s writing career caused him 
during his life as a monk; and it is important to emphasize here that, despite the various 
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hats which Merton may have worn over the course of his life, he was, as Lawrence 
Cunningham has argued, a monk first and foremost.46 
While the reader of Merton’s journals may well be left with the impression that 
Merton was consistently hanging on the brink of leaving either Gethsemani or even the 
Cistercians altogether, it is important to temper that impression by holding it alongside 
the realities which kept Merton where he was. Indeed, it seems that Merton always took 
seriously his obligations as a member of his community. As Michael Mott points out, 
“Had Thomas Merton been as neurotic, quixotic, and generally unpredictable as he has 
been portrayed at times, no one as shrewd as Dom James would have entrusted him with 
the post of either master of scholastics or master of novices. Nor, for that matter, would 
the abbot have chosen Father Louis as his confessor.”47 For his own part, Merton seems 
to have been very much aware of the manner in which the community, and in particular 
his superiors, kept some of his shortcomings in check far better than he could manage on 
his own. In a 1954 letter to Abbot Fox, Merton expressed his hope that Fox would 
“always tell me frankly when I am not doing what you want, because that is my one big 
safeguard, on which everything depends…”48 Over a decade later, fearing a potentially 
more lax abbot might be elected upon Fox’s retirement, Merton wrote to Archbishop 
Thomas McDonough of Louisville, apparently in the hope that McDonough would keep 
him reined in should the new abbot give him too much freedom: “With the possibilities 
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of new policies around here, I think I had better draw my own lines in case they are not 
drawn for me…”49 
This letter indicates an awareness on Merton’s part of what his vocation was, but 
an interesting level of caution regarding the way it might be manifest. It is not difficult to 
see why this should be the case. Implicit in the act of writing is the feeling that you have 
something worthwhile to say. Similarly, to have your writing published is to secure a 
legacy. Obviously, there can be a tremendous amount of pride built into the processes of 
writing and being published, and for Thomas Merton the Trappist, this was a source of 
self-doubt. He was simply unsure of the purity of his intentions, hearing in his head the 
sarcastic rebuke: “Admiration, admiration—You are my ideal—you are the one, original, 
cloistered genius, the tonsured wonder of the Western world.”50 Early attempts to 
reconcile his writing and his vocation were not productive, either. “God defend me from 
the stuffy academic language and from the pious jargon I feel I got into…on the theory 
that, since I was a monk, I had to write that way. NO! That is NOT the way to write! It 
does NO good.”51 
His inability to find peace on this question did even lead him to consider a change 
of order: “Should I move somewhere where I can find solitude and silence and peace to 
be alone with God in a pure tranquility that is impossible for a Cistercian?”52 Though he 
does not mention his writing in this passage as the source of his misgivings, it seems 
likely that it was a major contributing factor. And yet, writing would also be a part of the 
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peace he would come to find, little by little, because he became convinced that he was not 
writing for himself: “Since I belong to God and my life belongs to Him and my book is 
His and He is managing them all for His glory, I only have to take what comes and do the 
small part that will be allotted to me….”53 In moments of clarity, Merton was able to see 
the good resulting from his writing. “Now I see what it is all leading up to: to the 
happiness and the peace and the salvation of many people I have never known. There is 
no greater joy than to be drawn into union with God’s great love for the souls of 
men.…”54 Already (June 1948), Merton was starting to develop some basic  
understanding of writing as a form of contemplative prayer. In addition to the multitude 
of anecdotal accounts of the impact Merton’s writings have had, Ephrem Arcement 
agrees that Merton’s writing was vital for many: “…this dual vocation of monk and 
writer would become a uniquely influential source for the exercise of his own prophetic 
spirituality and contribute significantly to his own personal integration.”55 William 
Shannon adds that Merton’s writing “enabled him to articulate, for himself and for others, 
his ongoing experience of what it meant to be a Catholic and a monk in a fast-changing 
world wherein both Catholicism and the monastic life were being scrutinized, both from 
within and from without, in a way that was unprecedented…”56 
None of this is to say, however, that there were not days when it all seemed 
useless again. Indeed, Merton’s journal is full of instances where he ‘rediscovers’ things 
(like humility, or the centrality of Christ), and it appears to work that way with vices as 
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well as virtues. “The business of being poisoned in spite of yourself by the pleasure you 
take in your own work! You say you don’t want it, but it gets into your blood anyway.”57 
At times, Merton seemed skeptical about the encouragement to write that he received 
from his Superior. “That afternoon, when (the abbot) was in Louisville at the 
Archbishop’s, I got a check for nine hundred dollars on The Seven Storey Mountain, so I 
gave it to him the next morning. He told me to go on writing.”58 When he had 
reservations about writing, it continued to trigger doubt about his entire life as a 
Cistercian: “To make an Order, a spiritual tradition, the center of my life is not enough. 
Contemplation is not enough….In other words, I need to get rid of everything. Here I am 
compelled to keep my hands full. And if I write, I am bound to live submerged in 
books.”59 
Though Merton’s spiritual life may have been one long trajectory overall toward 
 
contemplation of God in solitude, it is already quite clear that this trajectory holds true 
only in a general sense. Some days were clearly better than others. It is for this very 
reason that Merton’s writing was so important to him. The written word helped him give 
glory to God (and guidance to readers) when times were good, and his habit of keeping a 
journal helped him come to some understanding when times were bad. Writing became 
for him a means of examining his conscience. This was of great help to him: “Every book 
I write is a mirror of my own character and conscience. I always open the final printed 
job with a faint hope of finding myself agreeable, and I never do.”60 
 
 
57. Merton, The Intimate Merton, 57. 
58. Ibid, 59. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid, 60. 
112 
 
 
 
Merton came to see that his writing was a key factor in his ongoing spiritual 
conversion: “And yet it seems to me that writing, far from being an obstacle to spiritual 
perfection in my own life, has become one of the conditions on which my perfection will 
depend.”61 He was well aware that the life of an author-monk was unlikely to be easy, but 
his awareness of God’s ability to work through him intensified: “It must come somehow 
from the Holy Ghost.”62 In coming to terms with his vocation Merton also drew strength 
from the liturgy. He was able to make a connection between Christ in the Eucharist and 
himself, put on display in the form of his writing: “One of the results of all this could 
well be a complete and holy transparency: living, praying, and writing in the light of the 
Holy Spirit, losing myself entirely by becoming public property just as Jesus is public 
property in the Mass.” Making the connection between this idea and his ordination to the 
priesthood, Merton hoped that “this is an important aspect of my priesthood—my living 
of my Mass: to become as plain as a Host in the hands of everybody. Perhaps it is this, 
after all, that is to be my way of solitude.”63 
Merton had developed a substantial theological framework to justify his unique 
vocation. After signing a deal that promised four books to his publisher, Merton felt that 
“…my work is my hermitage because it is writing that helps me most of all to be a 
solitary and a contemplative here at Gethsemani.”64 Writing therefore continued to be the 
dominant factor in Merton’s spiritual development. “This Journal…Apparently I have not 
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yet written enough of it to become completely solitary and to be able to do without it.”65 
There is agreement amongst commentators that Merton was not mistaken when he 
suggested that writing may have been a necessary part of his vocation. Malits suggests 
that “The effort to articulate what was happening in his life was for him essential to the 
process of self-discovery. That enterprise actually served to shape Merton’s identity, 
because writing about himself consciously engaged the man in the task he described as 
trying ‘to be what I am.”66 
It was because of his writing as well as his life as a Trappist that Merton became 
comfortable being an active monk. Instead of creating an image of solitude in his mind 
and finding a way to work toward it in reality, he learned to achieve the solitude that God 
granted him. Merton learned that “One must be in some sense a hermit before the care of 
souls can serve to lead one further into the desert. But once God has called you to 
solitude, everything you touch leads you further into solitude.”67 Solitude, in the true 
sense of it, did not depend on the degree of isolation, or on geography at all. Instead, it 
was something that was always available to a person who had pursued his/her proper 
vocation. 
With its many bumps in the road and probably more than a few wrong turns, 
Thomas Merton’s story is one of authentic Christian conversion. He never ceased trying 
to find a closer relationship with God. Despite the potential tension between his roles as 
author and monk, Merton was fortified by the one, and the other, on an alternating basis. 
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Without his writing, Merton may not have lasted at Gethsemani. Without the Trappist 
lifestyle (and certainly without his fellow Trappists), Merton would have struggled to 
advance to the point where an eremitic existence could be more than a hasty retreat from 
the world. It seems that this insight, which Merton shared in The Sign of Jonas, is 
genuine: “If I am to be a saint—and there is nothing else that I can think of desiring to 
be—it seems that I must get there by writing books in a Trappist monastery.”68 
The Formation of the Whole Person/The True Self 
If Merton was committed, despite his moments of doubt, to this idea of sainthood 
through Trappist authorship, then it was because he believed that that path would allow 
for him to be precisely who God created him to be. Michael Mott has claimed that “a 
battle with a kind of self-consciousness” was “the chief struggle of Merton’s life…”69 
This does not seem to be an exaggeration, as Merton spent a good deal of effort on 
defining what was, and what was not, the true self. Cunningham points out, for instance, 
that Merton believed “identifying the Cartesian ‘ego’ with the true self was a fatal error 
of judgment.”70 Merton himself wrote that “There is an irreducible opposition between 
the deep transcendent self that awakens only in contemplation, and the superficial, 
external self which we commonly identify with the first person singular.” Contemplation, 
then, “is precisely the awareness that this ‘I’ is really ‘not I’ and the awakening of the 
unknown ‘I’ that is beyond observation and reflection…”71 
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Del Prete summarizes the difference between the true self and false self by saying 
“The false self tends to identify itself in terms of its external activity, its output; it must 
be engaged in doing something in order to experience itself as real. The true self simply 
is. It does not have to do in order to be....The difference is that its doing is motivated by 
love, reflected in the quality (not quantity) of its actions.”72 Discovery of the true self is 
not to be equated to any process of mere psychological self-realization or intellectual 
adjustment. It is, simply, the discovery of what one is already in the eyes of the Creator. 
Merton’s monastic vocation, similarly, was not aiming for his detachment from the 
various things that exist in God’s creation. “We do not detach ourselves from things in 
order to attach ourselves to God, but rather we become detached from ourselves in order 
to see and use all things in and for God.”73Merton contended that much in the world gave 
glory to God simply by being what it was created to be: “For in being what God means it 
to be it is obeying Him. It ‘consents,’ so to speak, to His creative love.”74 For people, 
things are more complex, because “God leaves us free to be whatever we like.” 
Nevertheless, humanity’s prospects are not fundamentally different than those of the trees 
or birds: “For me to be a saint means to be myself.”75 
Contemplation 
This chapter has so far examined Merton’s understanding of Christian solitude, 
and why it was a crucial part of his own vocation. From there it was shown that Merton’s 
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solitude did not rule out the possibility of his being an author. To the contrary, Merton 
came to see writing as something he could not discard, as it was simply part and parcel of 
who God intended for him to be. As such, it was in writing as a monk that Merton was 
able to share something of his solitude with the world. Being an author-monk was the 
path by which Merton would learn to identify with the point vierge, the untainted— 
though often buried—presence of God within all people.76 At this point, the time is nearly 
right to begin considering the intellectual exchanges which characterized Merton’s 
apostolate of friendship while also propelling his vocation as a monk who was 
simultaneously both an author and public intellectual. What is needed first, however, is a 
brief survey of what Merton understood contemplation to be. 
According to its back cover, Thomas Merton’s New Seeds of Contemplation 
seeks to “awaken the dormant inner depths of the spirit so long neglected by Western 
man,” and to “nurture a deeply contemplative and mystical dimension in our spiritual 
lives.” If one expects that book to be Merton’s systematic approach to contemplation, 
some kind of detailed 12-step process, there is sure to be disappointment. In Merton’s 
opinion, such a book would not be possible, “For contemplation cannot be taught. It 
cannot even be clearly explained. It can only be hinted at, suggested, pointed to, 
symbolized.”77 Rejecting the idea that contemplation might be heavily systematized, 
Merton would comment elsewhere that “To restrict the contemplative monk to one set of 
narrow horizons and esoteric concerns would be in fact to condemn him to spiritual and 
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intellectual sterility.” 78It is telling, then, to note that the chapter in New Seeds called 
“What is Contemplation?” is only five pages long, while the chapter on “What 
Contemplation is Not” is nearly eight pages. 
It is at the crescendo of that second chapter that Merton dispels the notion that 
contemplation is a means of accessing some kind of perpetual bliss for the remainder of 
one’s life. Quite to the contrary, Merton felt that contemplation was something that could 
awaken “a tragic anguish and (open) many questions in the depths of the heart like 
wounds that cannot stop bleeding.”79Though this is not, at face value, a ringing 
endorsement of contemplative experience, Merton explains why there is a necessary 
 
element of pain: contemplation is a kind of iconoclasm. It is fair to use this term, 
iconoclastic, because “In the end the contemplative suffers the anguish of realizing that 
he no longer knows what God is.”80 While New Seeds represents some of Merton’s most 
mature thinking on contemplation, it is clear to see that such apophatic thinking had long 
captivated Merton’s imagination. St. John of the Cross was a strong influence on Merton 
in his early days as a monk, and later readings of Meister Eckhart and Julian of Norwich 
ensured the presence of an apophatic (the ‘negative’ approach to theology which seeks 
always to preserve the fundamental mystery of God) strain to Merton’s theology. 
Nevertheless, the Incarnation has given humanity things that can positively be said about 
God, and Christ’s Gospel makes clear to what the Christian ought to aspire. Merton’s 
notion of contemplation reflects this reality, especially given Merton’s reliance on the 
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Pauline notion of how, for the contemplative, “It is now no longer I that live but Christ 
lives in me.”81 
Merton’s contemplative experiences gave him a profound awareness of the 
presence of God. Such awareness could not help but transform Merton’s outlook, his 
thinking, and of course his writing as well. Arcement has written insightfully on the 
prophetic aspect of Merton’s spirituality. Arcement contends that Merton’s contemplation 
was inevitably going to spill over the walls of Gethsemani: “Through the transformation 
of the self into an authentic existence, the transformation of the world becomes possible, 
(Merton) thought. The two transformations together form Merton’s integrated vision of 
God’s desire for recreating the world in God’s image and likeness—of reconciliation.”82 
Merton’s contemplation gave him “spiritual insight into the reality of things.” 
Merton did not believe that he was an author and public intellectual in spite of his 
solitude, nor did he think that this was in spite of his contemplation. To the contrary, he 
wrote, agitated on behalf of justice regarding numerous causes, and engaged with various 
intellectual perspectives because of his contemplation. “By being firmly rooted in a life 
of contemplation, (Merton) understood, the monastic vocation blossoms into a prophetic 
witness to the kingdom of God.”83 Merton wrote, then, in part because of his desire to 
 
share the fruits of his contemplation, which he saw “not only as the nourishment 
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necessary for his own monastic and solitary vocation, but as a desperately needed 
antidote to the various poisons in contemporary Western life.”84 
Social Consciousness 
It is for this reason that Merton’s seemingly unique vocation as an author-monk 
who was also a renowned intellectual had a real consistency to it. Thomas Del Prete 
asserts that Merton’s growing social consciousness and voice were “not out of step with 
his growth toward greater identification with others…nor did it reflect a major 
discontinuity with his sense of vocational commitment or the spiritual insight represented 
by his meditative writing.”85 It therefore seems a rare, though perhaps minor, misstep by 
 
Cunningham where he states that Merton’s “thirst for imageless union with God” merely 
“coexisted” with his “wide-ranging reading and his insatiable desire for a deeper 
understanding of God.”86 
That being said, it does seem as though coexisted might be an appropriate word 
for the early years of Merton’s life at Gethsemani, when it seemed that his primary goal 
may well have been a yearning for God through renunciation of the world. After all, one 
can find the seeds of Merton’s social consciousness already germinating in the pages of 
The Seven Storey Mountain. Michael Mott argues, perhaps rightly, that Merton’s teenage 
dalliance with communism was likely a means for Merton to soothe an aching personal 
conscience by appealing to an apparently nascent social one.87 By the time Merton wrote 
 
his autobiography, however, and was able to express his contempt for a situation in which 
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Hollywood was glorified and Harlem maligned, there can be little question that his social 
consciousness had at least begun to bloom.88 
Arcement contends that Merton worried whether the church of his time had “an 
adequate platform for effective prophetic communication(.)”89 As Merton enjoyed the 
spiritual growth that came through greater degrees of solitude and contemplation, he 
came to see that he was perhaps uniquely well-placed to help the church speak 
prophetically. It is not difficult to see which social ills pressed most heavily on Merton. 
The Cold War certainly weighed on him, as did questions of war in general. Merton was 
also alarmed by some aspects of the astonishing technological advances of the mid-20th 
century, particularly when those advances were seen “in the context of unbalance with 
the other aspects of human existence in the world,“ wherein “the very splendor and 
rapidity of technological development is a factor of disintegration.”90 Such disintegration 
had, in Merton’s mind, left much of humanity feeling adrift, to the point that “there are so 
many of everything that one lives in a state of constant bewilderment and fear. One 
cannot begin to commit himself to any definite love, because the whole game is too 
complex and too hazardous and one has lost all focus. So we are carried away by the 
whirlwind, and our children are even more helpless than we ourselves.”91 
Merton’s hope that the church retained the means for prophetic communication, 
 
coupled with his ongoing reflections over the ills of life in the modern world, left him 
primed to be impressed anytime he saw someone exercising the kind of charismatic 
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prophesying that he himself would eventually undertake. Merton is not being 
melodramatic, for instance, when he writes with verve that simply seeing the witness of 
Daniel Berrigan “restores one’s hope in the Church.”92 Merton did not think of the church 
as a kind of corporation which had a message (prophetic or otherwise) to export to people 
who simply did not have it. Instead, Merton had a natural instinct, no doubt honed during 
his years as a teacher at Gethsemani, for meeting people where they were. In his book on 
Merton and education, Del Prete posits that the study of other cultures was crucial for 
Merton in that it helped him to engage those other cultures, but it also helped him to 
better understand himself.93 By the time his apostolate of friendship was in full swing, he 
would engage Russians, Western Europeans, Latin Americans, Indians, Middle 
Easterners, and others. This was part and parcel of his own spiritual development, but it 
was also reflective of this growing social consciousness over the course of the 1950s. 
Before looking at the apostolate of friendship itself, it is necessary to examine further the 
rootedness—geographically but also intellectually—that makes Merton a worthwhile 
exemplar for the Catholic intellectual life even today. 
Rootedness in Tradition 
It has already been shown how Merton relied on his rootedness in Cistercian 
community life to protect himself from his own flights of fancy. Indeed, the Trappist 
emphasis on stability in particular was surely a protection against the kind of restless 
traveling that characterizes so much of The Seven Storey Mountain. Interestingly, though, 
Merton was equally dependent on an analogous check within the intellectual realm. 
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Obligations to Gethsemani may have kept Merton from roaming geographically, but it 
was the Catholic tradition—as Merton understood it—that kept him from being 
overwhelmed by the multiplicity of perspectives with which he would dialogue over the 
course of the apostolate of friendship’s life. 
Near the beginning of No Man Is an Island, Merton writes that he had no 
intention to divorce from Catholic tradition, but that he would not blindly accept any 
unexamined truths that that tradition passed to him.94 Similarly, in his Author’s Note to 
New Seeds of Contemplation, Merton expresses the hope that it “does not contain a line 
that is new to Christian tradition.”95 On the one hand, such statements might seem like 
bland reassurances to his superiors and to the Trappist censors who closely examined all 
of his published work. In truth, however, Merton was especially cognizant of the dangers 
that his vocation as solitary author-monk would pose if he were completely detached 
from his community, the church, or its tradition.96 By the time he wrote the materials that 
make up Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, Merton was finding himself “more and more 
convinced that my job is to clarify something of the tradition that lives in me, and in 
which I live…”97 Around the time Conjectures was being published, Merton would note 
in a letter to Marco Pallis that “I agree entirely that one must cling to one tradition and to 
its orthodoxy, at the risk of not understanding any tradition.”98 Just over two years later, 
Merton would answer with clear approbation a letter in which Amiya Chakravarty, then 
at Smith College, had written that “The young scholars here realize that the absolute 
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rootedness of your faith makes you free to understand other faiths…Your books have the 
rock-like inner strength which sustains the Abbey of Gethsemani, which can challenge 
violence and untruth wherever they may appear.”99 
Of course, in agreeing with any assertion that he was a man of the Catholic 
tradition, Merton was absolutely not perceiving that tradition as something set in stone, as 
if it were merely a series of truths that were being preserved in an unchanging form from 
one era to the next. To the contrary, Merton thought of the Catholic tradition as 
something very much dynamic and alive. It is important to note here that, in New Seeds of 
Contemplation, Merton saw fit to pair tradition with revolution in one of his chapters: 
“The biggest paradox about the Church is that she is at the same time essentially 
traditional and essentially revolutionary. But that is not as much of a paradox as it seems, 
because Christian tradition, unlike all others, is a living and perpetual revolution.”100 The 
 
Catholic tradition was, in Merton’s thinking, a vast, communal response to the Good 
News of Christ that could never be exhausted, never be finalized in this world. Merton 
was no mere religious syncretist, nor did he eventually grow indifferent to the real 
differences between religious traditions. Instead, he was firmly rooted in the monastic life 
of Gethsemani Abbey, and notes frequently in various writings that his engagement with 
the other was always “designed to help him deepen his own Christian monastic life.”101 
 
Thus, if one desires to classify Merton and his literary corpus, it is perhaps best to 
describe him as a monastic theologian. Whatever truths he discovered, he sought them— 
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always—in the hope that they would further his spiritual journey. His intellectual 
encounters and the writings they produced therefore reflect this emphasis on the 
experiential. In Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, Merton writes that he is not trying to 
analyze Protestant thought as a Catholic so much as he was rather “a Catholic sharing the 
Protestant experience—and other religious experiences as well.”102 Merton would write, 
with no small amount of pride, that he was convinced that a Protestant would “have 
greater security and clearer light if he were in my Church, but he does not see this as I do, 
and for this there are deeper and more complex reasons than either he or I can  
understand. Let us try to understand them, but meanwhile let us continue each in his own 
way, seeking the light with all sincerity.”103 As a result, Merton could be highly critical of 
that “vapid and careless friendliness that accepts everything by thinking of nothing.” 
Instead, he wanted to be the best Catholic dialogue partner that he could by affirming the 
truth in his partners’ worldviews.104 
This position, and the willingness to engage the other to which it led, was a 
natural outgrowth of Merton’s theological reflections. Cunningham emphasizes Merton’s 
pneumatological perspective as a significant force behind his apostolate of friendship: 
“He did very much accept…that the Spirit moves all over the world, and from quite 
disparate experiences by quite diverse people one learns to deepen the contemplative 
life.”105 Cunningham also notes, however, what this chapter would hold up as the key 
theological insight behind Merton’s apostolate of friendship: “(Merton) was aided in this 
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quest by his conviction and experience that Christ as the Word, Christ as wisdom, 
permeated the entire cosmos.”106 This Christological position lies beneath much of 
Merton’s desire for his apostolate to have a unifying impact on the peoples with whom he 
would dialogue. “In Sophia,” Merton would write in New Seeds, “the highest wisdom- 
principle, all the greatness and majesty of the unknown that is in God and all that is rich 
and maternal in His creation are united inseparably…”107 Just as Christ is the unification 
of God and man,108 so too does Christ as Wisdom bestow a powerful, underlying unity to 
all the peoples of the world, regardless of their intellectual positions. 
As intrigued as Merton may have ever been by non-Christian perspectives, he was 
adamant about what they were missing: “I may be interested in Oriental religions, etc., 
but there can be no obscuring the essential difference—this personal communion with 
Christ at the center and heart of all reality as a source of grace and life.”109 Merton would 
not agree that Christ was simply missing in other traditions, however: “Christ is the 
fulfillment of the latent desires and aspirations of all religions and all philosophies. One 
must transcend them all to come to Him: yet in Him one finds all that was good and true 
in every other religion.”110 It was Christ, then, that ‘kept Merton Catholic.’ It was also 
Christ that allowed Merton to venture into the apostolate of friendship, with all of the 
interreligious dialogue therein. Still further, though, it would still be Christ that Merton 
would find in the fruits of that dialogue. John Wu would notice this very dynamic in a 
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1961 letter to Merton, in which he observed that Merton was “so deeply Christian that 
you cannot help touching the vital springs of other religions.”111 
Forming the Apostolate of Friendship 
In 1957, during what Cunningham rightly considers “a critical moment in 
Merton’s intellectual and spiritual maturity,”112 Merton wrote in his journal what may 
well have been something of a mission statement for his apostolate of friendship: “If I 
can unite in myself, in my own spiritual life, the thought of the East and the West…I will 
create in myself a reunion of the divided Church and from that unity in myself can come 
the exterior and visible unity of the Church…We must contain both (East and West) in 
ourselves, and transcend both in Christ.”113 If the world were to be transformed, Merton 
thought, he would himself need to be transformed first. 
If his apostolate were to have any success on this monumental front, Merton 
would obviously have to work from within the context of his monastic life—and his 
monastic vows. He simply would not be able to match the globe-trotting tendencies of 
many of his friends and correspondents. Indeed, from the time Merton entered 
Gethsemani in 1941, he would not leave again until 1948, when he was gone for a grand 
total of six hours on a business trip on behalf of the Order. In the ten years after that, 
almost every time Merton would leave Gethsemani, it would be in order to go to a 
hospital for care due to one of Merton’s many ailments. The only exceptions in this 
period were two trips to Louisville to obtain American citizenship, a trip to Ohio to scope 
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out a location for a new possible foundation, and a trip to Minnesota for a conference. 
Other monks were present with Merton on each of these excursions.114 
By the late 1950s and into the 1960s, however, restrictions at Gethsemani had 
loosened considerably.115 Merton’s apostolate may well have never happened had they 
not. In March 1958, Merton would learn something significant about friendship from a 
sermon by one of his confreres. Merton would write that “my worst and inmost sickness 
is the despair of ever being able truly to love, because I despair of ever being worthy of 
love. But the way out is to be able to trust one’s friends and thus accept in them acts and 
things which a sick mind grabs as evidence of lack of love—as pretexts for evading the 
obligation to love.”116 
It was perhaps only with this lesson on friendship—so reminiscent of Wadell’s 
 
description of friendship as a school of charity—that Merton began assembling his 
apostolate of friendship in the 1950s. It was in this decade, as Cunningham describes, that 
Merton, “well before the openness deriving from the Second Vatican Council, began to 
formulate ideas and strategies that would not only allow him to enter into dialogue with 
other Christians from other traditions, but would also help him learn how to relate to 
other cultures and to religions that were not Christian.”117 Already in 1954 Merton would 
 
declare to fellow monk Jean Leclercq that “I do not like the idea of an isolated, and 
spectacular, apostolate.”118 Six years later, Merton would report to his longtime friend 
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that “A very fine little hermitage has been built in a nice site; it is for the purpose of 
dialogue and conversations with Protestant ministers and professors, but it also serves for 
solitude and I have at least a limited permission to use it part-time.”119 
If by 1960 the apostolate of friendship was up and running, it was because of 
many developments over the course of the previous decade. For this chapter’s purposes, 
it is important to highlight two. First, 1958 marked the beginning of Merton’s relatively 
brief but deeply impactful—on both men, it seems—correspondence with Boris 
Pasternak. Though they would exchange only six letters, Merton discovered through 
these letters the kind of love that might be expressed and the kind of experiential bond 
that might be found linking people of widely divergent perspectives. 
The second major factor was undoubtedly Merton’s pitching of his idea for an 
apostolate of friendship to Pope John XXIII. Writing to Pope John only months after his 
famous experience at Fourth and Walnut, Merton had clearly come a long way in seeing 
that his might be a uniquely well-placed voice both for the purposes of communicating 
prophetically as well as seeking to strengthen the bonds of love between Catholics and 
others. By April 1960, Merton would similarly inform the Abbot General, Dom Gabriel 
Sortais, of his apostolate, though interestingly only after Pope John had written of his 
approval of Merton’s vision and sent along several gifts to Gethsemani. Merton’s 
apostolate of friendship was underway. 
Merton the Letter-Writer 
As famous a writer as Merton was in his day, and as popular as he remains even 
today, it must be remembered that he required a good deal of practice before his writing 
 
119. Ibid, 89. 
129 
 
 
 
became all that good. Indeed, even on the cusp of his gargantuan success with The Seven 
Storey Mountain, Merton was no stranger to strong critiques of his work. Evelyn Waugh, 
who would edit the English edition of Merton’s autobiography, visited Gethsemani 
Abbey in December 1948. Though Merton passes Waugh’s recommendation for his 
future literary career off as something of a compliment in The Sign of Jonas, it is a 
backhanded compliment at best: “Evelyn Waugh, who came to visit Gethsemani in 
December…thought that it would be a good idea for me simply to put books aside and 
write serious letters, and to make an art of it.”120 Merton never gave up on books, but 
letter-writing would occupy a major place in Merton’s life, up until his death. Once The 
Seven Storey Mountain was published, Merton enjoyed, or rather suffered from, an 
excess of fan mail. Happily for him, the vast majority of it could be answered with a 
simple card with a form response assuring the recipients of Merton’s prayers. 
Eventually, however, letter-writing became something more important for 
Merton, who seems to have always had a deep-seated yearning for human contact, 
despite his simultaneous thirst for greater solitude. It has been estimated that Merton had 
some 2100 correspondents.121 While many of these can hardly be said to plumb the 
depths of Merton’s best thinking, there is nevertheless an astounding range of people 
included in that number. “He wrote to poets; to heads of state; to popes, bishops, priests, 
and lay people; to monks, rabbis, and Zen masters; to Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans, 
and Orthodox Christians; to Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and Sufis; to literary agents and 
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publishers; to theologians and social activists; to old friends and young ones, too.”122 
While all of Merton’s writings seem to be autobiographical to one degree or another, 
reading his letters is a powerful means of getting to know the man, and seeing how his 
thinking developed over time. Of course, there are plenty of unpolished thoughts in his 
various letters, but the “flashes of intuition” they contain are nevertheless valuable for 
seeing Merton’s growth, be it spiritual, intellectual, or otherwise.123 For Thomas Del 
Prete, Merton’s writing of letters was simply a part of his quest for becoming 
authentically himself via learning as much as he could of the experiences of others: 
“Letter writing enabled him to explore and support the exploration of the genuine and 
personal in himself and others.”124 
Even those letters which are among the more utilitarian of the Merton corpus 
 
often reveal a great deal about him and about how he typically approached the realities of 
friendship. Merton’s lengthy correspondence with his literary agent, Naomi Burton 
Stone, illustrates clearly Merton’s willingness to share his vulnerabilities with those who 
were close to him. “They became close friends. She acted as ‘sister’ and sometimes 
‘mother’ to him. He valued her counsel, even the occasional scoldings she found it 
necessary to give him. In a way he does with no other correspondent, he shared with her 
his concerns, his needs, his fears.”125 Despite the incredible efforts Merton had been 
 
pouring into writing since his childhood, he maintained throughout his life a certain 
naiveté about the world of publishing. Burton Stone helped him navigate the murky 
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waters which he could not, especially from within the monastery. In a February 1947 
letter, Merton acknowledged this dependence, when he writes “I hope all this does not 
communicate my own mental fog to you, on whom I depend for clarification and clear 
vision!”126 In a May 1956 letter, Merton confided to her that, at least up to that point, he 
did not consider himself a skilled communicator. “You don’t know yet that for me 
communication is not communication but a narcissistic gesture of some sort at which I 
happen to be quite clever. Do you think that I have ever in my life communicated with 
another person? Sacramentally I hope, but not in writing.”127 Presumably, by the time he 
wrote his ‘apostolate of friendship’ letter to Pope John several years later, Merton felt 
rather differently about his ability to converse meaningfully with other people. 
Merton’s teaching responsibilities within the monastery motivated him to keep up 
a rigorous study of primary sources from within the Catholic (and especially the 
monastic) tradition. Letters also afforded him an opportunity to deepen his knowledge of 
the tradition. His nearly two decades-long exchange with Jean Leclercq was a major 
source of insights and resources for Merton’s lifelong quest for authentic renewal within 
his Order.128 Scholar of Christian mysticism Etta Gullick’s correspondence with Merton 
 
demonstrates a clear influence on Merton’s monastic studies as well. In particular, it 
seems that Gullick was instrumental in developing Merton’s assessment of Meister 
Eckhart. In June 1961 Merton would write her that while he liked Eckhart, he found that 
“now and again (Eckhart) leaves one with a sense of being let down, when he goes 
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beyond all bounds.”129 Forty-five days later, Merton would thank her effusively for 
sending him additional resources on Eckhart, at least one of which he considered “a book 
of enormous and providential importance…”130 By April 1966, Merton would confess to 
her that he had “read a lot of Eckhart and am more and more convinced of his 
greatness…”131 
Letters also allowed Merton to stay abreast of the Catholic tradition’s cutting 
edge. Daniel Berrigan was a longtime friend (mainly through correspondence) whom 
Merton admired for his poetry but also for his tireless social justice activism. Some of 
Merton’s hardest words for the Church were written in his letters to Rosemary Radford 
Reuther, who seems to have taught Merton something about the reality of Catholic 
feminism, among other things.132 Letters were also the most effective means for Merton 
to remain connected to the Catholic peace movement during the Vietnam War. 
Exchanges with Dorothy Day and James Forest did much to keep Merton advised of any 
and all developments, even after Merton’s Trappist superiors ordered him to cease 
writing on matters of peace. After Pope John XXIII promulgated his encyclical Pacem in 
Terris, Merton wrote sarcastically to Forest that “The Pope is lucky he does not have to 
be approved by the censors of our Order, he would never get by them!”133 
Perhaps the most significant of Merton’s correspondences, though, was that with 
 
Boris Pasternak (mentioned briefly above). Merton clearly admired Pasternak a great 
deal, as Pasternak’s courageous stand against Stalinism represented a clear prophetic 
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witness along the lines which Merton himself would strive to follow.134 Given Merton’s 
earlier reservations, as seen in his letter to Naomi Burton Stone cited above, regarding his 
ability to communicate meaningfully through letters, his brief relationship with Pasternak 
appears to have marked a change. The other possibility, of course, is that the letters with 
Pasternak did not so much reflect a change as they themselves enabled that change to 
take place. Each man would send only three letters to the other, but there is a clear 
intensity in their contents. In August 1958, two months before his letter to Pope John, 
Merton would tell Pasternak that “With other writers I can share ideas, but you seem to 
communicate something deeper. It is as if we met on a deeper level of life on which 
individuals are not separate beings. In the language familiar to me as a Catholic monk, it 
is as if we were known to one another in God.”135 As far as Merton was concerned, 
conversing with Pasternak had taught him a great deal about the human experience, and 
perhaps even the human’s task before God. “No, the great business of our time is this: for 
one man to find himself in another one who is on the other side of the world. Only by 
such contacts can there be peace, can the sacredness of life be preserved and developed 
and the image of God manifest itself in the world.”136 
Merton’s epistolary engagement with the Islamic world provides an excellent 
 
example of precisely the kind of intellectual hospitality that makes Merton’s apostolate of 
friendship feature so significantly in this dissertation. Admittedly, Merton’s most 
substantial grappling with Islam—and Islamic mysticism in particular—was conducted 
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with Louis Massignon, who was not a Muslim. Nevertheless, Merton learned a great deal 
from Massignon’s work, and incorporated much of what he learned in his own writing. If 
Merton can be considered a spiritual master of the 20th century, it must be because of his 
insights regarding the quest for the true self. Some of the richest passages he wrote on 
this topic rest significantly on the notion of le point vierge, which Merton took from 
Massignon.137 The expression, which Merton refrained from translating to English, refers 
to “At the center of our being…a point of nothingness which is untouched by sin and by 
illusion, a point of pure truth, a point or spark which belongs entirely to God, which is 
never at our disposal, from which God disposes of our lives, which is inaccessible to the 
fantasies of our own mind or the brutalities of our own will. This little point…is the pure 
glory of God.”138 
Merton’s friendship with Polish writer Czeslaw Milosz is also worthy of at least 
 
brief examination here. This exchange rivaled Merton’s correspondence with Pasternak 
in its intensity, and it offers a clear glimpse of how critical Merton’s very best of friends 
were willing to be of Merton. Michael Mott describes the strong impact Milosz had on 
Merton’s reading choices and perhaps even on his literary taste.139 Milosz would pull no 
punches if he thought something Merton had written to be of low quality. More 
interesting, though, is Milosz’s accusation from 1960 that Merton was too naïve in his 
reflections on the natural world. “In other words,” Merton interpreted the critique, “he 
thinks I am not Manichaean enough.”140 Mott interprets Milosz’s complaint as an 
 
137. Ibid, 357. 
138. Merton, Conjectures, 158. 
139. Mott, 356. 
140. Merton, Conjectures, 139. 
135 
 
 
 
expression of his own search for a spiritual guide.141 Whether or not Mott is correct, it is 
obvious that Merton and Milosz did not always treat one another gently, to the 
enrichment of both. 
This section has provided only a sketch of Merton’s ‘career’ as a letter writer. It 
was primarily in the writing of letters that Merton’s apostolate of friendship was carried 
out. As such, there are letters in which Merton appears quite vulnerable, and letters in 
which Merton’s compassion reaches its fullest expression. Throughout his letters Merton 
demonstrates his grounding in the Catholic tradition, even as his awareness of the 
dynamism of that tradition allowed him to yearn constantly for a fuller, deeper 
understanding of his faith. 
The Apostolate of Friendship in Person 
Though Thomas Merton’s apostolate of friendship was carried out primarily 
through the mail, Merton was able to meet with a fairly astounding number of his friends 
during the last decade of his life in particular. The number is astounding, of course, 
because of the nature of Trappist life generally, as well as Merton’s aforementioned 
yearning for ever-greater solitude---tempered at all times, though it was, by his persistent 
need for human contact. Not surprisingly, his epistolary relationships often laid the 
groundwork for his encounters in person, which ended up being a significant part of 
Merton’s apostolate in their own right. As was the case with Merton’s letters, Merton’s 
guests at Gethsemani—and the rare friend for whom he ventured forth from the 
monastery—represent a wide range of personalities and worldviews. For the purposes of 
this chapter, seeking as it does to survey Merton’s development as a Catholic intellectual 
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throughout his apostolate, it might be helpful to begin with one of the significant 
friendships Merton would be able to grow; that with Zen scholar D.T. Suzuki. 
It is not at all shocking that Merton would have been attracted to Zen. As 
Cunningham points out, Zen’s fundamental goal of “the penetration of the illusion to the 
non-Self” fit neatly with Merton’s understanding of the Christian contemplative life. 
Zen’s track record of emphasizing discipline without much along the lines of theological 
dogma also made it easier for Merton to explore as an unfailingly devout Catholic.142 
Merton initiated his correspondence with Suzuki in March 1959, with a letter sharing his 
humble suppositions regarding Zen with Suzuki, who responded with a letter containing 
his own suppositions regarding Christianity. Merton, who was never afraid of a rhetorical 
flourish, would gush to Suzuki that “it seems to me that Zen is the very atmosphere of the 
Gospels, and the Gospels are busting with it. It is the proper climate for any monk, no 
matter what kind of monk he may be.”143 Simultaneously, though, it is interesting to note 
how much energy Merton puts into his descriptions of Christian beliefs as he shared his 
own tradition with Suzuki: “The Christ we seek is within us, in our inmost self, is our 
inmost self, and yet infinitely transcends ourselves. We have to be ‘found in Him:’ and 
yet be perfectly ourselves and free from the domination of any image of Him other than 
Himself.”144 Ultimately, as has been seen in previously noted exchanges, what Merton 
seems to have been after was a sense of common experience that might transcend the 
apparent differences between Merton’s Catholicism and Suzuki’s Zen. Only one month 
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into their correspondence Merton shared with Suzuki his hunch that he had pinpointed 
such an experiential commonality: “With us, this stress on freedom, God’s freedom…is 
the thing that corresponds to Zen in Christianity. The breakthrough that comes with the 
realization of what the finger of a koan is pointing to is like the breakthrough of the 
realization that a sacrament…is a finger pointing to the completely spontaneous Gift of 
Himself to us on the part of God…”145 
In June 1964, Merton received word that Suzuki, then 94 years old, would be in 
New York, and would like to meet him. Rather unexpectedly, it seems, Merton was 
granted permission to make the trek from Abbot Fox. While Merton’s journals reveal that 
he was very anxious about returning to a city that had figured so greatly in his pre- 
monastic life and about the possibility of being recognized, they also reveal that his 
conversations with Suzuki were well worth the risks. “These talks were very pleasant, 
profoundly important to me—to see and experience the fact that there really is a deep 
understanding between myself and this extraordinary, simple man whom I have been 
reading for about ten years with great attention. A sense of being ‘situated’ in this 
world.”146 As was the case with Pasternak, Suzuki was another whom Merton had come 
 
to know ‘in God.’ On the purely intellectual level, Merton’s writings demonstrate the 
degree to which his engagement with Suzuki modified his thinking on non-Christian 
mysticism. Whereas he had once been entirely negative on the prospect of genuine 
mystical experience outside the church, he would eventually grant that Zen mystics may, 
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despite their lack of refined theological language, have “experienced the presence of God 
in what they speak of as knowing the inmost self.”147 
The trip to New York was an exceptional moment in Merton’s apostolate of 
friendship. In the vast majority of cases, if Merton was going to interact face to face with 
a person or with a group, it was going to take place at Gethsemani. Cunningham notes the 
consistency with which groups from various schools and seminaries made the trek to 
Kentucky in order to speak with Merton. Cunningham finds in his research that “the 
meetings had more of the quality of mutual exchange and common prayer in line with 
Merton’s desire to further a dialogue of friendship.”148 Merton was no scholar, and his 
conferences with people outside his own community were not academic conferences. 
Serious intellectual exchange would take place, but it would always take place in a 
prayer-filled context where Merton was apparently always looking to forge friendships, 
find common ground, and make whatever spiritual advances were possible through a 
comparison of experiences. An especially illustrative example of the kind of dialogue for 
which Merton was best-suited is the ‘Fellowship of Reconciliation’ retreat at Gethsemani 
in November 1964. A truly ecumenical gathering in which numerous traditions were 
represented, Merton intentionally avoided a rigid agenda because “What we are seeking 
is not the formulation of a program, but a deepening of roots.”149 
 
Unfortunately, it is obviously impossible to know what trajectory Merton’s 
apostolate of friendship would have followed had he lived longer. Merton could be 
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unpredictable. For several months in 1966, Merton carried on a romantic relationship 
with an engaged woman, a nurse he had met on one of many trips to Louisville for 
medical attention. Merton’s journals indicate the significant degree to which she (called 
simply ‘M’ in the journals) dominated his attention for those months. He wrote her often 
and met up with her frequently, also. These face-to-face meetings often required Merton 
to take advantage of his friends, who generally seem to have been amused initially by the 
romance between priest and nurse, but later aggravated or even fearful for Merton’s well- 
being.150 The affair undoubtedly adds important complexity to any consideration of 
Merton. At times, Merton suggests that there was something quite beneficial for his 
spiritual development in this relationship. M, for instance, seems to have done something 
to heal the wounds caused by the young Merton’s inability to forge entirely meaningful 
relationships with women: “In the light of M.’s love I realize for the first time how 
deeply I was loved back in those days by girls whose names I have even forgotten.”151 
Once the relationship had begun to diminish, however, it seems that Merton was willing 
to assess things apart from what he felt for her: “How evident it becomes now that this 
whole thing with M. was, in fact, an attempt to escape the demands of my vocation…I 
did not stand the test at all but allowed the whole essence to be questioned and tried to 
change it. I could not see I was doing this.”152 
 
Thomas Merton was killed in Bangkok in December 1968 in an apparent accident 
in which Merton was electrocuted after coming into contact with a faulty fan after 
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showering. Merton had, just before, addressed the monastic conference that had called 
him to Thailand. Abbot Primate of the Benedictines Rembert Weakland administered 
Last Rites to Merton, whose remains were returned to the United States in an American 
bomber. He had traveled throughout the East, attending conferences, giving retreats, and 
expanding his network of friends. Though there has been speculation that Merton’s death 
was a result of suicide or foul play, there appears to be no hard evidence to support such 
claims. Others have suggested that Merton, had he lived, would have left the Trappists, 
left Catholicism, and/or remained in the East. It is difficult to support such hypotheses, 
given Merton’s deep embrace of Catholic spirituality, and the degree to which his life at 
Gethsemani clearly suited him—despite his seemingly constant expression of a desire to 
be elsewhere. Merton was very much aware of his own shortcomings, and he was also 
aware of the need he had for the rootedness provided for him at Gethsemani. 
Preliminary Conclusions 
 
Thomas Merton’s apostolate of friendship was a rigorous undertaking that 
allowed Merton to better plumb the depths of his own Catholic tradition even as he 
represented that tradition to interlocutors of any and seemingly all intellectual homes. 
The friendships Merton forged through his apostolate most certainly involved risk on his 
part, especially given his awareness of his own inability to communicate meaningfully 
with others for much of his own life. Nevertheless, Merton intentionally created the space 
necessary to help transform people with worldviews quite different from his own to 
become friends. Whether Merton was the one doing the reaching out, or if he was the one 
being reached out to, the basic underlying ingredient of his hospitality was an abundance 
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of goodwill. Regardless of a person’s intellectual perspective, Merton had a clear gift for 
welcoming the other into dialogue. Merton’s intentionality on this front was no doubt 
aided considerably by his deep sense of his almost unique vocation as a Trappist monk 
sharing his contemplation with the rest of the world, to the enrichment of both that world 
and his own monastic spirituality. Thomas Merton saw his apostolate of friendship as 
needing to avoid both the temptation to engage in a simplistic apologetics as well as the 
temptation to collapse into an unthinking acceptance of all things. The Catholicism of 
Thomas Merton in The Seven Storey Mountain is therefore noticeably different than that 
of the man who wrote, say, Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. In his autobiography, 
Merton saw his embrace of Catholicism as a summit that he had reached once and for all. 
By the time he wrote Conjectures, Merton seems no less enthralled with his Catholic 
worldview, but he had a profoundly different understanding of how his faith oriented him 
to the world. Conjectures, as a result, gives full expression to Merton’s sense that he 
needed to share the riches of his contemplative Catholic perspective with the world 
around him. That world, as Merton could see with the clarity of his increasing social 
consciousness, needed Catholic insights. What Merton had also come to see, though, was 
that his Catholic perspective had benefitted from—and would probably continue to 
benefit—from the insights of his various friends. The friendships he maintained and the 
friendships he forged during his first decade in monastic life drew him out of any narrow 
conception of himself as monk that he may have once entertained for himself. His 
friends, similarly, could come to expect that they would be brought into serious 
engagement with the riches of Merton’s Catholic tradition. 
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Merton’s great spiritual insight regarding the nature of the true self was an 
additional boon to his apostolate of friendship. As Merton grappled with the questions 
and challenges posed to him through letters and face to face encounters, he endeavored to 
experience more than a straightforward intellectual refinement. On top of that, he desired 
to have any attachment within him to something other than God to be burned away. His 
immersion in the apostolate of friendship, on top of his normal monastic lifestyle, forced 
him to remain oriented to the other. Just as in Wadell’s conception of friendship as a 
school of charity, Merton’s relationships with people both within and far away from 
Gethsemani trained him to be more hospitable, even as his hospitality enabled him to be a 
better friend. 
Obviously, this chapter represents only a brief survey of Merton’s apostolate. 
 
Much more correspondence could be mentioned, and many more meetings at Gethsemani 
as well. This chapter has tried to zero in on a few notable examples that demonstrate the 
kinds of dialogue Merton engaged in while also showing the manner in which these 
exchanges broadened his horizons both spiritually and intellectually. Above all else, it is 
crucial for the remainder of the dissertation that this chapter succeeded in showing that 
Merton’s intellectual hospitality—and subsequent intellectual friendship, did not occur in 
spite of his Catholic faith, but because of it. Were it not for Merton’s particular 
understanding of solitude, contemplation, and Christology, it is clear that the apostolate 
of friendship would not have happened. For Catholic institutions of higher learning that 
strive to be both authentically Catholic and true universities, Merton’s example 
intellectual hospitality is a potent one. As a convert who became a Trappist who became 
143 
 
 
 
 
a public intellectual, Merton’s path of Christian discipleship was by no means a common 
one. Nevertheless, the particularity of Merton’s outlook as a Catholic was his very 
doorway into hospitable dialogue with the rest of the world. The Merton corpus is a 
gigantic testament to the university’s responsibility to invite students into and strengthen 
their grasp of a tradition which might serve as their intellectual home. Important 
decisions regarding things like possible changes to core curricula and invitations to guest 
speakers must be seen in light of that responsibility. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Bernard Lonergan and the Hospitality of Cognition 
 
 
Introduction 
 
That Thomas Merton represents an excellent exemplar of the kind of intellectual 
hospitality of which a Catholic thinker might be capable will hardly come as a surprise to 
anyone at least somewhat familiar with his life and/or works. Indeed, Merton’s corpus 
could be used to powerful effect by any university trying to inspire faculty or students to 
greater heights of hospitality in their own work. And, though it would be difficult to 
replicate the many characteristics and strengths which contributed to Merton’s 
hospitality, there are no doubt intellectuals on Catholic campuses who can match at least 
some of them. As a sporadic thinker, however, Merton does not necessarily provide a 
clear blueprint or method to follow. 
As such, this chapter is going to attempt a survey of a very different kind of 
Catholic intellectual, who was anything but sporadic. Indeed, Bernard Lonergan was so 
methodical a scholar that he did, quite literally, write the book on method. Unlike 
Merton, Lonergan will give a clear path for an individual scholar to follow in the interest 
of being a more hospitable thinker who is better able to befriend the intellectual other. As 
important as this is in itself, perhaps more significant is that Lonergan’s work will also 
suggest a path that universities might follow in the interest of making their entire 
curricula a training in hospitality. Historically, the Catholic tradition has demonstrated a 
fundamental orientation to hospitality in its striving for a synthesis of all knowledge. 
What better way to make room for another philosophy or school of thought than to bring 
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it into an all-encompassing engagement with the best of what Catholic thought has to 
offer? How better to make friends with the other than to give them the gift of our best 
while simultaneously seeking to incorporate any and all truth that they have to offer in 
return? 
The ability of Catholic university curricula to offer students an integrated 
education which enables them to synthesize all of what they learn into a coherent 
worldview has been strained over the past half a century. The fragmentation so 
characteristic of contemporary thought may well pose one of the gravest threats to the 
Catholic identity of a Catholic university. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that “the distinctive 
calling of the American Catholic university” should be “to challenge its secular 
counterparts by recovering both for them and for itself a less fragmented conception of 
what an education beyond high school should be…”1 After lamenting the nature in which 
 
such fragmentation is able to perpetuate itself throughout academe, MacIntyre complains 
that while “Each part of the curriculum is someone’s responsibility,” there does not seem 
to be anyone who “has a responsibility for making the connections between the parts.”2 
Bernard Lonergan has also been critical of fragmentation in the Academy, and has 
questioned whether there is, even, someone capable of doing the connecting. Too much 
specialization, in Lonergan’s estimation, “very easily results in a notion of education as 
the information belt supplying students with a great number of pieces and leaving to them 
the task of putting together what the professors cannot put together themselves.”3 
 
1. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, “The End of Education: The Fragmentation of the American 
University,” Commonweal (October 20, 2006). 
2. Ibid. 
3. Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 17. 
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That such fragmentation could hinder Catholic higher education as much as it has 
secular higher education would likely have come as a shock to those schooled in Catholic 
institutions in the decades immediately prior to the Second Vatican Council. The standard 
Catholic university education was built in no small part upon the foundation provided by 
the neo-Scholastic synthesis that resulted from a revival of Thomistic thought toward the 
end of the 19th century. Though this synthesis, as will be seen, was often enough 
criticized as being a peculiarly parochial function of an insular Catholic Academy, the 
kind of integration it aspired to can rightly be seen as indicative of an instinct for 
intellectual hospitality. Of course, this instinct can, and perhaps regularly was, hijacked 
for purposes rather more triumphalist than hospitable. Regardless, despite its once 
commanding presence within Catholic universities, the synthesis would not survive the 
1960’s. Ever since, the search has been on for a suitable replacement that might define a 
thoroughly Catholic education in the way that Thomistic thinking once did. This chapter 
will contend that the thinking of Bernard Lonergan is uniquely suitable for a timely 
renewal of education in the Catholic intellectual tradition, with Lonergan’s understanding 
of human cognition serving as the basis for a new method capable of integrating a 
curriculum. The goal is to describe the potential for hospitality latent in the older, 
Thomistic school of thought characterized by Aquinas himself, and show how 
Lonergan’s thought might ground a similarly hospitable synthesis of knowledge across 
the disciplines. It is important to note that this chapter is not advocating a reinstitution of 
the old neo-Scholastic synthesis. This chapter is also not trying to consider neo- 
Scholasticism from a vantage point characterized by naiveté, or misplaced nostalgia. The 
147 
 
 
 
 
shortcomings of the neo-Scholastic synthesis, and the manner in which it was 
implemented, are readily acknowledged. 
In its contention for a greater application of Lonergan’s thinking to Catholic 
higher education, this chapter is in good company. John C. Haughey, SJ posits that 
Lonergan’s work “has not been sufficiently plumbed to assist in answering the question 
about what it means to be educated in light of the Catholic intellectual tradition.”4 The 
post-Vatican II Church (and the universities which serve it) cannot thrive through a 
simple reversion to the old neo-Scholastic synthesis. This is, somewhat ironically, 
illustrated clearly in Pope Paul VI’s proposal of Aquinas as “a model to theologians, not 
only because of the profundity of his doctrine, but also because of his openness to the 
world and his respect for truth from whatever source.”5 In his own time, Aquinas was 
capable of providing an integrated philosophical system precisely because his thought 
was neither parochial nor reactionary. For Lonergan, the vitality breathed into the Church 
by the Council—if it is to prove enduring—“requires a genuine assimilation of what is 
new in modern science, scholarship, philosophy, and theology. It requires the careful 
preservation of what is still valid in the older traditions.”6 Much of Lonergan’s work can 
be characterized as a striving for this kind of assimilation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. John C. Haughey, SJ, Where is Knowing Going? The Horizons of the Knowing Subject 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2009), xi. 
5. Romanus Cessario, OP, A Short History of Thomism (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2012), 33. 
6. Michael McCarthy, “Toward a Catholic Christianity: A Personal Narrative,” in In Search of the 
Whole, ed. John C. Haughey, SJ (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 155. 
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Bernard Lonergan 
 
It is often noticed that seemingly everything Thomas Merton ever wrote was 
fundamentally autobiographical in nature. While the same may well be true of any writer, 
the reader of Lonergan can easily lose track of the man behind the method. Despite that, 
or perhaps because of it, it is important to trace, briefly, something of Lonergan’s 
biography in order to understand how his particular brand of intellectual hospitality came 
about. As was the case with Merton, Lonergan’s path included a whole series of 
important people, books, and ideas, that would all contribute something to the thought of 
this impressively capacious thinker. 
Bernard Lonergan was born in December 1904 in Quebec, to a hardworking 
father and a pious mother. After attending a local, ungraded elementary school, Lonergan 
attended a Jesuit-run high school in Montreal. Receiving a classical education at this 
boarding school, Lonergan was afforded the opportunity to skip grades because of his 
already apparent academic gifts.7 It was also during his time in high school that Lonergan 
discerned a vocation to the priesthood, choosing specifically to enter the Jesuit novitiate 
in Ontario in 1922. After the novitiate was completed, Lonergan was sent in 1926 to 
study philosophy at Heythrop College in England. Later on, Lonergan would recall that 
“My early education, up to about the age of 21 was in a classicist tradition.”8 Denied the 
ability to study method at Heythrop and at the University of London where he was 
enrolled as an external student, Lonergan studied the classics but also mathematics and 
logic. Additionally, it was at this point that Lonergan was to receive his formal 
 
 
 
7. Richard M. Liddy, Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan 
(Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1993), 5. 
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introduction to philosophy, which would be, as was customary of the time, by way of the 
neo-Scholastic system that continued to dominate Catholic education and religious 
formation. 
Always a voracious reader, Lonergan also received his first exposure to the 
writings of John Henry Newman while at Heythrop. Timothy Hanchin posits that it was 
from Newman (as well as Augustine) that Lonergan received “an enduring insight that 
would direct his life’s work: the starting point for philosophy should be an account of 
concrete, lived experience rather than metaphysics.”9 Liddy, relatedly, refers to Newman 
as “The major influence on Lonergan’s thought during his early years…”10 Some of 
Newman’s impact on Lonergan was no doubt attributable to Newman’s style: “Newman 
evidenced an uncanny ability to enter into the minds and views of his opponents. Before 
refuting liberal views he always insisted on presenting them with their full force.” 
Lonergan would later assert that Newman “encouraged me to look difficulties squarely in 
the eye, while not letting them interfere with my vocation or my faith.”11 
Some of the impact, however, was surely due to the specific content of Newman’s 
 
writings as well. In the book which was to be a favorite of Lonergan’s, Grammar of 
Assent, the core issue “was the nature of the human mind. What does it mean to know?”12 
For the future author of Insight, this was a topic of considerable interest. In Liddy’s 
estimation, echoing Hanchin, it was Newman’s method that would have the most 
enduring influence on Lonergan: “the focus on the concrete, the interior, the facts of 
9. Timothy M. Hanchin, “A Trinitarian Vision of Education: Bernard Lonergan’s Hermeneutics of 
Friendship and a Catholic University for Our Time” (PhD dissertation, Boston College, 2015), 44-45. 
10. Liddy, Transforming Light, 16. 
11. Ibid, 18, 19. 
12. Ibid, 19. 
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consciousness, as of primary importance, as distinct from what philosophers or scientists 
‘say’ about knowledge. This principle became in Lonergan’s writings the notion of self- 
appropriation. It is on the basis of our knowledge and appropriation of our own mental 
processes that we…come to express…who we are as human beings.”13 
Lonergan would continue to discover other influences as he pursued his studies 
 
and pursued his expanded awareness of the centrality of method. In 1930, Lonergan read 
J.A. Stewart’s Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas. Stewart’s interpretation of Plato would begin to 
propel Lonergan away from the nominalism which had been attractive to him for some 
years. In particular, it seems that Plato led Lonergan to what would be a lifelong 
conviction of the significance of understanding to the process of human knowing. Having 
struggled with concepts, Lonergan found in Plato that “Concepts then are rooted in 
‘grasping the intelligible in the sensible,’ as Lonergan would later put it.”14 
 
Augustine, too, would prove a key influence in Lonergan’s ongoing intellectual 
formation. The great Bishop of Hippo’s influence would prove to be multi-faceted for 
Lonergan both in light of what Augustine’s own thought offered him, but also because it 
facilitated Lonergan’s turning of attention to the work of both Aristotle and Aquinas. 
Augustine’s profound awareness of the many twists and turns of his lifelong search for 
truth indicated a “commitment to introspection, to coming to terms with the facts of his 
own consciousness and the inevitability of those facts.”15 Lonergan would later posit that 
Augustine “knows more about consciousness than Thomas does,” but he simply lacked 
 
 
13. Ibid, 39. 
14. Ibid, 45. 
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the technical vocabulary to express what he knew.16 Regardless, Augustine’s experience 
of conversion—not only religious but intellectual—would intrigue Lonergan so much 
that he would, in Insight, use “Augustine’s change of mind in 386 as a paradigm on the 
transformation that he is seeking to facilitate in the minds of ‘sufficiently cultured’ 
readers of the twentieth century.”17 
In 1935, Lonergan would write that “The intelligibility of reality itself needs an 
explanation. The sole explanation is that there is an ultimate identity of intelligence and 
reality…”18 This burgeoning conviction of realism would eventually lead Lonergan to a 
re-assessment of the scholasticism with which he had not been much impressed as a 
younger man. Lonergan required a philosophical framework that was attentive to the 
workings of human cognition as he understood them, and his expanding engagement 
through the mid-1930’s with Thomas Aquinas would give him such a framework. As 
 
Hanchin points out, “In Aquinas, Lonergan found not only a model of unceasing inquiry 
similar to his admired Newman and Augustine, but also a more profound account of the 
workings of the human mind.”19 By that point, Lonergan was already convinced of the 
centrality of understanding, but it would be Lonergan’s reading and reviewing a 
dissertation by one of this professors that would turn him on to another decisive step in 
knowing: judgment. Lonergan would write in his review that his professor, Leo W. 
Keeler, “especially tries to show that for St. Thomas the apprehension of a nexus is one 
thing, the act of assent is another; the former dwelling in the purely intelligible world, the 
 
16. Ibid, 73. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid, 82. 
19. Hanchin, 45. 
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latter affirming the objective existence of the intellectual content.” It was from this 
distinction, Lonergan believed, that it could “be deduced that we err, not so much 
because we apprehend false things, but because we are too precipitous in assenting.”20 
A fellow student in Rome had introduced Lonergan to the work of one of his own 
former professors, Joseph Maréchal of Leuven. Maréchal was fearless in his 
appropriation of Aquinas and his application of Thomism to the problems of 
contemporary philosophy. He held that “a comprehensive and modern critique of 
knowledge revealed the objective dynamism of human knowledge, culminating in 
objective judgments of existence.” The Catholic, then, should fear nothing of engaging in 
such a critique of knowledge, because it could “arrive at the basic Aristotelian and 
Thomistic metaphysical positions.”21 Lonergan learned from Maréchal that human 
 
knowledge functions as a process of “acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging to 
limited knowledge of reality and then the cycle of knowing begins to fill out perspectives 
or to rise to higher viewpoints.”22 Through his engagement (which appears to have been 
mainly through conversation with his classmate in Rome) with Maréchal, Lonergan was 
primed for a deep dive into the mind of Aquinas. In order to contextualize Lonergan’s 
engagement with Aquinas, it is necessary to give a lengthy overview of Thomism in both 
medieval and modern times. Only then can Lonergan’s own Thomistic orientation be 
understood, and only then will it be clear what intellectual hospitality might have looked 
 
 
 
 
20. Liddy, Transforming Light, 99. 
21. Ibid, 102. 
22. Ibid, 104. 
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like to Catholic intellectuals in the first half of the 20th century compared to those of the 
latter half. 
The Common Ground of Catholic Higher Education 
The reintroduction of Aristotelian philosophy into the West during the Crusades 
set into motion a chain reaction which would alter Western Christianity forever 
afterward. With Augustine continuing to dominate Catholic thought, universities (Paris, 
notably) were necessarily going to become battlegrounds between traditionally Christian 
and Aristotelian principles. Alasdair MacIntyre gives a concise overview of the 
showdown: “Where Aristotle asserted the eternity of the world, Christianity assigns to it a 
beginning at the moment of creation; where Aristotle ruled out the separate immaterial 
existence of the soul, and where Averroes’ interpretation of the De Anima, although it left 
room for the resurrection of the dead, reinforced the denial of any survival of the soul 
apart from the body, Christianity was committed to belief in such survival.”23 
Compounded by differing perspectives (between Aristotle and Augustine) on the question 
how people come to know, the understanding of truth, and the relation between error and 
morality, it is no surprise that Aristotelian philosophy was a matter of grave concern to 
many churchmen of the time. 
What was needed, therefore, was a concerted effort to engage, hospitably, with 
Aristotelian thought. That Aquinas ‘baptized’ Aristotle has become something of a 
truism. What he truly accomplished, however, is better understood as a synthesis of 
Augustinian and Aristotelian thought. “He judged Augustinianism by its standards; he 
23. Linda C. Kondrick, “Thomism and Science Education: History Informs a Modern Debate,” 
Integrative and Comparative Biology, 48, 2 (August 2008), 207. 
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judged Aristotelianism by its standards. He integrated the two in a way that allowed a 
compromise to be brokered between the two camps that were entrenched in their own 
traditions.”24 Aquinas’s notion of the human being as a whole composed of both body 
and soul helped him overcome what he found to be a major shortcoming in Augustine’s 
thought. As MacIntyre summarizes, in Aquinas “an Aristotelian account of nature…was 
not merely harmonized with an Augustinian supernatural theology but shown to require it 
for its completion, if the universe is to be intelligible in the way in which parts relate to 
wholes.”25 
Just as Aquinas engaged Augustine critically, he did the same with Aristotle. 
 
Rachel Goodrich contends that the originality of Aquinas “consists partly in the fact that 
as a metaphysician he adopts an ‘existentialist’ as distinct from an ‘essentialist’ 
approach.” While both Aristotle and Plato perceived essence as the core of reality 
(arguing that beings consisted of form and matter), Aquinas went further and affirmed 
“an act-of being which is prior to essence and constitutes the living actuality of each 
existent thing.”26 In noting this same development in Aquinas’s thought, Lonergan asserts 
that Thomas “was going beyond Aristotle in a profound and radical fashion.”27 
 
Readers of Aquinas will soon realize, though, the extent of what he accomplished 
in crafting a synthesis of Aristotle and Christianity: Aquinas incorporated ideas from a 
wide range of sources. Etienne Gilson refers to the “extreme diversity” of his sources: 
“St. Thomas borrows now from Aristotle, now from Avicenna, and now from St. John 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Rachel M. Goodrich, “Neo-Thomism and Education,” British Journal of Education Studies 7, 
1 (November 1958), 27, 28. 
27. Lonergan, Topics in Education, 94. 
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Damascene or St. Augustine. No matter how eclectic we suppose him to be, he cannot 
have collected thoughts so infinitely varied without modifying them considerably.”28 
Aquinas, it seems, simply had a mind with a gift for drawing, hospitably, multiple 
streams of thought together. But what, then, did this synthesis produce? What is 
Thomism? 
There has been, historically, no small difficulty in answering precisely that 
question. Part of that difficulty is a result of how prolific Aquinas was. Over the course of 
his career Aquinas produced “theological syntheses, disputed questions, biblical 
commentaries, commentaries on Aristotle, commentaries on other classical works 
commonly in use at medieval universities, polemical writings, treatises on specific 
subjects, letters and requests for expert opinions on particular issues, liturgical works, 
sermons, and prayers.”29 What do these diverse writings suggest, in sum? For Romanus 
Cessario, OP,Thomism is “a theological and philosophical movement that begins in the 
thirteenth century, (and) embodies a systematic attempt to understand and develop the 
basic principles and conclusions of St. Thomas Aquinas in order to relate them to the 
problems and needs of each generation.”30 
This is the work of the Thomist, then, just as synthesis was once the work of 
Thomas himself. Theology, for Aquinas, was all about “ordering truths to the one 
Truth…”31 For Thomas, the universe in its totality was best understood as a hierarchy, 
and his task as a philosopher was “to place each class of beings in its proper grade. To do 
28. Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1956), 77. 
29. Cessario, 10. 
30. Ibid, 13-14. 
31. Ibid, 9. 
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this, one principle of universal value must always be kept in mind: that the greater or less 
can only be appraised and classified in relation to the maximum, the relative in relation to 
the absolute.”32 There can be no being without God, in Aquinas’s system. “There is no 
being save the divine being in which all creatures participate; and creatures only differ 
from one another by reason of their greater or lesser degree of participation in the divine 
being.”33 
The thinking of Thomas Aquinas can rightly be described as a kind of realism. 
Thomas, and the Thomists who follow him, “defend the reality of creation, and hold the 
conviction that from the visible things of the universe the human mind can know the 
existence of God.”34 The human mind is capable of true perception of the universe, just 
as the human mind is capable of reasoning its way toward knowledge of humanity’s true 
end: God. Ultimately, then, there can be for Thomas no divergence between revelation 
and reason: they both come from God. Just as faith and reason cannot contradict one 
another, however, either one cannot proceed without the other: “They can neither 
contradict each other nor ignore each other nor be confused with each other. In vain will 
reason justify faith. It can never transform it into reason. The moment faith gives up 
authority for proof, it ceases to believe and begins to know. And in vain would faith 
move reason from without or beguile it from within. Reason can never cease to be 
itself.”35 Should reason begin to accept anything other than a definitive proof, it will yield 
 
at once to faith. The two are utterly distinct, then, but necessarily complementary. This 
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complementarity no doubt contributes to Thomism’s attractiveness as a philosophy 
around which to build a university education. Before that would happen in the American 
context, however, Thomistic thought would need to regain the momentum it had lost by 
the end of the eighteenth century. 
Pope Leo XIII’s 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris would prove to be the definitive 
document behind the revival of Thomistic thought. Leo was not any less troubled than his 
predecessor, Pius IX, by the intellectual currents of the time. Leo felt that anyone 
considering the problems facing the Church (and the world) “must come to the 
conclusion that a fruitful cause of the evils…lies in this: that false conclusions concerning 
divine and human things, which originated in the schools of philosophy have now crept 
into all the orders of the State, and have been accepted by the common consent of the 
masses.”36 Just as Thomas had become the master of original Scholasticism by being the 
 
great synthesizer he was, so too would neo-Scholasticism allow the Church to discern the 
good from the bad in contemporary thought. Rather than fearlessly engaging with 
contemporary philosophy, however, Leo’s revival of Thomistic thought would be 
oriented to a sifting of wheat—what the Church already had—from the chaff—what the 
world had to offer. 
Leo’s successors would continue to carry the neo-Scholastic torch. For example, 
Gleason recounts how, shortly before his death in 1914, Pope Pius X “made it clear that 
when he had earlier said St. Thomas was to be studied ‘particularly,’ he really meant 
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‘exclusively.’”37 This sentiment, especially coming from a reigning Pope, definitely 
suggests something of a reactionary nature to the neo-Scholastic project. Rather than a 
system of thought through which the Church might seek to confidently welcome an 
engagement with outside perspectives, neo-Scholasticism began to be treated as a kind of 
pinnacle, suggesting that Catholic thought was something that had already reached an 
accomplished gold standard. Rather than the courageously expansive hospitality of 
Aquinas, neo-Scholasticism would approach the other not with a spirit of seeking truth 
wherever it might be found, but rather with the bearing of one convinced of having 
already fleshed out the totality of truth. The Code of Canon Law, revised in 1917, 
similarly “commended to professors of philosophy and theology the methods, doctrine, 
and principles of…Thomas Aquinas.” Benedict XV would lend his support to the quasi- 
official status of neo-Scholasticism by referring to it as “the preferred doctrine of the 
Church.”38 
The revival would not make its most dramatic ascent until the 1920’s. On the 
heels of the first World War, Enlightenment-style optimism was no longer in vogue. “The 
nineteenth century’s confidence in reason, optimism about human perfectibility, and 
belief in progress…were utterly shattered by the cataclysmic shock of the Great War and 
the outbursts of revolutionary fury that accompanied and followed it.”39 When neo- 
Scholasticism came to dominate Catholic higher education, it likely did as much to 
 
distinguish a Catholic university education as did the presence of priests and vowed 
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religious staffing university faculties. After all, this school of thought “reasserted the 
capacity of reason to comprehend reality, the unity and harmony of the world…(and) It 
provided Catholic intellectuals with an ideology that expressed the intelligibility of the 
world and the Catholic community’s optimism and Americanism…” All this, of course, 
at a time when “many prominent American intellectuals had denied that intelligibility and 
become disillusioned…”40 
With an optimistic view of human nature and the capabilities of reason, neo- 
Scholasticism “criticized the age for its skepticism, irrationalism, disillusionment, 
individualistic capitalism, and totalitarian socialism.”41 The revival of Thomistic thought 
gave a philosophical basis for an obviously-Catholic faith commitment that impacted the 
full range of human endeavors: social, political, economic, and cultural. Catholic scholars 
of the time were well-equipped, then, to confidently engage the world around them. Such 
confidence is entirely conducive to intellectual hospitality as it encourages the scholar to 
undertake the engagement. Not surprisingly, neo-Scholasticism therefore had 
ramifications that extended well beyond the classroom. Luca Sandona, for instance, has 
described the impact of a Thomistic, natural law approach to economics, especially after 
the Second World War: “In particular, the economic growth of Germany and Italy was 
related to the identification of social justice as the main aim of public policy. The 
application of (natural law approach) ideas of equal opportunity and the recognition of 
individual effort improved individual and societal well-being and reduced inequalities in 
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income distribution.”42 Patrick Carey demonstrates the broad influence of neo- 
Scholasticism strictly within the American context, pointing out that it “supplied the 
natural law tradition for John Ryan’s social ethics; it also provided the intellectual 
foundations for John Courtney Murray’s understanding of church-state relations and for 
Gustave Weigel’s approach to Christian unity.”43 Undoubtedly, in a relatively short span 
of time Thomistic thought had re-emerged in a big way, and neo-Scholasticism had come 
to dominate Catholic thinking, and therefore Catholic higher education as well 
Philip Gleason rightly takes to task any commentators willing to overlook the 
intellectual seriousness of the neo-Scholastic revival. It was far more than simple “party- 
line philosophizing.” As Gleason argues, “It was, in fact, a very large and important 
school which at its height supported 25 specialized philosophical journals throughout the 
world and engaged the commitment of thinkers the quality of whose work makes it 
impossible to dismiss the whole phenomenon…”44 Indeed, there is no reason to reject out 
of hand the educational experience on the student side, either. Alice Gallin lauds the 1953 
introduction of a new curricular program at the Catholic University of America, called 
“Theology, Philosophy, and History as Integrating Disciplines in the Catholic College of 
Liberal Arts.” This program sought to use those three disciplines as a means of tying the 
content of all coursework together for the students, proudly demonstrating the unity of 
knowledge that neo-Scholastic thinking continued to defend. Reflecting on the success of 
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this program (and others that it spawned at various Catholic schools), Gallin suggests that 
“Seriously, this may well have been the best intellectual experience we ever offered our 
students in Catholic colleges.”45 Such a program, reflecting the neo-Scholastic confidence 
regarding the ultimate harmony of all truth, is a clear example of the old synthesis’s 
ability to encourage intellectual hospitality. Regardless of a given student’s predilection 
for one subject area over the other, the curriculum itself was structured in such a way as 
to encourage the student to be open to connecting lessons from one discipline to all the 
others. The honeymoon between Catholic higher education and neo-Scholasticism, 
however, was not to last. 
The collapse of the neo-Scholastic synthesis by the end of the 1960’s would 
drastically alter the landscape of Catholic higher education. Indeed, it is one of the major 
assumptions of this chapter that Catholic higher education has still not entirely 
‘recovered.’ Still, one need not look too hard to find clear reasons for the dissolution of 
the philosophical system that had given a Catholic university education its focus and 
distinctiveness. Already at the beginning of the embrace of neo-Scholasticism by 
Catholic universities in the 1920’s there was wide-ranging skepticism (despite the 
impressive academic output of Thomists noted above) regarding its worth as the 
backbone of a modern university curriculum. Outsiders to Catholic higher education 
often had “the impression of (its) being a school of philosophy accepted purely out of 
obedience…” As Gleason tellingly asserts, “in many cases that impression was fully 
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justified.”46 While instruction in neo-Scholastic philosophy may have taught over a 
generation of Catholic university students how to think, there is good reason to suspect, 
also, that its prevalence may have stunted the growth of American Catholicism’s overall 
academic profile. For some Thomists, the synthesis represented something of a pinnacle 
of human thought. It did not represent simply the best that humanity had done; it was the 
best that humanity could do. There is little room for intellectual hospitality in such a 
mindset. As a result, there was precious little authentic dialogue between neo- 
Scholasticism and the other intellectual currents of the time, such as pragmatism, 
idealism, and neo-orthodoxy.47 Even if the neo-Scholastic synthesis had survived, it is 
reasonable to suppose that it would have nevertheless guaranteed Catholic universities a 
secondary status among the nation’s institutions of higher learning.48 
In his assessment of the neo-Scholastic collapse, Liddy points to the dual specter 
of academic specialization and fragmentation that had already begun to loom in the 
middle of the century. Liddy suggests that “a battle emerged at Catholic universities 
between those advocating an overarching integrating vision that tended to be ‘imposed 
from on high’ and…those eager to embrace the products of modernity: individual 
autonomous departments with scholarly competence in specialized disciplines.” Within a 
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short span of time, Liddy contends, “the church’s massive commitment to neo- 
Scholasticism could not hold its own. (It) could not win the support of the powerful 
specialized departments of the universities to be their integrating language.”49 Had neo- 
Scholasticism been able to oppose growing academic specialization with a united front, it 
may have been a fair fight. No such unity existed, however, which “in itself was bound to 
unsettle its curricular function, for it was not unitary to start with…how could something 
called ‘Neoscholasticism’ serve to integrate and synthesize Catholic liberal arts 
education?”50 
In addition to the tensions between different neo-Scholastic schools of thought, 
 
Gleason highlights two additional factors leading to the collapse of the synthesis. First, 
neo-Scholasticism was crushed, in a sense, by its own weight: “No form of philosophy 
taught on such a scale could escape being vulgarized in the process, especially if, as in 
this case, the aim was to teach it as a comprehensive system.”51 With students required to 
take ample courses in philosophy at Catholic schools throughout the country, it cannot be 
surprising that some teachers assigned to these courses simply were not as effective as 
others. Additionally, the prominent papal role in the neo-Scholastic renewal described 
above did not make the synthesis more palatable to those outside Catholic universities. 
Especially after something of an ecclesiological paradigm shift during Vatican II, papal 
endorsements would hardly be enough to ensure neo-Scholasticism’s popularity even 
among Catholics at Catholic institutions. “Thomism was…well on its way to being 
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dismissed by Catholics themselves as ‘official ideology,’ the teaching of which amounted 
to little more than ‘indoctrination in the party line.’”52 
At this point it may be worth pausing briefly to ask, why is any of this talk of a 
neo-Scholastic collapse important? If it was, ultimately, overwhelmed by specialization, 
is it not better to assume that the right side won? To whom should this talk of 
fragmentation matter? For MacIntyre, the answer is as sweeping as it is straightforward. 
“It should matter to anyone who thinks it important what conception of human nature and 
the human condition students have arrived at by the time they enter the adult 
workplace—and therefore to any Catholic. For each of the academic disciplines teaches 
us something significant about some aspect of human nature and the human condition.”53 
A synthesis of knowledge, characterized in part by hospitality between the disciplines, 
allows the insights of each department to enrich the university’s overall narrative of what 
it means to be human. Whatever its failings, the neo-Scholastic synthesis allowed for 
such an appropriation of insights across the curriculum. In order to work toward a new 
means of integrating knowledge, Liddy suggests that Catholic universities require “a 
specifically philosophical vision strong enough to build bridges between faith and 
contemporary specialized knowledge.”54 In order to completely understand what the neo- 
Scholastic synthesis did for Catholic education, Liddy argues that one must see the true 
 
nature of the void its collapse has left behind: it is a “vacuum of meaning.” In effect, 
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there is “no consensus on the very meaning of ‘knowing’ and how human knowing in one 
area of specialization is related to every other area and to the rest of human living.”55 
If Liddy is correct in his assessment of the climate of higher education, then he 
has also demonstrated why Catholic higher education could not reasonably content itself 
with a reactionary reinstitution (whatever that would look like) of neo-Scholasticism. To 
combat the fragmentation of knowledge caused (in part) by rampant academic 
specialization, it could hardly prove effective to proceed as if the fragmentation had not 
happened in the first place. Nor would it be to follow Aquinas’s own lead, given that he 
“met the contemporary Aristotelian scientific world on its own turf.”56 Despite its virtues, 
neo-Scholasticism was hamstrung by its unfamiliarity with “modern scientific and 
scholarly ways of questioning. It was also severely hampered by an intuitionist view of 
knowing: reality is ‘out there’; all you have to do is take a good look at it. It had little 
appreciation for the complex structure of human experiencing, human understanding, and 
human judging.”57 In that area of human cognition, no modern Catholic scholar has made 
a more significant contribution than Lonergan. With the neo-Scholastic synthesis gone, 
Lonergan’s mapping out of “the basic human cognitive processes which underlie all 
disciplinary methodologies” offers significant possibilities for a new integrative 
framework.58 Such a framework may well be capable of hospitable engagement with a 
variety of disciplines and perspectives, in the spirit of Aquinas’s engagement with 
Aristotelianism. 
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Aquinas and Lonergan 
Neo-Scholasticism once seemed capacious enough to provide Catholic thinkers 
with an intellectual framework for not only the study of the world but also for the 
incorporation of truth wherever it could be found. As such, as a philosophical framework 
it possessed a real potential for intellectual hospitality, even if the reality of its function in 
the Catholic Academy often fell far short of anything that might be termed hospitable. To 
observe that neo-Scholasticism belongs to the past rather than the future is not to declare, 
then, that Aquinas has outlived his usefulness. To the contrary, there have been a number 
of intriguing signs of life on the Thomistic front, occasionally in the form of friendly 
assessments of Aquinas’s relevance in fields other than theology and philosophy. For 
instance, Sandona has enumerated a number of recent sources which regard a natural law 
approach as “a trustworthy epistemological basis for a new form of social economic 
thinking.”59 Sandona himself has advocated a more widespread appropriation of 
Thomistic applications in economics, suggesting it might be “particularly important to 
promote sustainable development, foster a balanced allocation of wealth and construct a 
stable financial and monetary system regulated by a supranational authority”60 In the hard 
sciences, Linda Kondrick argues that even a partial retrieval of Thomistic thinking on 
faith and reason might prove beneficial to those struggling to integrate what they know 
by faith with what they learn in the laboratory: “Students who feel they must choose 
between faith and reason, between religion and science, can be introduced to another 
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alternative, a holistic paradigm that allows the two, science and religion, to complement 
one another.”61 
Similarly, to suggest that Catholic higher education might systematically 
appropriate the work of Bernard Lonergan to fill the ‘vacuum of meaning’ left behind by 
neo-Scholasticism is not to simplistically move beyond Aquinas, either. Ultimately, it is 
certainly the case that Lonergan was “both critical and respectful of the achievement of 
scholasticism. In (his) view, one of scholasticism’s great achievements was integration of 
faith and reason.”62 Indeed, Lonergan was particularly indebted to Aquinas. As David 
Tracy remembers, “it is not insignificant that Bernard Lonergan…spent (his) early 
scholastic years trying to rediscover the mind and spirit of Aquinas at the most creative 
period of the Thomist revival.”63 Lonergan’s own doctoral dissertation (on grace) 
afforded him the opportunity to “reach the mind of Aquinas first on a single question, 
then on a much wider front.”64 Perhaps most importantly, Aquinas taught Lonergan a 
great deal about the task of a theologian. Specifically, it was Aquinas who showed 
Lonergan what it meant for a theologian to operate scientifically: 
(Aquinas) started from data; he next proceeded via a whole series of theoretic techniques to reach 
a strictly theological resolution of the problems set by the seeming contradictions of the original 
date. In short, he attempted and sometimes achieved not dogmatic certitude but that partial, 
analogous, incomplete but real theoretic understanding proper to the theologian.65 
 
Where Lonergan most clearly moves beyond Aquinas is in his greater attention to 
the knowing subject, beyond merely that which might be known (the object of knowing). 
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It was actually his study of Aquinas that led Lonergan to reflect more deeply on the 
knowing of the knower. As Tracy relates, Lonergan concluded that any final accuracy in 
his conclusions on Aquinas “could only be adequately achieved after he had established 
some real grasp of the subjective pole—the actual performance of Aquinas’s own 
intellect.”66 In effect, rather than focusing entirely on, say, “the metaphysical expression 
of Aquinas’s cognitional theories,” Lonergan would come to critically analyze first “the 
psychological facts and epistemological implications which gave birth to that 
metaphysics. And then—but only then—for the metaphysics which brought that mind to 
self-expression.”67That this was an intention behind Insight is clear. In its introduction, 
Lonergan acknowledges that there is something seemingly backward in the approach that 
he proposed to take to mapping out human cognition: “Among contemporary scholastics 
there is a broad agreement on metaphysical issues, and at the same time a strongly 
contrasting divergence on epistemological questions. This disparity may lend my work an 
appearance of wrong-headedness, for instead of approaching what is doubtful from what 
is assured I begin from knowledge and reach metaphysics only as a conclusion.”68 At the 
book’s very end, Lonergan considered that he had demonstrated a clear continued 
relevance for the thought of Aquinas: “…I would say that it is only through a personal 
appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness that one can hope to reach the 
mind of Aquinas, and once that mind is reached, then it is difficult not to import his 
compelling genius to the problems of this later day.”69 
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It was in studying Aquinas that Lonergan came to perhaps his greatest insight; 
namely, that until then there had been perhaps a stunning oversight on the part of 
academics precisely when it came to the nature of insight. What does it mean for one to 
know? What happens when someone does come to know? Are there, truly, different ways 
of knowing? It is precisely in his mapping out of an answer to these questions that 
Lonergan may have given Catholic higher education the tools to once again integrate the 
disciplines and thereby ground its ability be intellectually hospitable. 
Lonergan and Cognition 
 
The goal of a higher education, Catholic or otherwise, cannot ultimately be 
separated from an improvement in students’ ability to know. Ideally, if a university is 
offering something above and beyond job training for a career motivated mainly by 
increased earnings potential, this is not merely a case of going to college to learn more. 
Instead, it is reasonable to suppose that students should also be taught how to know more 
effectively, regardless of their career path, for the rest of their lives. And this might be 
said for students with whatever intended course of study. All the disciplines offer 
students an approach to knowing, or to perceiving the world around them and their place 
within that world. As Terry J. Tekippe states, intelligence and reasonableness cannot 
simply be discarded through an act of will. So native are they, Tekippe notes, “to the 
human being that one would want to cease possessing those qualities only after being 
satisfied that it was the smart and reasonable thing to do.”70 
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In 1957, when Bernard Lonergan published Insight: A Study of Human 
Understanding, he sought “an explanatory understanding of the dynamics of human 
understanding, that is, the basic ‘method’ followed by the human spirit at the basis of all 
other methods.”71 Such attention on the subject of human knowing—rather than its 
objects—was not a commonplace in contemporary Catholic thought as such a focus 
might be seen to challenge the objectivity of truth. Nevertheless, Lonergan persisted, 
writing later that he perceived Insight as “fundamentally an expression of traditional 
thinking.”72 Studying empirically the actual carrying out of the methods employed by 
mathematicians, philosophers, and scientists, Lonergan “traces the dynamic method of 
the human spirit unfolding through the basic levels of experiencing, understanding, and 
judging.”73 Armed with expertise in multiple disciplines, Lonergan was able to map out 
the cognitive process which all humans followed, regardless of their own disciplines or 
specializations. In opposition to the trends of fragmentation in academic life, then, 
Lonergan’s work on insight may well represent the basis of a real and hospitable dialogue 
between various ways of knowing. To know how the human mind comes to know, in 
short, is to understand the foundation of any scholarly method. 
For Lonergan, insight is the “supervening act of understanding.” Indeed, insight is 
so central to cognition that “to grasp it in its conditions, its working, and its results is to 
confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole field of human inquiry and human 
opinion.”74  Insight is, using Tekippe’s terms, that “mental activity by which the mind 
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grasps the intelligible connections between things that previously had appeared 
disparate.”75 As such, insight is that sudden (though perhaps not as sudden as one might 
sometimes like) epiphany that seems to change the entire way that a given 
problem/question/situation is perceived. In fact, once the insight is gained, there is little 
chance the subject will be ever be able to consider the original issue in the same way 
again. As Lonergan puts it, insight “passes into the habitual texture of one’s mind.”76 
This is why Tekippe is on solid ground when he describes insight as a breakthrough, or 
even as a “release from the tension of inquiry.”77 
Always concerned with method, Lonergan believes that human cognition is 
inherently methodical in nature. With knowing being the goal of cognition, it is certainly 
legitimate to ask how learning can be ordered to the acquisition of knowledge if the 
knowledge to be learned remains a mystery through much of the process. The answer, 
according to Lonergan, “is the heuristic structure. Name the unknown. Work out its 
properties. Use the properties to direct, order, guide the inquiry.”78 
While insight may be central to the cognitive process as mapped out by Lonergan, 
it certainly is not the beginning of that process. We are propelled through the process of 
cognition, it seems, by a “primordial drive,” a "pure question.” Lonergan notes, “But no 
one just wonders. We wonder about something.”79 Humans, like animals, begin with 
sensory experience. Such experience for humans, however, has always encouraged the 
formation of questions in the human mind that seeks to make sense of that which has 
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been experienced. The answers to these questions might be termed insights. Once insights 
are obtained, they may lead to the development of a concept, by which “the universal 
grasped by the insight under particular conditions is expressed in general form.”80 
Even a concept is not the end of the process of knowing, however. No matter how 
clever an insight or how all-encompassing a concept may seem to be, they often raise 
questions of their inherent truthfulness. As Lonergan readily acknowledges, “among the 
more conspicuous properties of understanding is its liability to incompleteness, 
inadequacy, error.”81 Insights can be entirely coherent, but that is not enough. Are they, 
in fact, true? There is, then, need for a third level in the cognitive process, one in which 
 
insights are subjected to “an affirming or denying, an agreeing or disagreeing, an 
assenting or dissenting.”82 This is the level of judgment, which entails a personal 
commitment in way that the previous levels do not. As Lonergan posits, “It is on this 
third level that there emerge the notions of truth and falsity, of certitude and the 
probability that is not a frequency but a quality of judgment.”83 
Initially, Lonergan had intended to end Insight after the thirteenth chapter. He 
found, though, that if he “went no further (than chapter 13), my work would be regarded 
as…incapable of grounding a metaphysics…”84 Not surprisingly, then, Lonergan 
continued onward. For him, the link between cognition and metaphysics was as necessary 
as it was clear. “Just as the notion of being underlies and penetrates and goes beyond all 
other notions, so also metaphysics is the department of human knowledge that underlies, 
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penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments.”85 It will come as little surprise 
at this point in the chapter that Lonergan’s thinking takes an explicitly Thomistic turn. In 
chapter 15 of Insight, Lonergan introduces the terms—already familiar to any student of 
Thomism—potency, form, and act. The function of the mind corresponds to the nature of 
reality, in a manner not unlike the relationship between a key and lock.86 The nature of 
the process by which people come to know the world around them indicates something 
about the nature things within that world. Potency, Lonergan writes, “denotes the 
component of proportionate being to be known…by an intellectually patterned 
experience of the empirical residue.” Form, according to Lonergan, “denotes the 
component…to be known, not by understanding the names of things, nor by 
understanding their relations to us, but by understanding them fully in their relations to 
one another.” Act, Lonergan contends, “denotes the component…to be known by uttering 
the virtually unconditioned yes of reasonable judgment.”87 Clearly, there is here “an 
astounding similarity to the doctrines of the Aristotelian and Thomist tradition.”88 
Has Lonergan made things overly-complicated? After all, is there not a constant 
temptation to simply equate the entirety of the cognitive process to the level of 
experience? As Tekippe helpfully points out, it would be utterly incoherent to render a 
judgment to the effect that there is no such thing as judgment. As far as conception goes, 
“A person may coherently conceive of a universe in which there is no conception. What 
one cannot coherently do is to conceive this universe as having no conception, because 
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the very act of conceiving this universe as having no conception would constitute at least 
one exception.”89 Finally, again, it would be “incoherent to have an insight that there is 
no such thing as insight.”90 Logically, therefore, Lonergan’s theory of the cognitional 
structure is entirely self-justifying. 
Insight and Fragmentation 
 
The fragmentation of knowledge described briefly in the introduction of this 
chapter is a significant challenge for the Catholic intellectual life, and therefore to 
Catholic higher education as well. This is in no small part because of the way that it 
hampers the Catholic university’s ability to be a community-practitioner of intellectual 
hospitality. The various disciplines can easily tend to exist in their own silos, quite 
isolated from the others. This inability for different academic departments within a 
Catholic university closely parallels the way that fragmentation leaves hamstrung the 
efforts of Catholic intellectuals to hospitably engage the other. Robert M. Doran, SJ, 
suggests that the “fragmentation of knowledge…has…grown only more acute, and with it 
the potential for ideological stalemates, mutual recriminations of all sorts, and the denial 
through silence of the very existence of those with views other than our own.”91 
How might a Catholic university respond to such a powerful trend that is so very 
detrimental to the long tradition of Catholic education? One intriguing response has been 
the proliferation of interdisciplinary courses, programs, and lecture series on Catholic 
campuses that seek to break down the barriers between disciplines by bringing academics 
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of various areas together while simultaneously helping students to recognize connections 
between what they learn in one course with what they have learned from courses in an 
entirely different discipline. While such interdisciplinary endeavors are entirely 
worthwhile, they do not seem to have the campus clout necessary to integrate the entire 
university curriculum in the way that the old Neo-scholastic synthesis had in an earlier 
era. As Haughey asserts, “a modern university needs more than interdisciplinary research 
to come to a sense of a common work or to the experience of being in a common 
enterprise.”92 
It is here, armed with this basic outline of human cognition, that the potential for 
Lonergan’s thought to serve as a catalyst for integration in Catholic higher education 
might be seen. Indeed, the integration of all knowledge seems to have been a goal of 
Lonergan’s behind the writing of Insight in the first place. Early in the book Lonergan 
would claim that “our concern is to reach the act of organizing intelligence that brings 
within a single perspective the insights of mathematicians, scientists, and men of 
common sense.”93 The integration of knowledge would require the various disciplines to 
 
be hospitable toward each other, engaging in a vigorous and rigorous dialogue. Lonergan, 
Haughey rightly notes, was convinced that such dialogue would be most successful if 
“authentic personal subjectivity and collective intersubjectivity are operating in a more 
explicit manner. Why? Because of the fact that the cognitional operations we all are 
equipped with are invariant, hence universal.”94 
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Lonergan’s theory of cognition guaranteed that his outlook was not at all shaped 
by a kind of ivory tower mentality. Lonergan sees a distinction between the kind of 
intelligence one might expect to find in, say, a laboratory and a garage, but that 
distinction implied no qualitative advantage for one over the other. “There is intelligence 
in industry and commerce, in finance and taxation, in journalism and public relations. 
There is intelligence in the home and in friendship, in conversation and in sport, in the 
arts and in entertainment.” And the intelligence that one found in each of these areas, 
Lonergan believes, followed the same process of experiencing, understanding, and 
judging: “In every case, the man or woman of intelligence is marked by a greater 
readiness in catching on, in getting the point, in seeing the issue, in grasping implications, 
in acquiring knowhow.”95 Distinguishing between science and common sense, 
furthermore, did not mean that a person is simply forced to adopt one or the other as the 
way of knowing that would be predominant in his/her life. Rational choice, Lonergan 
contends, “is a choice of both, of science to master the universal, and of common sense to 
deal with the particular.”96 
In a university, similarly, there is significant potential for Lonergan’s theory of 
cognition to serve as the intellectual basis for hospitality. This hospitality will be a means 
not only for bringing Catholic and non-Catholic perspectives into engagement with one 
another, but it will also serve as the basis of hospitality between the disciplines, helping 
them to work toward greater integration of knowledge. For the scientist, the levels of 
experiencing, understanding, and judging would unfold in the forms of “experimentation, 
95. Lonergan, Insight, 196. 
96. Ibid, 203. 
177 
 
 
 
hypothesis formation, and verification.” For the historian, they would be manifest as 
“research, interpretation, and historical judgment.” An accurate account of human 
interiority as it manifests itself in the various methods employed by the human spirit is 
the basis for a philosophical vision strong enough to integrate the various scientific and 
scholarly methods.”97 As Liddy adds elsewhere, if “Catholic college administrators and 
faculties…would reflect upon and discover, with Lonergan’s inspiration and guidance, 
the basic human cognitive processes which underlie all disciplinary methodologies,” then 
the Catholic university would be a place characterized by widespread “interdisciplinary 
communication in pursuit of the common good of the university and of society.”98 
Lonergan and Method 
 
The potential impact of Lonergan’s cognitional theory on Catholic higher 
education is undoubtedly this chapter’s primary contribution to the dissertation. The next 
several sections represent, in some ways, appendices of additional implications of 
Lonergan’s thought for the Catholic intellectual life and Catholic higher education. Some 
of these additional implications have been highlighted by the foregoing consideration of 
Lonergan’s Insight, as is the case with this brief section on Lonergan’s theological 
method. The goal here is not a thorough review of Lonergan’s method so much as an 
acknowledgement of how Lonergan himself seems to have been thinking of the 
adaptability of his thought to the Catholic intellectual life. 
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Lonergan may well provide a framework for increased hospitality and cooperation 
between the disciplines, orienting such cooperation toward a synthesis of knowledge. But 
who is responsible for beginning, pursuing, and persisting in this hard work? Presumably, 
all stakeholders in a Catholic university community have a vested interested in promoting 
and maintaining the Catholic identity of their institutions. That said, it is also clear that 
certain disciplines will, by their very nature, have a perhaps more substantial role to play. 
Pope John Paul II wrote that “Theology plays a particularly important role in the search 
for a synthesis of knowledge as well as in the dialogue between faith and reason. It serves 
all other disciplines in their search for meaning, not only by helping them to investigate 
how their discoveries will affect individuals and society but also by bringing a 
perspective and an orientation not contained within their own methodologies.”99 
Theology, then, is instrumental in facilitating the dialogue between Catholicism and 
everything else. Additionally, theology provides the space for the various disciplines to 
consider the relationship between them. In circumstances where theology is perceived 
with suspicion or even derision by academics, though, might this not set up for failure the 
enterprise of promoting a synthesis of knowledge with all of the intellectual hospitality 
that such a project would both require and promote? For Lonergan, theology’s status in 
the Academy could be shored up significantly not by changing its vantage point (as in 
preferring a supposedly more objective ‘religious studies’ to theology), but by being 
clearer regarding theology’s method. 
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As noted in the biographical sections above, Lonergan had had a longstanding 
fascination with method, which would eventually culminate in his 1971 work Method in 
Theology. Advising his readers from the beginning that a book on theological method 
must necessarily read differently than a book of theology, Lonergan employs his 
understanding of human cognition in order to define how the discipline of theology 
comes to know. Lonergan defines a method as “a normative pattern of recurrent and 
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.”100 Just as in the natural 
sciences—which had demonstrable success in defining their own method—theology 
involves a number of distinct but related processes that will encourage inquiry, inquire, 
evaluate inquiry, ensure that the fruits of inquiry are incorporated into what is already 
known, and wield the fruits of inquiry to begin asking the next generation of questions. 
But is such theological deliberation worthwhile? Is any deliberation worthwhile? 
“To deliberate about deliberating,” Lonergan believes, “is to ask whether any deliberating 
is worth while. Has ‘worth while’ any ultimate meaning? Is moral enterprise consonant 
with this world?”101 Thinking about method, or perhaps better, thinking about knowing 
leads a person eventually to the question of God. Theology, then, for Lonergan, is an area 
of legitimate intellectual inquiry: “…’however much religious or irreligious answers 
differ, however much there differ the questions they explicitly raise, still at their root 
there is the same transcendental tendency of the human spirit that questions, that 
questions without restriction, that questions the significance of its own questioning, and 
so comes to the question of God.” Obviously, the believer, the agnostic, and the atheist 
100. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 4. 
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may answer that question differently. In the case of the latter two, though, even “their 
negations presuppose the spark in our clod, our native orientation to the divine.”102 
For Lonergan, theology involves a twofold movement: one involves a retrieval of 
insight from a religious tradition situated in a particular cultural past, while the other 
looks ahead to the future, seeking to mediate the content of that tradition into what the 
culture is and will be. Thus, it is clear that Lonergan does not embrace a notion of culture 
as something to be accomplished once and for all and then simply preserved. Theology 
undertaken with such a classicist notion of culture would see itself as “a permanent 
achievement,” wherein theologians would continually “(discourse) on its nature.” Instead, 
Lonergan perceives culture empirically, wherein “theology is known to be an ongoing 
process…”103 Lonergan’s method includes eight functional specialties in theology, with 
the first four involved in the retrieval of the past while the latter four work toward the 
future dimension of the theological task. These eight functional specialties include 
research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and 
communications.104 Since, in Lonergan’s theory of cognition, the human person engaged 
in any investigation must operate on the levels of experience, understanding, judgment, 
and decision, Lonergan saw that there must be four functional specialties involved in 
each of theology’s movements.105 Though an individual theologian may be especially 
accomplished in or focused on any one or a combination of the eight specialties, he must 
also be cognizant of how his areas fit the rest of the eight if theology is to be done well. 
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Otherwise, “the man with the blind-spot is fond of concluding that his specialty is to be 
pursued because of its excellence and the other seven are to be derided because by 
themselves they are insufficient. From such one-sidedness theology has suffered gravely 
from the middle ages to the present day.”106 
Lonergan’s Trinitarian Theology 
 
In 2015, Timothy Hanchin submitted a dissertation on Lonergan’s ‘Trinitarian 
vision of education’ and the implications of his Trinitarian theology for friendship in 
Catholic higher education. This chapter would be remiss to avoid any engagement with 
Hanchin’s research given its proximity to the content of this chapter as well as this 
dissertation as a whole. This section will attempt to distill Hanchin’s work with two goals 
in mind. First, Hanchin’s research further demonstrates the degree to which Lonergan’s 
thought is indebted to its grounding in the Catholic tradition, especially—as indicated 
above—Aquinas. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this section will begin to more 
intentionally connect Lonergan’s work to the kind of intellectual hospitality and 
friendship in Catholic intellectual life that this dissertation is both examining and 
advocating. Up to this point, the chapter has tended to speak broadly of the capacity of 
Lonergan’s cognitional theory to drive toward a greater integration of knowledge which, 
we are contending, implies a significant receptivity and even hospitality to perspectives 
and insights encountered through engagement with both Catholics and non-Catholics 
alike. This and the following sections will more intentionally address the hospitable 
orientation latent throughout Lonergan’s work. 
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Hanchin surveys the Lonergan corpus to propose a vision of Catholic higher 
education saturated with friendship. Hanchin’s thesis is that “Bernard Lonergan’s integral 
hermeneutics—the mutual mediation of the ways ‘below upwards’ and ‘above 
downwards’—provides a promising heuristic for the Catholic university’s self- 
understanding as a participation in the coordinated missions of the Son and the Spirit and 
therefore sharing in the life of the triune God—by exercising friendship.”107 For 
Lonergan, following in the footsteps of both Augustine and Aquinas, understanding one’s 
own understanding “provides an analogy that aids us in more adequately understanding 
the mystery of the Trinity.”108 Lonergan’s theory of human cognition, Hanchin contends, 
can lead one to understand God’s life as analogous to friendship: “The sending of the 
missions of the Spirit and the Son is an act of friendship with creation extended by a God 
constituted as friendship.”109 Christ both represents and offers a reconciliation between 
God and humanity, signaling God’s acceptance of and love for people by overpowering 
evil and fashioning out of it something good; namely, love. “The love of a divine person 
looks upon the evil and suffering of his friends as his own—made manifest in the sorrow 
and detestation for sin that Christ exhibits on the cross—and transforms his friends’ evil 
into good so that his friends may be friends with God.”110 
For Lonergan, the Trinity is understood as a community of friends, the friendship 
 
between which is so perfect that it binds “three distinct persons…as one.”111 What, 
exactly, though, is the friendship between the Son and the Father? Between the Father 
107. Hanchin, 6. 
108. Ibid, 111. 
109. Ibid. 
110. Ibid, 161. 
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and the Spirit? Can these instances of friendship be understood as identical to the 
procession of either the Son or Spirit from the Father? Hanchin suggests that “The 
distinction of persons is analogously conceived in terms of the dynamism of 
consciousness, and the consubstantiality of the Trinity is attributed to the infinite act of 
divine consciousness. There is an inherent relatedness of understanding, affirming, and 
loving.”112 For Aquinas, when one loves something, there is within the lover “an imprint 
of the loved reality.” The object of love and the reality which is known, then, are both 
present within one who loves and knows.113 The Son and Spirit process from the Father 
in these terms. The Father knows (Son), and the Father loves (Spirit). 
Augustine had once posited that “None can love what he does not know.”114 
 
Aquinas noted, however, that the love of a person for God does not function along a 
simple knowing-to-loving trajectory. God is not perfectly known, but can be loved 
perfectly. Aquinas, therefore, describes “a reciprocal dynamism between the faculties of 
the intellect and will. The will wills what is recognized as good having been grasped by 
the intellect in the act of understanding, but the will also wills the intellect to understand. 
Love is therefore conversely the cause of knowledge.”115 As will be seen in the next 
 
chapter, John S. Dunne will also grapple with this dynamic relationship between intellect 
and will, knowing and loving. 
Lonergan’s theory of human cognition accounts for the dynamic relationship 
between knowing and loving, which parallels the processions of the Son and Spirit from 
 
112. Ibid, 101. 
113. Ibid, 88. 
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God the Father. Lonergan “identified the extroverted, visible mission of the Word with 
development below upwards and the introverted, invisible mission of the Spirit with 
development above downwards.”116 By ‘below upwards’ one means that the development 
of the human person “flows from attentiveness through understanding to judgment 
producing loving action.” This movement was clearly Lonergan’s focus throughout 
Insight, which described knowing as proceeding from experience to understanding to 
judgment. The way ‘above downwards,’ on the other hand, entails a “(cascading) from 
loving action through judgment informing understanding and attentiveness,” as in the 
case of the human person transformed by and in the love of God.117 Therefore, 
Lonergan’s theory of human cognition was not unrelated to his earlier work on 
Trinitarian theology, but actually reflected his understanding of the relationship between 
and the missions of the divine Persons. 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that Merton’s apostolate of friendship, 
despite its uniqueness, was not something he pursued in spite of his vocation as a 
monastic contemplative. Rather, he came to see that apostolate as part and parcel of his 
vocation, part and parcel of what it meant for him to be a Catholic, Trappist monk. 
Merton’s intellectual hospitality, therefore, was in no small part an expression of his 
faith. Something similar can be said in Lonergan’s case, despite the vast gulf between 
Lonergan and Merton in terms of style and interests. Lonergan’s major contribution to 
philosophy is his work on cognition. His major contribution to theology is his ability to 
take what he had learned regarding human knowing and use it to forge a coherent method 
116. Ibid, 205. 
117. Ibid, 166. 
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for theology to follow. Lonergan’s thought, oriented as it is toward defining common 
ground between widely divergent perspectives, is inherently hospitable. This hospitality, 
like Merton’s, is not something that Lonergan achieved despite his personal commitment 
to the Catholic faith. Instead, given the impact of Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology on his 
theory of cognition, it is no stretch to say that Lonergan’s hospitality is also a function of 
his own Catholic identity. 
Hospitality, Friendship, and Lonergan 
 
Dialogue of any kind requires the parties involved to navigate the tension between 
common ground and the real differences that distinguish them. In the contemporary, 
postmodern context, this can seem especially difficult given the sheer pluralism of 
perspectives and the widely divergent philosophical and religious systems that underpin 
them. For the university striving to bring all knowledge into conversation, however, the 
responsibility is not one it can afford to shirk. For the Catholic university, there is a desire 
to share the riches of the Catholic tradition, but there must also be a clear desire to find 
truth wherever it is to be found—even as the institution remains committed to asserting 
the one Source of all truth. 
Where is the common ground necessary for engagement between Catholic 
thought and that of ‘the world’ to be found? Given the broad spectrum of worldviews to 
be found throughout the world, coupled with the astonishing diversity of cultural 
outlooks, is common ground simply a pipe dream? Frederick Crowe, SJ, asks “Is there a 
community that lies behind their differences and makes communication between the 
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cultures possible, allows transition from one to another as well as integration of their 
goods and achievements in the realm of spirit.?118 His answer, and this chapter’s answer, 
is that the very process of human cognition as mapped out by Bernard Lonergan provides 
the basic common ground from which dialogue between religions, cultures, and academic 
disciplines might proceed. What virtues are perhaps required to not only acknowledge 
this common ground despite glaring apparent differences but also to make the sustained 
engagement between perspectives beneficial for all involved? The obvious answer might 
be to posit that tolerance is the requisite virtue. Tolerance, this dissertation contends, 
pales in comparison to hospitality as a Christian virtue. Haughey suggests that “simply to 
make room for those who hold these plural worldviews” is at best “a merely tolerant 
hospitality.”119 Hanchin, similarly, suggests that tolerance is a weak virtue, given that it 
“is often non-engagement as peace keeping when navigating various truth claims in a sea 
of pluralism.”120 For Lonergan, the stakes of orienting one’s intellectual posture toward 
tolerance were high: “when people merely tolerate one another’s views, they cannot have 
any common view, and they cannot act effectively to deal with social evils, (which) gives 
rise to totalitarianism.”121 
Haughey is equally critical, though, of a kind of hospitality that would seek to 
engage the other with the ulterior motive of somehow prevailing in the end. “A host who 
is out to win is actually more like a would-be conqueror than a host. A host who claims to 
 
118. Frederick E. Crowe, SJ, “Neither Jew nor Greek but One Human Nature and Operation in 
All,” in Communication and Lonergan, ed. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup (Kansas City: Sheed and 
Ward, 1993), 91. 
119. Haughey, 37. 
120. Hanchin, 258. 
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know what the other should do or be has already failed a basic test of hospitality.”122 
Instead, what Haughey would like to see in the Catholic intellectual life—and thus on the 
campuses of Catholic universities—is a more robust brand of intellectual hospitality that 
is capable of promoting meaningful dialogue between the Catholic tradition and, without 
exaggeration, everything else. “…a university can house plural worldviews by hearing 
them, taking them seriously, engaging them. This…form of hospitality can lead to a real 
growth in understanding on the part of both hosts and guests.”123 
Concretely speaking, of what might such hospitality consist on a Catholic 
university campus? Haughey acknowledges that it would be multilayered and proceeds to 
describe three distinct levels. The first involves the individual faculty member, who must 
exhibit a hospitable openness toward the findings of her research, allowing the evidence 
to take her where it leads rather than trying to “mangle the evidence in…her favor.” The 
second layer of hospitality on a Catholic campus, according to Haughey, would be 
interpersonal. Scholars of various disciplines and even worldviews must be willing to run 
the risk of disagreement that comes with serious academic discussion between them. The 
institutions themselves, it seems, must provide structures within which such encounters 
might take place. Finally, in what might be the most all-encompassing layer in relation to 
the academic life of the university, would be a vigorous engagement with the Catholic 
intellectual tradition.124 
 
 
 
 
 
122. Haughey, 37. 
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Haughey recognizes that this third layer might do with some additional 
explanation, devoting two chapters to an extended description of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition, which he calls “the fourth leg under the chair of Peter,” along with Sacred 
Tradition, scripture, and the magisterium of the Church.125 This intellectual tradition 
developed historically out of the fact that the Good News of Christ needed further, and 
even continual, development so as to flesh out its full ramifications and maintain its 
relevance as the Church worked always to preserve the integrity of the Gospel at all 
times. Believing in the God of all creation, Who is the source of all truth, the Catholic 
intellectual tradition has apparently no limit to its capacity. It is entirely committed to the 
understanding of all that is. As Haughey asserts in terms reminiscent of Lonergan, 
“where one is seeking out truth and value, one is seeking ‘being,’ and if that pursuit is 
unrestricted and disinterested, one is contributing to this tradition whether one is aware of 
this or not.”126 
This unboundedness of the Catholic intellectual tradition can be invigorating, but 
also frightening to those committed to the preservation of the truth of the faith, as well as 
its transmission to the next generation. It is the Church’s “first line of hospitality,”127 but 
it will necessarily seem to cross the visible boundaries of thought which is apparently or 
explicitly Catholic. For this reason, it seems legitimate to suggest that there is indeed a 
necessary fourth layer to the kind of hospitality needed on Catholic university campuses, 
one that is as unique as Haughey’s third, the engagement with the Catholic intellectual 
 
 
125. Ibid, 61. 
126. Ibid, 74. 
127. Ibid, 68. 
189 
 
 
 
tradition. There must be a level of hospitality, perhaps even friendship (recall the circular 
relationship between the two described in chapter 2) between the university and the 
hierarchy of the Church. As Hanchin makes clear, tension between bishops and Catholic 
universities, or between bishops and theologians in particular, is best seen as a conflict 
between two cultures: the classicist cultures in which many clerics were formed, and the 
academics who have “no reference point” for it.128 
It is in the midst of this tension, at the heart of so many of the conflicts between 
Catholic universities and churchmen described in chapter 1, that Hanchin’s work on a 
hermeneutics of friendship based in Lonergan’s thought becomes intriguing. Lonergan, 
Hanchin contends, “is in the line of Heidegger and Gadamer in radicalizing the notion of 
hermeneutics as part of the finite and situated character of all human knowing.”129 
Lonergan was far more interested in what it meant for one to know, and what one did 
when knowing, than in whether a person knew anything. Hanchin proposes a 
“hermeneutics and pedagogy of friendship as a way that a Catholic university may 
participate in the ongoing missions of the Spirit and Son and therefore participate in 
divine friendship.”130 Lonergan himself noted the correlation between his Trinitarian 
theology—God as community of friends—and his hermeneutics. “He identified the 
extroverted, visible mission of the Word with development below upwards and the 
introverted, invisible mission of the Spirit with development above downwards. Like the 
two divine missions, the two vectors of development are distinct and 
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coordinated.”131Attentiveness to what it means to know can assist the Catholic university 
not only in its quest for knowledge or to integrate all knowledge, but also in its task to 
articulate its role within the Church. As the Church works to build the Kingdom of God 
insofar as it is able, the Catholic university seeks to participate in the missions and 
friendship of God precisely as a community of learners, coming to know in a dynamic 
pattern that matches and mirrors the pattern of cognition outlined in Lonergan’s Insight. 
Preliminary Conclusions 
Lonergan was convinced of the value of a good general education. As he was 
convinced that it is simply “too easy to produce crackpots by premature specialization,” 
he respected a general education’s abilities to develop a person’s assimilative powers: “If 
one learns to know man through the reading of literature and the study of history, one 
will have a basis for stepping into the human sciences that is much more useful perhaps 
than the study of those sciences.”132 Lonergan’s theory of the cognitive process could 
help the university professor embrace a vision of the Catholic university precisely as a 
university, rather than as a multiversity that plays host to a whole series of parochial 
disciplines. Lonergan’s is “a strikingly catholic philosophy in the deepest sense of the 
term. It is open, dynamic, comprehensive, historically minded, pluralistic, integrative, 
and critical. Lonergan takes his stand on human beings as they are, concrete existential 
subjects with a mature commitment to self-knowledge and self-appropriation.”133 
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And it is precisely in this notion of ‘self-appropriation’ that the full implications 
of Lonergan’s thought for students might be seen. Frederick Crowe, SJ suggests that 
Lonergan does not teach a reader about a topic so much as he helps the reader come to 
know the reader. In Lonergan “we find…an occasion, hear an invitation, receive a 
stimulus to learn something about ourselves by attending to our own interior 
activities.”134 The structure of human consciousness as Lonergan perceives impacts 
everything a person does. Lonergan’s self-appropriation is a person coming “to the 
explicit awareness that ‘This in fact is who I am: one who experiences, questions and is 
capable of understanding, judging, deciding, loving.”135 This self-appropriation is akin to 
an intellectual conversion which allows the scholar or student to convey what they have 
learned in a certain specialization and convey it meaningfully to scholars and students 
immersed in another. As Liddy optimistically posits, “Such conversion leads to ‘the 
theory of philosophic differences,’ that is, the philosophy that enables us to discern and 
critique the prevalent philosophies of the culture around us. It allows one to move beyond 
one’s own restricted world…to accurately assessing the currents, theories, and 
philosophies of the world around us.”136 
In order to welcome students into the kind of work that a Catholic university does, 
 
perhaps there is a need for all students to attend early on in their studies to what it means 
for them to know. If hospitality is to be a goal of the Catholic university, or at least a 
virtue that is to motivate the sorts of decisions a Catholic university undertakes, students 
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need to be helped in order to see how such hospitality functions. Teachers at all levels of 
education are routinely counseled to make sure that students know the educational goal of 
what they are doing at any given time. With more attention given at the beginning of 
undergraduate studies to what it means for students to know, students could be better able 
to see cohesion between the various academic disciplines. How have students come to 
know what they know already? What will it mean for them to know in a theology course? 
In a chemistry course? In a history course? Lonergan’s theory of human cognition would 
equip students and scholars alike to better engage with those who see things rather 
differently they do, or at least have gone about understanding the world around them 
using a different method of knowing. This may be the most substantial antidote to the 
specialization and fragmentation of higher education today. Students aware not only of 
the content that a given professor is trying to communicate to them but also of what it 
means for them to know in the first place—regardless of discipline—will be well-placed 
for a hospitable engagement with multiple subjects and multiple worldviews. 
A Catholic university must always be a place where the Church is able to engage 
with all cultures. In order for such an engagement to happen, the identity of the Catholic 
institution must always be strong enough to warrant the confidence necessary to be 
hospitable toward those cultures. As Haughey observes, “the virtue most peculiar to 
committed academics is their hospitable disposition towards data, in whatever guise it 
comes or however uncongenial it might seem to be. Hospitality welcomes others…as 
worthy of the room one makes for them.”137 In order to encourage the scholars and 
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professors of Catholic higher education to be so hospitable, there must be a means of 
articulating that notion so central to the Catholic tradition; namely, that a unity of all 
knowledge is possible under a framework of faith. 
In an earlier era, the thinking of Thomas Aquinas, filtered through the neo- 
Scholasticism of the early 20th century, offered a synthesis of knowledge that could serve 
as a backbone for a distinctively Catholic curriculum. With the old synthesis long gone, 
Bernard Lonergan’s thinking on cognition offers a possible replacement. With its 
understanding of how all peoples of all cultures (and from all academic disciplines) come 
to know, Lonergan’s theory of human consciousness opens a door to interdisciplinary 
dialogue based on self-appropriation and the resulting awareness of how the ‘other’ also 
comes to know. This, in turn, could overcome the longstanding trends toward ever- 
increasing specialization and fragmentation of knowledge, helping professors help 
students to see a genuine wholeness in their education. Once students have been helped to 
see where they, themselves, ‘stand’ intellectually, they will be uniquely well-placed to 
make the most of opportunities to engage with, for instance, those speakers whom some 
might deem controversial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: John Dunne and the Hospitality of Passing Over 
 
Introduction 
Just as it would be hard to overestimate Thomas Merton’s impact on the 
spirituality of American Catholics in the 20th, so too would it be difficult to quantify 
Bernard Lonergan’s influence on Catholic theology in the decades since Insight and 
Method in Theology were published. One of the most unique theologians to emerge from 
the ranks of Lonergan’s students was undoubtedly John S. Dunne, C.S.C. Reading 
Dunne, like reading Lonergan, is an experience rather unlike that of reading most 
Catholic theologians. Like Lonergan, Dunne can sometimes seem to the reader that he 
has developed—if not his own language—then at least his own matrix of questions, 
quotations, and insights that he consistently injects into his books. Like Lonergan, the 
reader will not find in the majority of Dunne’s works an explicit reliance on Church 
Fathers, councils, papal pronouncements, etc. Though Dunne was, like Merton, perhaps 
most famous for his prolific career as an author of works of spirituality, he was also an 
extremely capable theologian. Unlike Merton, Dunne does not comment on the 
particulars of current events. Like both Merton and Lonergan, Dunne’s record suggests 
that he was an accomplished teacher, reportedly having taught more students at the 
University of Notre Dame than any other professor. 
Also like Merton and Lonergan, and certainly of most importance for this 
dissertation, John S. Dunne was one of the more notable practitioners of Catholic 
intellectual hospitality of the past half century. Thomas Merton’s apostolate of friendship 
led him to look far beyond the walls of his monastery in order to engage with people of 
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very different backgrounds and worldviews, all the while learning and teaching. Bernard 
Lonergan’s map of human cognition allowed him to see a breathtaking unity of 
knowledge, woven together by the consistent processes of human knowing. As such, 
Lonergan was able to see a common ground underneath all forms of knowing, that was 
therefore supporting people who pursue perhaps widely divergent paths to knowledge. 
Though Lonergan’s influence on Dunne certainly shines through Dunne’s work in a 
number of places, Dunne’s intellectual hospitality possessed a distinctive style and 
method. 
As will be seen, Dunne’s earliest work, focused largely on the theology of 
participation found in Aquinas, is unexceptional in its style. As Dunne got just a bit older, 
however, his interests and even his method would undertake a drastic transformation. It 
was when he turned 30, Dunne would later recall, that he developed a “vivid awareness” 
of “life opening up all the way to death…”1 In terms of writing style, Dunne would only 
occasionally resort to technical theological language for the remainder of his career. As 
 
far as his interests were concerned, death—both as such as well as his own eventual— 
would drive the development of his thought and inspire the process that he would call 
‘passing over.’ 
It is this process of passing over that represents Dunne’s contribution to this 
dissertation as an obvious exemplar of Catholic intellectual hospitality. In passing over, 
Dunne would attempt to immerse himself in “the standpoint of other lives and times,” 
 
 
 
1. John S. Dunne, A Journey with God in Time, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
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before “coming back to that of our own lives and times.”2 Whereas Merton’s friendship 
extended to a large number of his contemporaries, Dunne’s offer of hospitality—and 
perhaps even friendship—was extended most often to people long dead, to cultures quite 
foreign to his own, or to eras long since passed. 
Dunne’s books are unique, but he did not feel that he had any claim to a 
monopoly on passing over. Gandhi, in Dunne’s estimation, was himself skilled at 
“(passing) over by sympathetic understanding from his own religion to other religions 
and (coming) back again with new insight to his own.”3 Dunne would also point to 
Machiavelli as a fellow practitioner, in that Machiavelli would commune for hours each 
evening with “the great men of former times.” In addition to escaping boredom, 
forgetting trouble, and overcoming fear of poverty and death through these nightly 
experiences, Dunne contends, Machiavelli was also able to “gain from the past an 
understanding of the present and future.”4 
This chapter will explore the particulars of Dunne’s intellectual hospitality as 
 
demonstrated in his method of passing over. Though Dunne’s practice of hospitality was 
not identical to Merton’s or Lonergan’s there will emerge some obvious common ground. 
In all three cases, these prodigious thinkers and prolific writers were inspired to 
hospitality by something inherent to their own Catholic faith. Indeed, all three were able 
to be hospitable to the other because of their commitment to Catholicism, not in spite of 
it. Once Dunne’s work has been thoroughly surveyed in this chapter, the dissertation will 
2. John S. Dunne, The Reasons of the Heart, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1978), 149. 
3. John S. Dunne, The Way of All the Earth, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 
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finally be able to support several conclusions regarding what Catholic intellectual 
hospitality seems to be in practice, and what the ramifications of that might for Catholic 
higher education. 
John S. Dunne’s Early Biography 
 
The first-time reader of Dunne might easily feel, at first, as though he has 
stumbled upon an author with his own language, or at least his own form of 
communication. Dunne seems to almost constantly invoke the same names as he tackles 
subjects. Dante, Gandhi, Aquinas, Buber, and many others are called upon to help 
develop Dunne’s ideas, and it is sometimes the same quote from one of these figures that 
pops up several times in the same book or even in multiple books. Typically, Dunne 
would write a single paragraph each day. While there are certainly times, as a result, that 
Dunne’s work reads like someone’s stream of consciousness, to leave one’s conclusions 
about Dunne there would be to miss the development that happens within each book and 
certainly from book to book as well. Very little of the work he published in the latter half 
of his life deals with classic theological categories as an exclusive or even primary focus. 
Instead, Dunne never seems to move entirely beyond his preoccupation with death. Not 
surprisingly, then, Dunne’s reflections on life, time, meaning, and death always strike the 
reader as though there is an autobiographical thread running throughout his work. 
What might seem initially to be Dunne’s own personal style or language, 
however, may actually turn out to be nothing more than the language of the human 
condition communicated from Dunne’s personal experience of changing standpoints. 
Interestingly, the reader will be best positioned to see Dunne’s work as applicable to all if 
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he has a handle on Dunne’s biography. Very much in the style of his teacher, Lonergan, 
Dunne’s theology was undertaken by someone who had diverted his attention toward the 
knowing subject. Before beginning his first book, Dunne decided to write an 
autobiographical sketch as a necessary step before embracing the kind of intellectual 
hospitality that would characterize his work. Dunne, it seems, needed to know how and 
why he knew what he knew, in order to begin considering and engaging with the 
perspectives of others. Dunne’s intellectual hospitality, therefore, required him to occupy 
a place, or perhaps even a tradition, of his own. While that early autobiographical 
reflection was never published, he did eventually publish an autobiographical work, A 
Journey with God in Time, in 2003. In that book, Dunne would interpret events in his life 
through the lens of insights he had gained rather later on. 
Dunne thinks of his life as a journey with God in time.5 Nevertheless, Dunne (not 
 
at all unlike Merton) believes that there are moments in life when the presence of the 
eternal can be seen or known. Dunne, born December 3, 1929, fondly recalls a childhood 
in which his natural curiosity was encouraged by a family that valued reading. The 
memory of his grandfather telling him stories suggests that his first five years were happy 
ones. Indeed, his grandfather’s place in Dunne’s life is confirmed when he says that “God 
has become my companion on the way, I realize now, replacing my grandfather…”6 The 
 
decade after his grandfather’s death was not as happy. Dunne remembers beginning to 
look at the people he encountered in those days, trying to find people who were happy in 
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order to learn their secret. Dunne’s habit of passing over to the perspectives of others, 
therefore, has very deep roots. 
Dunne’s earliest recollection of doing theology also dates back to when he was 
quite young, comparing God to sparrows. “My concept of God was of Someone as 
harmless as a sparrow and yet existing everywhere, like sparrows, and caring about 
everyone and everything.”7 Later on, Dunne recalls sleeping outside during the summers, 
when the vastness of the night sky would fill him with a sense of wonder that the world— 
and everything else—actually existed. One hears the echoes of Dunne’s lifelong 
engagement with Aquinas and Lonergan in his contention that “The wonder was not so 
much a proof as a sign of God’s reality. To come to God from the wonder is an insight. It 
means no longer taking for granted what is most taken for granted, the existence of 
things, and when that is no longer taken for granted, God’s presence appears.”8 
Dunne’s parents sent him to boarding school one hundred miles from home in 
Austin, after “perceiving my unhappiness…This then became my first sally in quest of 
happiness.” Armed with his memories of lost happiness in the midst of his teenage 
unhappiness, Dunne compares his boarding school years to the experience of Odysseus. 
The time away from home was like a journey through a wonderland, encountering “dread 
and fascination of the mystery of life.”9 The second venture in Dunne’s quest for 
happiness was “a spiritual quest, and it followed closely on my journey away from 
home.” Dunne’s lifelong habit of passing over seems to have begun here quite 
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intentionally, and the intellectual hospitality it entails often seems oriented more toward 
Dunne’s desire to receive insight rather than offer it. “Passing over to fellow students was 
passing over to fellow seekers, not finders; passing over to teachers, on the other hand, 
was passing over to finders, or so I hoped.”10 From these teachers, Holy Cross brothers 
and priests, Dunne hoped to find the secret of happiness. The young Dunne thought he 
had found that secret in the opening lines of The Imitation of Christ (from John’s 
Gospel): “One who follows me will not walk in darkness.”11 
This discovery seems to have set the stage for Dunne’s “third sally in quest for 
 
happiness,” which was “to go to Notre Dame to join the priests of Holy Cross.”12 While 
at Notre Dame, Dunne would take his first steps into philosophical thinking, engaging 
with Newman’s distinction between knowledge and learning. Though Dunne had always 
been encouraged to love learning by his family, the acquisition of knowledge struck him 
as a higher goal. “To be learned was to be well read and well informed, but to have 
knowledge was to have insight and understanding. It was to have vision. It was for me the 
beginning of a quest of vision. My quest of happiness was changing into a quest of 
wisdom.”13 
 
In the last chapter, it was noted how Thomism had come to reassert itself in the 
Catholic Church through the neo-Scholastic revival. It is not at all surprising, then, that 
Dunne’s newfound quest for wisdom would take a turn toward Aquinas during his 
college years at Notre Dame. During the summer after his sophomore year, Dunne 
 
10. Ibid, 17. 
11. Ibid, 18. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid, 19. 
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committed to reading the Summa Theologiae. Apparently, Dunne employed the strategy 
of reading the body of each article only, skipping objections and responses to objections. 
This was nevertheless enough to shape Dunne’s view of the world. “Reading it article by 
article, I was getting the vision of things, how everything comes from God, how human 
beings return to God, and how Christ is the way.”14 Dunne found peace and serenity in 
reading Aquinas, which he also found reading Augustine’s Confessions. Aquinas made a 
more significant impression on Dunne, though, as can be seen from his decision to read 
through the Summa over and over, year after year. With his appropriation of Aquinas’s 
vision of all things originating with God, and of human beings proceeding from and then 
turning back toward God, Dunne was inspired to seek the very summit of academic 
accomplishment: “Now an ambition took hold of me, to do with modern thought what 
Saint Thomas had done with ancient thought.” Dunne seems to have put no mean effort 
into carrying out this goal. “I began to read Kant…But then I realized Kant was working 
from Newton’s science…I realized I would have to work instead form Einstein’s science, 
taking space and time to be the sensorium of the moving observer…I began to collect 
principles like this to form the basis of a kind of Summa.”15 
Upon graduation from Notre Dame, Dunne learned that the Congregation of Holy 
 
Cross, his order, would be sending him to Rome for advanced studies in theology. 
Interestingly, Dunne found that he could be receptive, and even hospitable, to places 
inasmuch as those places could be the loci of others’ perspectives. Dunne would therefore 
look back on his initial journey to Rome as an exercise in passing over, “first of all to the 
14. Ibid, 22. 
15. Ibid, 23. 
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ancient city of Rome, entering into the journey Virgil describes in the Aeneid…The 
illustrious men and women of ancient Rome…were the dead for me. I was seeing them as 
immortal souls, not just as figures living in our memory of them…”16 In coming back 
from this venture in passing over, of course, Dunne was coming into the Rome of the 
present and his theological studies at the Angelicum. Dunne had decided to study there 
given the importance of Aquinas in Dominican theology, but his continuing desire to do 
with modern thought what St. Thomas had done with classical thought apparently left 
Dunne dissatisfied with the Angelicum’s “closure of theology on the Summa, and so he 
“decided to transfer after that first year to the Gregorian, the Jesuit school of theology in 
Rome.”17 This decision would prove to be of momentous significance for the later 
trajectory of Dunne’s thought. 
After his first summer break in Europe, Dunne returned to Rome. This again 
struck him, later on, as having been a “process of passing over, now to Renaissance 
Rome as well as to ancient Rome.” Dunne found himself passing over, in particular, into 
the method of Leonardo and Michelangelo, as he saw it, “seeing the human body in terms 
of the universe and seeing the universe in terms of the human body.”18 After the 
following summer and return to Rome, Dunne found himself “passing over now to 
 
modern Rome and modern Catholicism in its crisis of renewal in the last days of Pope 
Pius XII.”19 This apparently involved reading the works of those theologians, like de 
Lubac, at the forefront of the Catholic ressourcement as well as leading Protestant 
 
16. Ibid, 29. 
17. Ibid, 30. 
18. Ibid, 31. 
19. Ibid, 32. 
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thinkers such as Karl Barth. Dunne learned that Barth was working on his own 
magisterial work of systematic theology, and entertained the idea of asking to study with 
him. When that idea did not come to fruition (Dunne does not get into details here), he 
asked to remain at the Gregorian, in order to write his dissertation under the direction of 
Bernard Lonergan. 
Lonergan’s Influence on Dunne 
 
It was around the time of Dunne’s ordination in December 1954 that he first heard 
Lonergan’s lectures in Rome. Dunne would recall that “I knew him in his earlier period 
when he was writing his book Insight and before he did his later and more systematic 
work Method in Theology.”20 It was Lonergan, ultimately, who suggested Dunne’s 
dissertation topic: “on the idea of participation in the theology of Saint Thomas.”21 
Dunne’s first attempt to finish his dissertation was not altogether successful, as he tried to 
do it somewhat hurriedly, relying largely on what he already knew from his annual 
readings of the Summa. “Lonergan rejected this version of my thesis and told me to do it 
over again, this time examining all the texts where Saint Thomas speaks of participation. 
So I began a laborious process of writing down all the passages on participation and 
collecting them into piles according to subject…”22 Being, Dunne found, was simply that 
something, or rather all things, exist. How things exist, however, is through participation 
in Being. “According to Saint Thomas, moreover, God is Being by essence not just by 
 
 
 
 
20. Ibid, 35. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
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participation. The whole wonder of existence thus is concentrated in God. Everything 
other than God participates in Being and has its own mode of participation.”23 
Lonergan’s influence on Dunne extended much further—or perhaps deeper—than 
simply having a role in selecting a dissertation topic or even in the crafting of that 
dissertation. Lonergan aspired to a knowing of knowing, a turn to the subject. Dunne, 
even decades before the publication of his spiritual autobiography, undertook his 
theologizing with a considerable degree of attentiveness to self. Dunne, for instance, 
would say that his ‘search for God in time and memory’ would be akin to writing an 
autobiography. This “would involve you in a process of bringing time to mind.” This, 
eventually, would “carry you to the edges of your life, backward to birth and forward to 
death; it would give you a sense of your lifetime being a part of a larger time…You 
might compare your life with other lives that seem somewhat parallel; you might even 
compare it with lives out of epochs long past. You might wonder how far your story is 
simply the perennial human story…”24 
Indeed, Dunne seems to have been captivated by Lonergan’s insight into insight, 
his idea of understanding as “insight into image. Thus faith seeking understanding 
became for me faith seeking insight into the great images of faith, especially life and light 
and love, the three great metaphors of the Gospel of John.”25 Dunne would not, however, 
appropriate Lonergan’s vocabulary or his thought without adding his own distinctive 
flair. Indeed, this is typical of Dunne’s ability to make room in his own thinking for the 
 
23. Ibid, 36. 
24. John S. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory, (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1977), vii, viii. 
25. John S. Dunne, The Circle Dance of Time, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2010), 1-2. 
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insights of others: “Later I came to my own notion of insight as what happens when the 
reasons of the heart become known to the mind. It became essential for me then to 
explore the realm of the heart and to understand the human heart and the heart’s desire.”26 
     It is especially—and certainly not surprisingly—in Dunne’s earlier works where 
Lonergan’s influence is clearest. Citations to Lonergan’s work are relatively rare in 
Dunne’s books. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to miss the imprint that Lonergan had 
left on Dunne’s thinking. “A knowing of knowing would be like a view from a 
mountaintop. By knowing all about knowing itself one would know in some manner 
everything there is to know. It would be like seeing everything from a great height…The 
knowing of knowing would mean being in possession of all the various methods of 
knowing.”27 How could anyone familiar with Lonergan’s Insight not, upon reading these 
 
words from Dunne, immediately think of Lonergan’s vision for where his theory of 
human cognition might lead him? Dunne himself seems to express a similar excitement 
for the possibilities: “It would mean knowing how an artist thinks, putting a thing 
together; knowing how a scientist thinks, taking a thing apart; knowing how a practical 
man thinks, sizing up a situation; knowing how a man of understanding thinks, grasping 
the principle of a thing; knowing how a man of wisdom thinks, reflecting upon human 
experience.”28Dunne, however much he may have been influenced by Lonergan, though, 
 
falls mostly into that last category as a man of wisdom. Dunne knows that God is 
typically imagined to be at the top of such a mountain. Dunne was firmly convinced, 
 
 
26. Ibid, 2. 
27. Dunne, The Way, 17. 
28. Ibid. 
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though, and indeed much of his career as a theologian reflects a commitment to the 
conviction, that God was not only at the top of such a mountain. “There is a wisdom at 
the bottom of the mountain, let us say, just as there is at the top. The God we imagined at 
the top had a wisdom which amounted to a knowing of knowing, a knowledge which 
gave him complete and inviolable autonomy. If we were to imagine a God at the bottom, 
we would have to imagine him possessing a wisdom which could see through autonomy 
itself.”29 Lonergan’s theory of cognition shaped Dunne’s thought to a considerable 
degree, but Dunne’s style would remain very much his own. This is not to say, by any 
means, that Dunne eschewed his mentor’s insistence on clarity of method in theology. 
Though Lonergan had not yet written Method in Theology when Dunne studied under 
him in Rome, Dunne does exhibit a tendency to be clear and up front about his method, 
particularly in some of his first books after Lonergan’s Method was published in 1972.30 
Dunne’s Early Work and His Debt to Aquinas 
The previous section attempts to situate the work of John S. Dunne alongside that 
of his dissertation director, Bernard Lonergan. The goal of this section is twofold. First, it 
will aim to continue the chronicle of Dunne’s life begun earlier in this chapter by 
examining briefly his earliest work as a professional theologian. Second, it will proceed 
from considering the influence of Aquinas on Dunne’s early work to a broader survey of 
Aquinas’s influence on Dunne’s entire corpus. Just as the previous chapters show the 
degree to which Merton and Lonergan were immersed in the Catholic tradition, so too 
will this section be crucial for at least beginning to demonstrate Dunne’s own rootedness 
29. Ibid, 21. 
30. See, for example, Dunne, Reasons, 147-152. 
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in Catholicism in no small part because of his rootedness in Thomistic thought 
throughout his career. Dunne’s intellectual hospitality, like that of Merton and Lonergan, 
is made possible in no small part because of this rootedness. 
In 1960, Dunne’s article on “Two Contemporary Approaches to Theology” was 
published in Theological Studies. Within the essay, Dunne identifies and critiques the two 
approaches, with the one being the analytical approach of John Wisdom and the other 
being the existentialist approach of Rudolf Bultmann. “Though a Catholic will find much 
to criticize in either approach,” Dunne found, “it is profitable for him to engage in 
discussion of one and the other as a kind of dialogue with contemporary thought.”31 
 
Though this article clearly does not involve the writing style that makes Dunne’s later 
work so distinctive, the sentiment expressed in this statement certainly does suggest 
something of Dunne’s general willingness to engage with just about anyone or anything. 
As Jon Nilson has observed, Dunne’s later works of theology are notable for his tendency 
to venture off of the beaten path as far as sources are concerned: “the ‘sources’ of 
Dunne’s theology are not often the typical ones of Scripture, dogma, Fathers, councils, 
and great figures of the theological traditions.”32 
 
Aquinas, however, proves to be the clear exception. It has already been said that 
Dunne’s habit of studying Aquinas annually was established early on, and that he 
eventually settled on the Thomistic theology of participation for a dissertation topic. In 
1957, Dunne published a summary of his dissertation in Theological Studies under the 
 
31. John S. Dunne, CSC, “Two Contemporary Approaches to Theology,” Theological Studies, 21 
(1960), 46. 
32. Jon Nilson, “Doing Theology by Heart: John S. Dunne’s Theological Method,” Theological 
Studies, 48 (1987), 83. 
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title “St. Thomas’ Theology of Participation.”33 Finding that humanity could be by nature 
only what it could be by participation in God’s own essence as pure act of being, Dunne 
discovered that humanity had been created with, as it were, a capacity for God. Though 
this essay is written entirely within the typical style and conventions and Thomists of the 
era, there is nevertheless something to that notion of man’s capacity for God that would 
prove essential for Dunne’s later work and especially his notion of passing over. 
In A Search for God in Time and Memory, Dunne’s second book and the first 
wherein he explicitly attends to his strategy of passing over, Dunne wonders if that 
passing over may be a key for understanding another person. “I must die with him and 
rise with him again; I must pass over with him from the standpoint of life to that of death, 
and then I must pass back with him from the standpoint of death to that of life.” To 
Dunne, this was hardly an original thought but rather was essentially Pauline. “I must do 
in his regard something analogous to what Paul would have the Christian do in regard to 
Christ: be buried with him in death in order to be raised with him unto life.”34 At this 
point, Dunne’s reflections on passing over had brought him, obviously, quite close to the 
heart of traditional Christian doctrine. If, as Dunne found in his doctoral work, a person 
has a capacity for God (through participation in God’s being), in what way is that 
capacity impacted or shaped by the Incarnation? What would it mean, in other words, to 
have a capacity for Christ? 
 
 
 
 
 
(1957). 
33. John S. Dunne, CSC, “St. Thomas’ Theology of Participation,” Theological Studies, (18) 
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It is unsurprising that Dunne is reminded, only a few pages further into A Search 
for God in Time and Memory, of Paul’s hauntingly beautiful hymn to Christ’s kenosis in 
the Letter to the Philippians. The “logic” of Christ’s kenosis and subsequent exaltation, 
Dunne posits, is that of “the man who loses himself as God in order that man may be 
born in undergoing the passion of God, for it is the passion of God to lose oneself as God 
in order that man may be born. So the ‘name that is above every name’ belongs to such a 
one, that is, the name of the Lord.”35 Dunne sees something similarly kenotic in the 
passing over he attempts: “we have first to pass over from our standpoint to (Jesus’s), and 
only then will we be able, passing back to our own standpoint, to participate in his 
kenosis and exaltation.”36 Obviously, Dunne is speaking here of passing over to the 
perspective of Jesus37 Himself. Dunne’s use of the word participate in this statement, 
though, is a clear indication of the early work he had done to finish his doctorate. To pass 
over, which again is Dunne’s method of intellectual hospitality, was not so much a 
temporary abandonment of Dunne’s Catholic perspective so much as it was a (however 
imperfect) reflection of and participation in the being of a God Who is revealed in Christ. 
Dunne also remained, throughout his career, captivated by Aquinas’s vision of a 
person’s spiritual journey: “a great circle going from God to God with the figure of Jesus 
as the way.”38 As he passed over to the religion of the poor, Dunne believed that 
“everything is converging upon Omega, or really upon Alpha: our journey together in 
35. Ibid, 22. 
36. Ibid, 25. 
37. While Dunne does occasionally speak of passing over into the earthly experiences of Jesus of 
Nazareth (see John S. Dunne, Reading the Gospel, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 
99-100), he most often discusses passing over to Jesus as a means of entering, insofar as one can, into the 
relationship of the Son and Father. 
38. Dunne, Reasons, 19. 
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time is toward the sources of life.”39 In the estimation of Paul Kollman, CSC, Dunne’s 
final book (for which Kollman wrote the preface) was shaped in large part by the same 
image of a circular journey, an “embracing paradigm of emanation from God and return 
to God…”40 For Dunne at the end of his career, this vision from Aquinas was at the very 
heart of his understanding of how to carry out Christ’s Great Commandment. To love 
God with all of one’s mind, Dunne reckoned, was to come “to a peaceful vision of 
everything coming from God and everything returning to God and Christ as the way…”41 
Similarly circular is the relationship between knowing and loving, which also 
 
comes up several times in Dunne’s writing: “we take things in by knowing them, and 
from there to the heart, as knowing leads into loving, and from there back to the things of 
life, as we go out to things by loving them. Then the circle goes round again, as the 
loving leads into new knowing and the knowing into new loving.” Does this have an 
impact on Dunne’s central method of passing over and coming back? “When I enter into 
a sharing of life with others, I am entering into this round dance of mind and heart, letting 
others have a mind and heart-changing effect upon me.”42 
 
Dunne would return to this cycle of knowing and loving again in his 1993 book 
on the contemplative life (in which, incidentally, Dunne acknowledged “getting my 
conception of the contemplative life more from Aquinas,” even as it had an Augustinian 
 
 
 
 
39. John S. Dunne, The Church of the Poor Devil, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1982), 102. 
40. John S. Dunne, Dark Light of Love, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), vii. 
41. Ibid, 58. 
42. Dunne, Poor Devil, 135. 
211 
 
 
 
flavor to it as well).43 The book was written in the wake of a dream Dunne had in which 
he encountered Aquinas, and asked him “Do we love with a love we know or with a love 
we do not know?”44 Knowing, according to Aquinas, “brings the things we know into us, 
but loving takes us out to the things we love.”45 Dunne makes clear that this circle is not 
unrelated to the first circle of moving away from and then toward God. Instead, “It is like 
the great circle of love coming from God and returning to God. In fact, as loving becomes 
knowing and knowing becomes loving, the circle of the soul becomes in us the great 
circle of the love of God.”46 
This section has demonstrated that Dunne’s entire method of passing over is 
undertaken not as something apart from or even moving away from Dunne’s own 
commitment to the Catholic faith. Instead, it seems, Dunne’s passing over is a reflection 
of his prolonged study of Aquinas, and was part and parcel of his attempt to participate in 
the being of God, Who is revealed in Christ. Before delving into the specific instances of 
passing over that characterize Dunne’s various works, the next section of this chapter will 
try to establish the full breadth of the possibilities of passing over. Once the full 
‘landscape’ of passing over is mapped out, the succeeding sections will profile Dunne’s 
more substantive experiences of passing over. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43. John S. Dunne, Love’s Mind: An Essay on Contemplative Life, (Notre Dame: University of 
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Dunne’s Method: Passing Over and Coming Back 
 
For Bernard Lonergan, a method was “a normative pattern of recurrent and 
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.”47 Jon Nilson argues that 
Dunne’s method, unique though it is, fits Lonergan’s definition of method, and therefore 
“deserves more serious attention and a more prominent place in the contemporary 
theological conversation than it has been given so far.48 This section, proceeding as it 
does from a perspective of agreement with Nilson’s contention, will echo and seek to 
augment Nilson’s own work to describe of what, exactly, Dunne’s method consists. 
Though Dunne’s work can often seem inextricably linked to his own life story, Nilson 
rightly sees value in Dunne’s position that “My method is my journey.”49 With the 
journey on Dunne’s mind being, essentially, life, perhaps instead of seeing Dunne’s work 
as a highly unique expression of an individual prone to thinking theologically about his 
own life, it may be better understood as an expression of the experience of all of us? 
“The sense of a complete relativity of standpoints,” Dunne observes, “a relativity 
such that no standpoint, fixed or shifting, is the true standpoint, seems characteristic of 
the twentieth century.”50 Over the course of a person’s life, one’s standpoints change a 
great deal. As Nilson summarizes, Dunne believes “the quest for understanding is not like 
exploring unknown terrain from one fixed perspective. Instead, it is a journey in time 
from standpoint to standpoint, each of which illumines more of the unknown.”51 Passing 
over, then, was the means by which Dunne would seek to complement the standpoints of 
his own experience with those of others, further helping him to illumine the unknown. 
47. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 4. 
48. Nilson, 65. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Dunne, Search, 66. 
51. Nilson, 66. 
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“Passing over means entering into the standpoint of another person, age, or culture and 
thereby gaining new understanding. Passing over means temporarily adopting another 
and different perspective on common concerns and thus discovering truths about oneself, 
others, and God which would not have been found solely within the confines of one’s 
own standpoint.”52 Upon coming back to his own standpoint, of course, Dunne would 
find that that standpoint was not really the same as it had been, “because it has been 
expanded and enriched by the truths discovered in passing over.”53 Only God’s 
standpoint is absolute, though one can discover something true in every standpoint of his 
life, and from every standpoint to which he passes over and then comes back. That 
passing over is an exercise in intellectual hospitality ought to be clear. There is an 
openness required to pass over, a willingness to be vulnerable in the face of what the 
other sees, knows, and has experienced. Where did Dunne’s hospitality lead him? 
Dunne’s first book, The City of the Gods, was not the book he had initially 
planned to write. Dunne envisioned, at first, a book on the political theology of the 
ancient Greek city-states. As Nilson puts it, Dunne “had evidently planned a massive 
undertaking whose accomplishment would have consumed years.”54 Dunne would 
discover, however, that such a task, wherein “the viewpoint from which the work was to 
be written was fixed” and “the topics were clear and the method ready to hand,” could  
not inspire him to see it through to completion.55 Having recently turned thirty, Dunne 
found that the confrontation with the problem of death, and not political theology, was his 
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primary interest. Dunne’s curiosity regarding death was fanned by his reading of the story 
of Gilgamesh, in which the ancient hero traveled the world seeking an avenue to 
immortality. Though Dunne does not use the language of ‘passing over’ and ‘coming 
back’ in The City of the Gods, he was able to see later that that was, nevertheless, exactly 
what he had done in that book. He had “engaged in passing over to cultures. I compared 
cultures there in terms of their answers to death.”56Or, as he put it again several years 
later, “I had passed over to times in my first book…”57 For the reader familiar with some 
of Dunne’s later work, there is no doubt that The City of the Gods can be seen clearly 
(and quite early on) as an exercise in passing over. Dunne remarks in his preface that 
“Homer said of Odysseus that ‘he saw the cities of many men and learned their mind.’ 
We shall be seeking in our fashion to do just this, to see the cities of many men and learn 
their mind, only to us the cities of men will be cities of gods more than of men because 
we shall be seeking like Gilgamesh to learn their mind on life and death…”58 
One no longer needs to read between the lines to find passing over in Dunne’s 
 
next book, A Search for God in Time and Memory. “Passing over to other lives and times 
became a conscious project for me in writing this second book, and coming back with 
new insight to my own life and times.”59 Whereas he had passed over to cultures in his 
first book, in the second Dunne “became engaged in passing over to lives. It was there 
that I began to use the term ‘passing over’ and began to study the different standpoints, 
 
 
56. Dunne, The Way, xi. 
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biographical and autobiographical, from which a life can be understood.”60 Nilson notes 
that passing over is one of three facets of Dunne’s overall method, along with the 
aforementioned equation of method with journey, and, as Dunne puts it “a process of 
eliciting images from feelings, attaining insight into those images, and converting 
insights into a guide for life.”61 While Dunne occasionally uses one of these three aspects 
independently of the others, he will also use “passing over and coming back to refer to (a) 
conjunction of all three components.”62 
In his third book, The Way of All the Earth, Dunne passes over to religions.. To 
 
pass over into the great religions of the world, Dunne would write three decades later, is 
to enter into the “shaking of the foundations that they bring about. Buddhism shakes the 
foundations of the self…Christianity shakes the foundations of life and death…Islam 
shakes the foundations of our will and purpose.”63 How, or perhaps why, is a passing  
over to the religions possible when they often seem separated by a gulf that may at once 
seem both spiritual and doctrinal? It is possible, Dunne writes, “in virtue of (the) common 
experience of a center of stillness surrounded by silence…There is a unity of religious 
experience, therefore, as well as the ‘varieties of religious experience,’ and the unity is 
that of the heart as our center of stillness surrounded by silence, while the varieties are 
those of the reasons of the heart known in the various religions.”64 As Dunne put it more 
directly elsewhere, “the great religions each consist of unique insights into the common 
 
experience of humanity. There is a depth in common experience, I want to say, that is 
 
60. Dunne, The Way, xi-xii. 
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revealed in the great religions.”65 Or, again, “The possibility of passing over seems to 
imply that each man is somehow all men, that each life is somehow all lives.”66 Every 
person to whom Dunne might pass over, then, “is a microcosm, that…reflects the whole 
universe from a particular standpoint.”67 
In 1978, Dunne took a voyage through South America that included a five day 
journey up the Amazon. This trip would prompt Dunne’s next experiment in passing 
over, which is memorably documented in The Church of the Poor Devil. At its most basic 
level, the passing over Dunne undertook in South America was simply a “passing over 
from one social class to another.” He was also passing over, though, from one culture to 
another, and “ultimately, as it turned out, from personal religion, as I now see my own 
starting point, to the religion of the poor.”68 Interestingly, though, Dunne never seems to 
 
have lost sight of the fact that any human standpoint that seems absolute is necessarily 
illusive. The absolute standpoint, and the standpoint to which Dunne was aspiring, 
belonged to God. “So the mystery of encounter involved me in an encounter with popular 
religion as well as with the great religions, and an encounter with women as well as with 
men, but my thou was never really other than God, and my journey was always a journey 
with God in time.”69 Dunne would come to see passing over as an expansive method of 
 
theological reflection, encompassing even something so simple as reading, which 
“becomes a passing over into the thoughts, the lives, the times of others.”70 Even with 
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passing over covering so much ground as to involve Dunne’s reading, the God Who is 
revealed in Jesus seems always to serve as the backdrop of Dunne’s method. It has 
already been seen how passing over builds upon Dunne’s early work on the theology of 
participation found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Dunne sought to participate in the 
being of God, and that, Dunne found, depended on his willingness to pass over to Jesus 
Himself: “It is a matter of entering into his relationship with God, letting his God be our 
God, letting his thou become our thou and his I am become our own  I am so he can say 
‘I in them and thou in me.’”71 
This section has tried to survey the full territory covered by John Dunne’s notion 
of passing over and coming back. This method has been traced through the course of 
Dunne’s major works, and it has been seen how his method was an essentially hospitable 
one, enabling him to engage with other people, places, cultures, and eras. Sometimes this 
passing over involves actual travel, sometimes it involves encountering the other face to 
face, sometimes it is conducted through reading. Ultimately, though, it points Dunne back 
toward the standpoint of God, a standpoint illuminated by the person of Jesus. At this 
point, now that the broadest contours of passing over have been sketched, it is necessary 
to delve deeper into some of the specific instances of passing over so as to see Dunne’s 
method ‘in action.’ 
The City of the Gods 
 
Dunne’s first book, The City of the Gods, was published in 1965. Intending to 
write a work on ancient political theology, Dunne received a grant for a year of research 
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and writing at Princeton. As he read the classics at Princeton, however, Dunne found 
himself focusing his attention on something far closer to home than ancient political 
theology: “my feelings were all about my youth passing and my life opening up before 
me to death.”72 Passing over and coming back are not explicitly mentioned anywhere in 
this book, but it seems that by the time he was nearly through with the writing, Dunne 
had formulated a question that would spur much of the theological work he would pursue 
for the remainder of his career: “If I must some day die, what can I do to satisfy my 
desire to live?”73 
Reading the classics, in particular The Epic of Gilgamesh, had prompted Dunne to 
 
take his earlier focus of ancient political theology and re-direct it toward asking how 
various societies throughout history had grappled with the certainty of death. It is no 
great wonder, then, that Dunne would focus a considerable part of his book on 
exploring—or, as the older Dunne would have put it, passing over to—the myths of these 
societies. “What we call ‘myths’ at the present time…are usually expressions of the 
experience of earlier times, and what we are willing to regard as myths current in our 
own time are for the most part what we recognize to be survivals or revivals of these 
earlier myths.” The myths, as Dunne saw clearly, cannot properly be understood as 
artifacts that existed only on the fringes of the societies that created them. “It will not be 
the accessory elements of our own culture which will be regarded as myth in the 
future…but the most important element of it, the measure by which we judge earlier 
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myths to be myths, the standpoint which makes the modern man modern.”74 Reading 
Gilgamesh led Dunne to look at these various myths as solutions to the problem of death, 
something with which all societies have obviously had to contend.75 
Dunne no doubt saw something of his own experience in the story of Gilgamesh. 
At first, Dunne found, Gilgamesh “suffers from the common illusion of being immortal, 
regarding death as something which happens to people in general not to himself in 
particular. After he had come face to face with death too many times to retain this 
illusion, Gilgamesh “sets out to acquire a name and a fame that will live on after his 
death.” Perhaps that way something of him might survive as a lasting testament to 
accomplishments, or at least to his existence. The story, though, is dominated largely by 
the third stage, “in which his whole existence becomes a desperate quest for life 
everlasting.”76 For Dunne, Gilgamesh was much more, therefore, than simply the product 
 
of his own time, or his own culture. Instead, Gilgamesh became an “image not only of 
archaic man but of man himself because we can discern in his stark figure the reason why 
no standpoint has remained the leading edge of human experience for long.”77 As epoch 
gives way to epoch throughout history, as societies put forth different solutions to the 
problem of death, humanity never, Dunne contends, ultimately breaks out of Gilgamesh’s 
shadow. 
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Passing over to ancient Egypt, Dunne finds the pyramids “standing witness to the 
Egyptian concern over life after death.”78 The Egyptians were able to see a possibility for 
life after death insofar as “identity was believed to consist in physical individuality and 
was thought therefore to be conserved as long as the body was preserved in the tomb.”79 
Obviously, the ancient Egyptians were not constructing pyramids for everyone and 
anyone. Rather, the common people were seen to share “vicariously in the experience of 
the king,” who “lived the life which had been lived by the dead king…”80 The aggregate 
of these deceased individuals, it seems, became “an anonymous collectivity consisting of 
all the dead who had become Osiris.”81 Graves were robbed, however, and some bodies 
were not protected or preserved forever. Feeling cut off from their past, then, the 
Egyptians no doubt found their solution to death to be wanting. 
Passing over next to ancient Greece, Dunne finds in Homer a very different 
answer to death, predicated in no small part on a very different relationship between the 
people and their gods. Whereas earlier peoples might have waged war so as to capture a 
goddess whose residence was claimed by two cities, Homer writes instead of Helen, a 
goddess fallen down to the human level. This development points, Dunne contends, to 
“The despair of all fellowship with the gods…”82 Dunne finds in Homer a contention that 
 
war, since it cannot be fought to win proximity to the gods, is essentially absurd. When 
Odysseus rejects, in the Odyssey, the goddess Calypso, he proposes a solution to the 
problem of death rather different than that of the Egyptians. He chose “to be happy and 
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die rather than to be unhappy and live forever.”83 Though this seems to be, at first, a 
renunciation of the quest for immortality undertaken by Gilgamesh, Dunne finds that it is 
rather “not because he had no desire for immortality but because he did not want an 
immortality which could be attained only through the experience of death. What he 
wanted was an indefinite prolongation of his earthly existence.”84 For Odysseus, this 
would have been a prolongation of his earthly existence at home. 
Dunne surveys the confluence of historical factors that lead to the idea that the 
soul is immortal, and notes how this new conviction altered the urgency of the problem of 
death: “Once the soul is considered immortal, though, and thought to enjoy something 
more than a ghostly existence after death in a nether world, the desire for the boundless 
perpetuation of the present life tends to lose its force.”85 From there Dunne finds the 
rationale behind the development of Socratic and Platonic philosophy, as well as various 
forms of Eastern mysticism. Instead of satisfying the desire to live, these schools of 
thought advocated a renunciation of the will to live and recommended one engage instead 
“in what Plato and Socrates call the ‘practice of dying.’”86 In Christianity, too, Dunne 
sees similarities to these other mystical perspectives. These similarities seem to be 
outweighed by “Some fairly salient divergencies,” however. Namely, Christianity’s 
“denial of reincarnation, of fate, of dualism, and of immortality apart from God” tends 
“to destroy the significance of mysticism as an escape from the present life.”87 
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But what of Christianity’s answer to the problem of death? With its doctrine of 
only one God, and that this God is, in fact, the God of the living (to whom even the dead 
are alive), Christianity did not so much offer a new answer to the problem of death as it 
changed “the very terms of the problem.”88 A post-death existence that appears attractive 
no longer seems so clearly to be a thing worth strenuously avoiding. Dunne passes over 
to a number of other ancient and medieval perspectives before bringing The City of the 
Gods to a close, but it is telling that the end brings him back again to Christianity. Is this 
end the equivalent of Dunne’s later notion of coming back? After learning how various 
peoples answered the problem of death, the end of the book finds Dunne haunted by 
Christ, rather than Gilgamesh. “Not having the power to lay down his life and take it up 
again, man cannot know about Christ’s Resurrection the way he knows about facts which 
correspond to what he himself knows how to do or experience.” “What man should do if 
he must some day die is be willing to lay down his life.”89 If one lays down his life as it 
is, and relies on God to take it up again, “released from all evil,” he will discover that 
which is, in Dunne’s estimation, “man’s last and best hope, the hope Christ has brought 
to him, the Christ who said ‘I am the resurrection and the life; he who believes in me, 
though he be dead, shall live; and whoever lives and believes in me shall never die.”90 
This initial, academic foray into the method of passing over is a clear indication of how 
 
expansive Dunne’s intellectual hospitality could be. To pass over into another 
civilization, Dunne shows himself capable of immersing himself in the perspective of an 
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entirely different (and oftentimes extinct) culture, bringing the fruits of those experiences 
back into his assessment of Christianity. 
A Search for God in Time and Memory 
Dunne’s second book, A Search for God in Time and Memory, was suggested to 
him by the method he followed in the The City of the Gods. “I thought at first that 
individuals would simply be instances of the answer to death in society, but then I saw 
how personal memory of the past meant a similarly personal anticipation of the future.”91 
Rather than seeing people merely as microcosms of their societal context, Dunne begins 
in his second book to consciously pass over to the lives of other individuals. This may be 
seen as a more daring practice of hospitality than that which involved passing over to a 
culture: it is surely harder to be open to concrete individuals—with all their flaws—than 
to more abstract groups of people. The hope, for Dunne, was to shed light on what he 
could not see by learning what others could. 
At the very beginning of A Search for God in Time and Memory, Dunne tells—or 
perhaps warns—his reader that the journey is to be an intense one. “It is a search that will 
carry us on quests and journeys through life stories, through hells, purgatories, and 
heavens, through ages of life, through stories of God. It is the sort of thing you might 
undertake if you were writing an autobiography or composing a personal creed.”92 As 
such, time was clearly very much on Dunne’s mind. His path through this book would 
 
require him to be attentive to his life, to his memory, to the way that his lifetime fit into 
time as such. The kind of self-awareness that would come from this attentiveness to self, 
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Dunne argues, will enhance “greatly your ability to understand lives other than your own. 
You find yourself able to pass over from the standpoint of your life to those of others, 
entering into a sympathetic understanding of them, finding resonances between their lives 
and your own, and coming back once again…”93 Whereas Jesus was something that 
Dunne seemed to rediscover at the end of The City of the Gods, He is rather more 
conspicuously present here, as if always looming on the horizon. For “It is by passing 
over that a man makes contact with Jesus, becomes contemporary with Jesus, and it is by 
coming back to himself from this that Jesus in turn becomes contemporary with him.”94 
It is important to remember, though, that none of this is to say that death was no 
 
longer on Dunne’s mind. To reflect on one’s life, after all, may certainly involve 
reflecting on the end of one’s lifetime. Instead, A Search for God in Time and Memory is 
still quite obviously the work of someone trying to satisfy his desire to live, despite the 
inevitability of death. Passing over to St. Paul, Dunne finds a perspective on death which 
obviously continued to be highly influential down through the time of the Protestant 
Reformation and even down to the present. “The sting of death is sin,” Paul memorably 
declares to the Corinthians.95 The antidote, then, to death’s sting is the righteousness 
 
found in reliance upon Christ’s own faithfulness. All people, according to Paul, deserve 
to die, because all people are unrighteous. “Evidently,” Dunne concludes, 
“unrighteousness gives death its sting by making a man worthy of death and making him 
know that he is worthy of death. The sting is the consciousness that one is worthy of 
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death. What righteousness does, consequently, is not to eliminate death itself but to 
eliminate this worthiness of death.”96 The quest for justification, something which Paul 
clearly believed could not be conferred on the self by the self, was a “quest for divine 
acceptance.”97 
Jesus challenged the earlier, Pharisaical conceptions of God and God’s justice in 
that He, despite being condemned to die via crucifixion, was unconditionally accepted by 
God. For Paul, therefore, “The news about Jesus…was the revelation of a God who was 
righteous in a way quite different from that which would have been expected by a 
Pharisee.”98 For Dunne, then, to pass over from his modern standpoint to that of the New 
Testament was to go from being “responsible for making our lives unacceptable or only 
 
conditionally acceptable to a standpoint where we appear to be unable to make our lives 
unconditionally acceptable.”99 Coming back, though, Dunne finds that Christ, “by his 
willingness to be our fellow, appears to have brought unconditional acceptance to us.”100 
It is unsurprising that Dunne passes over next to St. Augustine, and it is also 
unsurprising, given the nature of A Search for God in Time and Memory, that Augustine 
would have tremendous influence over Dunne’s thinking. In thinking about his life back 
to its beginning, Augustine had been led to think back even further, to the very beginning 
of everything. This is why Augustine’s Confessions end with chapters on memory and 
time. It was St. Augustine’s Confessions, therefore, that suggested to Dunne the title of 
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his second book.101 Unlike Paul’s story, Augustine’s strikes Dunne as possessing a 
“genuinely archetypal character,” because it “is told (as) a story of experience, of the 
running of a gamut of experience, rather than as a tale of unique deeds and 
achievements.”102 It is this focus on experience rather than deeds, Dunne posits, that led 
Augustine to carry his search for God “to the outermost limit of his past experience, to 
the nothingness that preceded his conception and birth. It is here that he finds God.”103 
This nothingness brought Augustine face to face with his own contingency, his own 
dependence on God for his very being. In this contingency, Dunne argues, Augustine saw 
common ground shared by himself and the entire world, finding himself “in some real 
sense contemporaneous with the beginning of time.”104 
In passing over to the standpoint of the modern person, Dunne observes how 
 
remarkable it is that “Christ has been able to remain the archetypal man of Western 
civilization in its transition from medieval to modern form.”105 Whereas medieval people 
could experience mediation between themselves and God in both spiritual and temporal 
affairs, the Reformation and ‘Revolution’ broke these structures of mediation down and 
led to a drastic restructuring of life in the West. As the preeminent Mediator between God 
and humanity, though, Christ could be the gold standard for the medieval mediators but 
also for the alienated person of modern times. As Dunne observes, “The words ‘My God, 
my God, why have you forsaken me?’ which Christ uttered upon the cross, have become 
meaningful to modern man in his unmediated existence in a way that they could not be to 
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the medieval man living in the hierarchical world of mediation.”106 The loss of mediation 
between the human and the divine in early modern times leaves the individual exposed to 
the brilliant glare of divine scrutiny, Dunne finds. Passing over to the standpoint of 
figures as diverse as Luther, Erasmus, Calvin, John Wesley, and John Bunyan, Dunne 
explores the different means of coming to terms with the loss of spiritual mediation. 
From there, Dunne passes over the standpoints of the autonomous man, the 
human person in an age after the temporal mediators of medieval lord and king no longer 
stood between her and the God of the living. In particular, Dunne surveys the 
perspectives of Rousseau, Wordsworth, and Goethe, with plenty of insights from 
Nietzsche, Jung, and Sartre included along the way. Indeed, Dunne discovers that the 
modern man is left with the responsibility of inventing himself, “eliciting images from 
feelings, attaining insight into the images and converting insight into a guide of life…”107 
The Way of All the Earth 
In 1968, Dunne set out on his first journey throughout South America, during 
which he found his thoughts settling on a new inspiration: “‘Not to be afraid of Freud and 
Marx,’ I told myself, Freud saying religion is wishful belief and Marx saying it is the 
opiate of the people, but to look for insight in the great religions of humanity.”108 This 
refusal to be afraid of Freud and Marx, despite their notorious antagonism toward 
Christianity, is interestingly reflective of Dunne’s hospitality. Instead of throwing up 
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walls and hiding behind the defenses of his own intellectual and religious tradition, 
Dunne desired to seek truth wherever it could be found. Dunne determined around this 
time, apparently, that his intellectual quest was aiming for understanding rather than 
certainty. “The circle of truths becomes smaller and smaller on the quest of certainty, I 
thought, but it becomes larger and more encompassing on the quest of understanding.”109 
Dunne spent the academic year of 1969-1970 at Berkeley, where he worked on his book, 
The Way of All the Earth. In this, his third book, Dunne attempts to pass over to the great 
religions of the world, and into the lives of Buddha, Jesus, and Muhammad. 
In the midst of this search for wisdom in the great religions of the world, Dunne 
clearly refines—and amplifies—his understanding of passing over and coming back. “Is a 
religion coming to birth in our time?” Dunne asks at the beginning of his preface. 
Acknowledging this as a possibility, and taking Gandhi as his model, Dunne describes 
passing over and labels it “the spiritual adventure of our time.”110 At no point in the book 
does Dunne slip into a lazy assessment of the great religions that sees nothing but 
common ground. To the contrary, Dunne is consistently clear and fair in his delineation 
of the differences among the religions and the men who founded them. Nevertheless, 
implied in the very method of passing over is the awareness of some commonality, some 
shared experience that makes passing over meaningful in the first place, and coming back 
an enrichment of some kind. Originally, Dunne recalls, “I expected that experiments with 
truth would mean gaining new experiences by walking new paths…As I went on, though, 
I began to realize that the experiences on which the religions were based were common 
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experiences, and that the uncommon thing was insight into the experiences, the 
‘enlightenment’ and the ‘revelation.’” The title of the book, taken from the King James 
Version’s translation of a phrase found both in Joshua and 1 Kings, Dunne chose “to 
mean the common experience of mankind and wish to say by it that the religions consist 
of insight into the common experiences of mankind.”111 
Taking Gandhi’s experiments with truth as his model, Dunne delves immediately 
 
into the human problems of love and war, and examines how one’s religious instinct to 
avoid both is challenged by the incarnate deity found in both Christianity and Hinduism. 
Dunne imagines one climbing a mountain “to escape from love and war, for he feared 
that love might so encumber and complicate his pursuit of happiness that he could never 
be happy, and that war might bring on the loss of everything he already possessed and of 
his hopes for the future besides.” Though one might seek self-sufficiency through 
knowledge at the mountaintop, it also becomes clear that “he had lost everything else by 
escaping from love and war,” so he turns around “and (starts) to make his way down into 
the valley again.”112 Though Gandhi’s vow of celibacy and commitment to non-violence 
 
might seem a part of his own escape up the mountain, Dunne contends rather that they 
are part of Gandhi’s return down the mountainside. Gandhi’s celibacy was, according to 
Dunne, “not a retreat from the two-person to the one-person situation so much as an 
advance from the two-person to the many-person situation; (it) was an experiment in 
universal love.”113 Similarly, Gandhi’s nonviolence was “not a refusal to fight so much as 
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a willingness to fight with a handicap, namely without using violence, and to run thereby 
a greater personal risk in the struggles of mankind; (his strategy of nonviolence) was an 
experiment in courage.”114 
In writing on the simple life of the religious man, Dunne’s attention turns to the 
life and teaching of Buddha, for whom both the flesh and spirit could burn with desire. 
“The desire that was satisfied yesterday,” Dunne learns, whether it is a bodily or spiritual 
desire, “arises again today and is stronger and more insistent for having been satisfied 
yesterday.”115 To live life in search of contentment, then, may well prove to be illusory. 
Instead, Dunne wonders, perhaps it is well-being that ought to be the goal of the simple 
 
life? Or possibly bliss? Dunne suggests that both Jesus and Buddha found a way to live 
well, and be well, without searching for or finding contentment. Indeed, the lives of 
Buddha and Jesus are quite similar in Dunne’s mind, despite the life of Jesus being 
“greatly telescoped.” Buddha renounced luxury and lived the ascetic life for seven years 
before finding a middle way between the two, which he spent the remainder of his life 
trying to share with others. In much the same way, Jesus spent forty days in the desert 
and had perhaps only a few years to spread the good news, in comparison with the four 
decades of Buddha’s public life.116 
The brevity of Jesus’s life poses a problem for any Christian, in that He did not 
have an opportunity to demonstrate how to live the second half of one’s life. In the 
example of Buddha, however, Dunne sees that “Evidently…the ultimate length of life 
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does not matter; the important thing is to find one’s way to bliss and then spend the 
remainder of one’s life, long or short, sharing one’s insight with others.”117 But what of 
the person who has already reached middle age and has yet to find bliss or the path 
toward it? “Communicating whatever limited insight he has found might in fact be the 
best method of searching for the way…As one communicates the limited insight one has, 
one receives further insight.”118 
Passing over is, again, part and parcel of what is for Dunne a quest for 
understanding rather than certainty. After all, “the more intensely one seeks certainty the 
more uncertain one becomes. Perhaps this is because what is sought…is a state of repose, 
a repose of heart or of mind which is incompatible by its very nature with the restless 
state of seeking. One can find repose only by ceasing to seek for it.” If, however, one 
seeks for, say, “inspiration or movement of the heart—one is likely to find what one is 
looking for.”119 If one is able to change her orientation in this way, she will no longer be 
 
“anxiously trying to make sure of other persons,” and “no longer depressed by (her) 
failure to be reassured by them.”120 Things like reaching agreement between perspectives, 
or restoring confidence in one’s own perspective, will give way to goals such as attaining 
insight and understanding. This will make passing over possible. 
In chapter two, it was shown that Christian hospitality of any kind involves risk 
on the part of the practitioner. For a practitioner of Christian intellectual hospitality like 
John Dunne, the intellectual nature of his hospitality did not abolish or even minimize the 
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risks that he took. Perhaps he would find something he could consider superior to 
Christianity, and would therefore abandon the Gospel. Perhaps he would have come to 
abandon faith altogether, able to do little more than lament the lack of absolute agreement 
between religious traditions. The method of passing over that Dunne both followed and 
advocated, given its orientation toward understanding rather certainty, seems to have 
made any risks worth taking. Of course, the practitioner of Dunne’s brand of Christian 
intellectual hospitality will not be the same after having passed over. “His purity of heart, 
his singleness of mind, his peace of soul, such as they are, will in the last analysis be 
those of the Gospel. And yet his understanding of the Gospel will be transformed by his 
understanding of the Dharma and the Koran.”121 
In short, Dunne’s passing over, like all of the examples of Christian hospitality 
explored in chapter two, rests in no small part on a willingness to receive even as much as 
giving. Dunne argues that Jesus was, Himself, deeply influenced by John the Baptist, and 
therefore suggests that the life of Jesus “can be seen as a rich and full life of giving and 
receiving.” There is real danger, then, for a Christian to be unwilling to pass over. As 
Dunne writes: 
If I try to live a life of giving without receiving, communicating my insights to 
others but unwilling to allow others to have an influence on me or to give me 
anything, I find myself becoming a troubled man before others, anxious to be well 
received by them, a troubled man by himself, keenly aware of the lack of intimacy 
in his life, a man with a troubled body, troubled by urges of sexuality and  
violence to take what he does not receive. The willingness to receive tends to 
change all this. It breaks down the unwillingness which keeps others at a 
distance…122 
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The Church of the Poor Devil 
During a 1978 trip through South America, his second, Dunne spent five days on 
a riverboat on the Amazon. Having come across mention of a small chapel called the 
Church of the Poor Devil in a guidebook, Dunne was intrigued and asked a group of 
students traveling on the riverboat to help him find it. What he found was a small 
wedding chapel that was officially called the Chapel of Santo Antonio. It was the 
unofficial name, though, that held Dunne’s attention. “Who was the Poor Devil? I could 
find no answers then, but later I became so enamored of the name and intrigued by it that 
I decided to name a book for it, The Church of the Poor Devil, a book about the religion 
of the poor.”123 Clearly, a great deal more than the name of a chapel had struck Dunne on 
his journey. Having passed over to cultures, individuals, and religions in his first three 
books, Dunne does a little bit of all three in this one. Dunne’s intellectual hospitality is 
extended here to the poor he encountered, poor from very different cultures than Dunne’s 
own, and with a commitment to Christianity that seemed both familiar and foreign at the 
same time. As Dunne would later recall, his passing over in this book was, even here, 
inseparable from the overarching quest of his life: “…the mystery of encounter involved 
me in an encounter with popular religion as well as with the great religions, and an 
encounter with women as well as with men, but my thou was never really other than God, 
and my journey was always a journey with God in time.”124 
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Within the book, the Church of the Poor Devil is used by Dunne as an image for 
the religion of the poor. It meant, for Dunne, “an adventure in passing over from personal 
religion to the religion of the poor and coming to a vision of human misery and the 
heart’s longing.”125 Dunne finds in the religion of the poor two elements, each of which 
were unfamiliar—or at least different, than they were in his experience of personal 
religion: human misery and the heart’s longing. Dunne sees danger in failing to 
appreciate the reality of either. To take the heart’s longing as an illusion, Dunne fears it 
would be “impossible for me to enter into sympathy with the sigh, the heart, and the soul 
of the poor. I am left with the conditions under which the poor live, but I have no way of 
getting inside the poor themselves.”126 To fail to see the reality of human misery as real 
would be to fail “to understand what the heart’s longing means to the poor, living under 
conditions of poverty and deprivation.”127 Throughout The Church of the Poor Devil, 
Dunne attempts to take both to be real, so he might “come to a vision of the human road 
as a way leading from the human condition to the heart’s desire, a way of living in our 
naked humanity.’128 
Dunne vividly remembers a scene from the voyage in which the two classes of 
 
people—rich and poor—were neatly separated into two styles of living quarters on the 
boat; the poor had hammocks on the lowest and middle decks, while the rich (including 
Dunne) had cabins on the middle and upper decks. Passing alongside a village made up 
of many little huts on the riverside, people from the village began to row out to the 
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riverboat on their small canoes. While the people from the cabins just watched, the 
people from the hammocks laughed, cheered, and threw clothes down for the people in 
the canoes to retrieve. The people in the hammocks, Dunne concluded, already “shared a 
life with the people in the canoes, while the people from the cabins stood outside of that 
life.”129 
The scene moved Dunne to ask if it were possible to pass over to discover the 
human essence that joins such seemingly disparate groups together. “Is it possible for a 
person from one social class to understand one from another…Is it possible for a person 
from one society to understand one from another…?”130 Even if the only thing that 
human beings have in common is that they live alone, Dunne contends, that very 
aloneness is itself not nothing, and may serve as a starting point in passing over. Dunne 
felt lonely at the sight of other people interacting freely with one another on the riverboat, 
 
but seeing the cramped conditions of the poor on the boat made him realize also that he 
wanted to be alone. Despite the poor’s lack of privacy, however, Dunne noticed that they 
still apparently had their own thoughts and feelings: “Yet there is common ground: we 
both live in the solitude of our heart. Really we live in the same solitude. It is as if we 
lived in the same wilderness, the same desert or the same forest. We can meet there.”131 
What is the result of such a meeting? What can Dunne, or anyone else for that 
 
matter, gain from passing over from personal religion to the religion of the poor? Dunne 
certainly experienced a broadening of horizons in passing over and coming back in this 
 
 
129. Ibid, 1, 2. 
130. Ibid, 5. 
131. Ibid, 8. 
236 
 
 
 
way: “There is an awakening of soul…I go from concern about personal destiny to 
concern about the common fate, from feelings surrounding my relation to the things of 
life to feelings surrounding the things themselves, the common joys and sorrows.”132 
Whereas Dunne had once thought of his personal religion as an expression of his own 
situation, his own aloneness, passing over to the religion of the poor led him to see how 
“my longing is connected with their longing.”133 Dunne’s aloneness, or indeed the sum 
total of his suffering, he found, is “my link to the suffering of humanity.”134 
Christ 
 
Throughout Dunne’s employment of passing over and coming back, he 
consistently practiced an almost breathtaking degree of intellectual hospitality. Whether 
he was passing over to cultures, individuals, religions, or economic classes, Dunne was 
always able to consider the very best of what the other had to offer, and see how his new 
insights might help illuminate elements of the human experience which may have been 
obscure to him, before. Hospitality requires a willingness to make room for the other, 
space within which the other might be able to become a friend. Hospitality certainly 
entails an openness to sharing what one has, but it is equally dependent on an openness to 
receive what the other might have to offer in return. Passing over is a clear example of 
intellectual hospitality. Dunne’s investigations took him all throughout history and all 
over the world. His journey, though wide-ranging, rarely gives the impression of 
restlessness, however. What anchored him, and prevented passing over from becoming a 
 
 
132. Ibid, 56. 
133. Ibid, 86. 
134. Ibid, 116. 
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thinly-disguised intellectual waywardness? What gave him the confidence to venture into 
the hospitable embrace of others, and the strength to make room for the insights of the 
other within his own intellectual home? It has been shown, already, that Dunne’s method 
proceeds from an awareness of the human person’s shifting standpoint over time. With 
only God’s standpoint being absolute, every perspective to which Dunne passed over had 
the potential to augment his own with some new insight into the way of God’s world. 
This dissertation has shown how, for both Thomas Merton and Bernard Lonergan, 
intellectual hospitality is not something that is accomplished or practiced in spite of one’s 
anchoring in the Catholic tradition, but is rather an expression of that tradition. Dunne’s 
hospitality is no different. This chapter has demonstrated how Dunne’s early work on a 
theology of participation in the thought of Thomas Aquinas contributes to his method, 
developed later, of passing over. If someone exists through her participation in the being 
of God, she therefore has, by virtue of her own existence, a capacity for God. The 
doctrine of the Incarnation suggests this capacity has a kenotic potential. In passing over, 
especially in passing over to Christ Himself, she is enabled to mirror and even participate 
in Christ’s own kenosis.135 
 
If passing over was, from the time of the first book wherein it was a conscious 
method, a means of making contact with Christ, it would seem, then, that Dunne was at 
no point thinking that passing over involved risking his identity as a Catholic Christian. 
Intriguingly, however, Dunne remembered elsewhere that his method of coming back 
apparently did, at least for a short time, leave his ongoing commitment to the Christian 
 
135. Dunne, Search, 19, 22, 25. 
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faith an open question. During a 1974 trip to the Holy Land, Dunne had an opportunity to 
spend time in friendship with Jews, Christians, and Muslims and in study of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. “But the really transforming experience for me came when…I 
went a little apart and sat reading the Beatitudes...It was as if I were meeting Christ and 
he were saying ‘Follow me!’ I realized I am a Christian and not simply a universal man 
who can understand all the religions.”136 What can be made of this realization? To what 
extent had Dunne, truly, begun to think of himself as an entirely objective student of 
religion rather than a Christian? Dunne gives us little upon which to base a clear 
conclusion on this point. At the very least, though, it is fair to say that Dunne clearly had 
made himself vulnerable in his passing over and coming back. If authentic hospitality 
necessarily involves risk, Dunne had, undoubtedly, undertaken Christian hospitality as he 
sought to engage the other. 
For Dunne, to be a Christian is to enter into the relationship of Jesus and the 
Father. Rather than suggesting that He takes our place in His sacrifice on the cross, 
Dunne suggests that Jesus enables us to take His place. This involves an experience of 
both God’s intimacy with and distance from us. “What happens in Christianity, I believe, 
is that we enter into the ‘unconditional relation,’ as Martin Buber calls it, of Jesus with 
his God, whom he calls Abba.”137 While the feeling of God’s remoteness can be 
 
frightening and real, Jesus’s vantage point—and our crossing over into it—tames it with 
an awareness of God’s immanence. Dunne quotes Buber again, in his observation that “If 
separation ever touches (Jesus), his solidarity of relation is the greater; he speaks to 
136. Dunne, Journey, 62. 
137. Ibid, 65. 
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others only out of this solidarity.”138 It is this vantage point of Jesus that makes 
Christianity remain distinctive and appealing to Dunne. His most extensive reflections on 
Jesus are found in his 2000 work, Reading the Gospel. Reflecting on his (at that point) 
nearly half a century-long career as a theologian, teacher, and writer, Dunne writes that 
“My own odyssey of reading and traveling has been an experience of the mystical unity 
of the great religions. It is in coming back, though, and going deep in my own religion, in 
planting my oar deep in the heart of my homeland that I’ve come to perceive the 
uniqueness of Christianity.”139 
Preliminary Conclusions 
 
As a young man, Dunne intended to do with modern thought what Aquinas had 
done in his Summa. This synthesis of knowing may never have been completed, but 
Dunne nevertheless serves as a clear exemplar of the goal of a university—Catholic or 
otherwise. Dunne always understands his standpoint to be a dynamic one, ready at any 
time to be augmented by whatever broadening of horizons might come from passing over 
into the perspectives of other people, other cultures, or other religions. For the passing 
over to be fruitful, however, there must be an initial perspective and there must be an 
intention of coming back to it with the fruit of what has been learned. 
Dunne was, by all accounts, an accomplished professor, but his method 
demonstrates less teaching than, for instance, Merton’s apostolate of friendship. This can 
no doubt be attributed largely to the fact that many of the perspectives to which Dunne 
passed over were perspectives of people long since passed on. Dunne does not provide as 
138. Dunne, Circle, 16. 
139. Dunne, Reading, 5. 
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systematic a method for intellectual investigation as Lonergan, but he does propose in 
passing over a method that really anyone with a standpoint might follow (even if it is 
someone who has not given cognition much attention). Dunne’s intellectual hospitality is 
therefore different than the other two brands surveyed by this dissertation. There would 
seem to be a ready applicability of Dunne’s method for both students and scholars of 
Catholic universities who seek to be hospitable in both the classroom or the public lecture 
hall. Just as one might run great risk in opening up his home to a needy passerby, John 
Dunne ran the risk of damaging his commitment to Catholicism as he passed over to the 
various perspectives he did over the course of his career. Nevertheless, that commitment 
gave him a frame of reference by which to measure the insights that he learned, and also 
an intellectual home into which to invite the other in the first place. Dunne’s hospitality is 
further indication of the need for a solid grounding within a tradition. One might easily be 
captivated by the breadth of Dunne’s quest to pass over, but one must also appreciate the 
importance of Dunne’s mooring in Catholic, and especially Thomistic, thought. 
If a Catholic university is successful in welcoming students into conversation with 
the Catholic tradition, students may, following Dunne’s lead, have little reason to fear the 
perspectives of even the most controversial of professors, authors, or guest speakers. In 
order to pass over, in effect, students need something to which to come back: they need a 
place to call their intellectual home. For the Catholic intellectuals on campus, Dunne’s 
brand of intellectual hospitality is certainly a call to be mindful of their role in forming 
their students, but it is simultaneously a call for courageous engagement with the other. 
Even for non-Catholic students there are significant ramifications of Dunne’s brand of 
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intellectual hospitality. Though a Catholic university’s role is not to proselytize, all 
students should be invited to run the risk of passing over into Catholic perspectives and 
benefitting from anything good and true that they find within those perspectives. Indeed, 
even most of the Catholic students themselves could find passing over into Catholic 
perspectives to be an exercise in becoming vulnerable in the search for truth. 
Though Dunne’s books do not read like those of most theologians, there is a 
clearly Catholic vision running throughout his written work. He never seems to have 
‘outgrown,’ for instance, the Thomistic sense of all things proceeding from and 
ultimately returning to God. Also, Dunne never left Jesus out of the picture, seeking 
always to make contact with Him as he sought to participate in Jesus’s kenosis by 
emptying himself out through passing over to the other. Not all members of a Catholic 
university community, of course, would opt to see their learning as a participation or 
reflection of Jesus, but this hardly seems crucial. These same faculty and students are 
already contributing to the mission and identity of the Catholic university to seek the 
truth wherever it is to be found, even if they are in profound disagreement over the 
Source of that truth. In the same way, the intellectual hospitality of John Dunne, though 
thoroughly Catholic, can be applicable to all. 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Hospitality in Catholic Higher Education 
 
 
Overview 
Hospitality is the Christian virtue which makes room for the other to become a 
friend. While this virtue is no doubt most often considered in physical terms of providing 
for a guest’s bodily needs, there is in the life of the church a need for intellectual 
hospitality as well. Intellectual hospitality involves the welcoming of someone with a 
different worldview into conversation with mutual enrichment and even friendship being 
among the goals. These goals can be achieved regardless of whether any disagreements 
persist, so long as the other has been hospitably welcomed into a dialogue that involves 
the practitioner of hospitality accurately reflecting his own point of view, while critically 
engaging the perspective of the other to both offer and receive truth wherever it is to be 
found.1 After a brief recap of the previous five chapters, intellectual hospitality and its 
potential in the Catholic intellectual life of today will be considered. This consideration 
will necessarily require an acknowledgement of potential limitations in the practice of 
hospitality and the difficulty of cultivating intellectual hospitality as a virtue. The unique 
approaches of Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne to overcoming these difficulties will be 
explored before I conclude with some recommendations on how intellectual hospitality 
might be promoted in Catholic higher education. 
Chapter one demonstrated the need for a retrieval of hospitality and its application 
in Catholic higher education. In particular, the ecclesiological shift both signaled and 
1. The “cause of truth” has been described as “the honour and responsibility of a Catholic 
university…” John Paul II, Ex Corde Ecclesiae, August, 15, 1990, 4, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john- 
paul-ii/en/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiae.html. 
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further propelled by the Second Vatican Council reoriented the relationship between the 
Church and the world. With a new willingness to engage world, the Church had a greater 
need for universities capable of hosting the encounter between the very best of Catholic 
thought and the many other perspectives that characterize the modern world. With such 
openness, however, came challenges to institutions’ Catholic identity. Faculty hiring and 
invitations to speakers who might be openly antagonistic toward Catholic teaching have 
raised questions about how Catholic identity is to be protected or maintained in an era 
when the prevalence of vowed religious on campus can no longer serve as a sufficient 
assurance of Catholic identity. At the same time, a refusal to engage with the modern 
world would also confront Catholic higher education with challenges.2 Without a robust 
intellectual life rising to meet contemporary circumstances, the Church’s interpretation 
and presentation of the Gospel could easily grow stagnant. Catholic universities could 
quickly be relegated to the second tier—or worse. 
In the current context, how can a Catholic university navigate the tension between 
a desire for the open inquiry proper to a university and the need for fidelity to the 
Catholic tradition? The ancient Christian virtue of hospitality represents the most 
significant answer to that challenge. Often enough, hospitality has been given as the 
rationale for welcoming controversial speakers onto Catholic campuses. Surely 
hospitality as a virtue, however, reaches far beyond the welcoming of controversial 
speakers to campus and has an entire range of applications at a Catholic university. But, 
 
 
2. And would run directly counter to the Second Vatican Council. See The Second Vatican 
Council, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. 
Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Guild Press, 1966). 
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what are they? And, what exactly is hospitality? Must a university’s hospitality 
necessarily involve letting anything and everything happen, or can it have limits? 
Chapter two described hospitality as a virtue that encourages both a strong sense 
of identity and a posture of welcome to and charity toward others. Since Henri Nouwen’s 
retrieval of hospitality as a virtue, it has become clear that hospitality requires a 
willingness to embrace one’s own particularity in order to receive the other. One cannot 
welcome someone else into his home if he is homeless, either literally or intellectually. In 
order to make space where the other can become a friend, there needs to be a place where 
space can be made. In the contemporary context, characterized as it is by widespread 
fragmentation and specialization of knowledge, intellectual hospitality likewise requires 
grounding in order to avoid being left adrift. Chapter two also noted a close, circular 
relationship between hospitality and friendship. The openness that comes with hospitality 
allows friends to be made, while friendship functions as a school of charity, drawing us 
out of ourselves and teaching us to grow in the concern for others that makes hospitality 
possible. 
Chapter three presented Thomas Merton as an exemplar of how this circular 
relationship between hospitality and friendship functions. The Merton who became 
famous for The Seven Storey Mountain would be transformed in the 1950s by his 
experience of teaching and befriending his fellow monks at Gethsemani Abbey. This 
transformation instilled in Merton a new desire to share his contemplative perspective 
with the world in an apostolate of friendship. Throughout the latter half of his monastic 
life, Merton was able to engage with a stunning range of people with widely divergent 
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perspectives. Throughout this truly hospitable dialogue, Merton displayed a constant 
willingness to impart wisdom from his own Catholic tradition even as his dialogue 
partners taught him a great deal in return. It was Merton’s rootedness in Catholicism that 
freed him for engagement with the other. 
Chapter four described the particular challenge posed to Catholic institutional 
identity in Catholic higher education by the fragmentation of knowledge. Indeed, this 
must also be seen as an obstacle to a Catholic university’s ability to be hospitable in that 
it encourages the separation of the disciplines and limits one’s ability to see common 
ground upon which dialogue might take place. This chapter described the former 
prominence of the neo-Scholastic synthesis as well as its ability to synthesize knowledge 
and be hospitable. With the collapse of neo-Scholasticism, Catholic higher education 
lacked a unifying vision for how all knowledge might be united. Bernard Lonergan’s map 
of human cognition may well represent the best potential basis for such a vision in that it 
suggests a common ground beneath the methods of any and all academic disciplines. As 
was the case with Merton, Lonergan’s openness to the other was not unrelated to his 
commitment to Catholicism but was rather made possible because of it. 
In chapter five, John S. Dunne was presented as a third and final example of a 
Catholic thinker who had clearly possessed and practiced the virtue of intellectual 
hospitality. Much of Dunne’s career centered on his unique method of passing over into 
the perspectives of others and then coming back to enrich his initial position with the 
insights he had gleaned by passing over. Throughout Dunne’s works, he passes over to 
people, places, social classes, religions, and civilizations. This ability to be open to the 
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other is again not something that requires an abandonment of his Catholic worldview, but 
is rather an expression of his commitment to the Catholic tradition. In particular, Dunne’s 
deep familiarity with Thomistic thinking led him to see passing over as reflective of his 
participation in the life of the God Who is revealed in Christ. 
Disagreements over Catholic identity often seem to take place between two poles: 
the one is the open inquiry appropriate to the task of any university, and the other is 
fidelity to the Catholic tradition and Catholic teaching. I join what is likely a healthy 
majority in trying to maintain a tension between the two while offering a friendly critique 
to any who would emphasize the one while neglecting the other. To those prioritizing 
open inquiry, I would suggest that it is shortsighted to suppose that students can walk 
before they can run. Undergraduates deserve an opportunity to situate themselves in an 
intellectual tradition before they are left to consider the magnitude of knowledge to which 
the university will expose them. Without such a grounding, these undergraduates will 
find it very difficult to cobble together anything close to resembling a cohesive 
worldview. To those primarily concerned with fidelity to Catholic teaching, I would point 
out the sheer dynamism which has characterized Catholic thought down through the ages, 
and more recently the thought of such Catholic intellectuals as Merton, Lonergan, and 
Dunne. Indeed, Lonergan’s thinking on the importance of moving beyond a classicist 
perspective on culture is helpfully illustrative on this point. The work of the Catholic 
university may partially be bound up in the transmission of the wisdom of the ages, but 
there is also a need for the university to conceive its work as an ongoing process of 
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bringing that wisdom into a critical encounter with human learning as it continually 
unfolds.3 
Intellectual Hospitality 
 
The Christian practice of hospitality has long entailed something more substantial 
than simply providing for the physical needs of a stranger or guest. Of course, it would 
hardly be hospitable to disregard the hunger, thirst, or discomfort of the guest in one’s 
home. One of the defining characteristics of a distinctively Christian hospitality, though, 
is the importance of recognition. The person knocking on the door of one’s home, 
whatever their condition and however inconvenient their presence on the doorstep might 
be, remains someone created in the image of God and someone for whom Christ died. 
Christian hospitality recognizes, therefore, the inherent dignity and value of the stranger 
or guest. 
What would recognition require in the practice of intellectual hospitality? If one is 
in conversation with someone of a very different intellectual or faith perspective, what 
would it mean to recognize his/her dignity and value? The answer, I contend, is to 
critically engage with that person’s worldview. To seek, as far as one is capable, to 
understand the outlook of the other and to seek whether there is anything worth 
appropriating therein. Such a critical engagement, as has been shown in the cases of 
Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne, does not mean a lazy acceptance, or even tolerance, of all 
that one’s dialogue partners have to say. Nor is it undertaken with the stubborn posture of 
the apologist who is unwilling to see the true or the beautiful anywhere but in the mirror. 
3. See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), xi- 
xii, 123-124. 
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How does one know if one is engaging critically while remaining hospitable? While this 
is a difficult question, the answer may well be found in the ancient Christian insistence on 
dwelling together in common life as an integral part of hospitality. If one’s critical 
engagement with the other takes his/her thoughts seriously, accepting and rejecting 
anything that deserves to be accepted or rejected, all the while retaining the ability to 
dwell together, an authentically Christian intellectual hospitality has been achieved. 
What separates intellectual hospitality from mere civility, or good manners? The 
answer here seems to be that true hospitality involves feeling a loss of self.4 It challenges 
us to expand our understanding of who our neighbors are, and it reminds us that those 
who are different—and even those we may have once perceived as adversaries—are 
people. It also has the ability to shake us out of our complacency. To enter into the 
perspectives of others may well lead me to question the status quo with a clearer vision. 
Intellectual hospitality may help me to ask whether cultural norms in our nation, in our 
city, in our church, or on our campus actually are obstacles on my path of discipleship. 
Limitations 
Any discussion of limitations on Catholic intellectual hospitality will necessarily 
be an uncomfortable one. To suggest that there may be limits to how hospitable a 
Catholic thinker, or even a Catholic university, ought to be will no doubt strike many as 
backward, and perhaps even painfully reminiscent of an earlier era in Catholic higher 
education. And yet, practitioners of Christian hospitality always run into limitations, and 
4. One is reminded here first and foremost of Christ’s mission, characterized by the hospitable 
embrace of humanity. This mission, according to St. Paul, was a kenotic one (See Philippians 2:6-11). 
Within the context of this dissertation, the clearest example of one losing the self in order to emulate Jesus 
in fully engaging the other is likely Dunne. See John S. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory, 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 21-25. 
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always have to come to terms with them, however painful it might be. To suggest that 
intellectual hospitality might be different, that it might be possible to be intellectually 
hospitable with no limitations whatsoever, may be more reflective of hubris than 
hospitality. 
What, then, are the limitations? Are there perspectives out there with which 
Catholics simply should not engage? Are there people whose ideas simply should not be 
allowed on a Catholic university campus? Are there, for instance, certain non— 
negotiables in the Catechism that might serve as a shibboleth for entrance to the campus? 
It would be hard, after surveying the work of Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne, to answer 
any of these questions in the affirmative. And yet, all three of those thinkers were formed 
in an intellectual tradition before their hospitality was sharpened. Rather than asking if 
there are ‘untouchable’ perspectives out there, it seems a great deal wiser to prescribe a 
more introspective path. Catholic universities might ask themselves, for instance, whether 
their core curricula are, in fact, forming students, or at least encouraging them to enter 
into an intellectual tradition. They might even ask whether their faculty is strong enough 
in relevant areas to warrant inviting, say, a famous abortion rights activist to speak on 
campus. Will the theology department be able and willing to engage students on the 
issue? Are there scholars on campus with backgrounds on bioethics who might, similarly, 
engage students? If a socialist politician, or a wealthy capitalist with questionable 
business dealings of some kind are to be invited to speak on campus, are there members 
of the faculty who will be able to lead discussions on Catholic social teaching in order to 
ensure that students will be able to engage those speakers critically while also engaging 
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with the best of Catholic thought? Given the diversity of Catholic institutions of higher 
education, it is difficult to prescribe any ‘one size fits all’ kind of approach to intellectual 
hospitality. To ignore limitations out of hand, however, seems clearly short-sighted. 
Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne each suggest something about how to cultivate the virtue 
of intellectual hospitality. 
Merton 
 
As a young man, Thomas Merton had been as fully immersed in the world as one 
could likely be. Eventually, he would flee to the monastery so as to escape from the 
world which he had written off as full of obstacles to the spiritual life. Had Merton’s 
outlook never developed beyond where it was in the writing of The Seven Storey 
Mountain, he would be a poor source of lessons for the Catholic intellectual life or 
Catholic higher education of today. As has been shown, however, Merton’s career saw 
his thinking develop tremendously, to the point where he was willing to fully engage the 
world he had once left behind. A series of important eras in his life served to draw 
Merton out of himself to recognize the significance of the other, and even the need for the 
other in one’s intellectual (and even spiritual!) growth. 
After his dismal year at Cambridge, Merton’s life took a clear turn for the better 
when he enrolled at Columbia University and found a group of men with whom he had 
what were likely the first substantial friendships of his life. This circle of friends 
contributed much to Merton’s embrace of the Catholic faith and the Catholic intellectual 
tradition, though they do not seem to have led Merton to a plan of engagement with 
perspectives beyond that tradition. Instead, when Merton became Catholic and eventually 
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a monk, he apparently thought that his journey had reached its climax. The experience of 
teaching in the monastery, however, shook Merton out of his self-centered spiritual 
sensibilities to the point where he was able to see something good in other people. 
Merton’s commitment to the rhythm of monastic life and his grounding in the life of his 
Trappist community helped him to see his solitude as a connectedness to God’s world. 
This insight eventually led to a proliferation of interactions, both through letters 
and in person, with people from all over the world and with various views of the world. 
All the while his apostolate of friendship was being carried out, however, Merton seems 
to have always appreciated the importance of retaining his identification with a distinctly 
Catholic outlook. Indeed, his transition toward a more eremitic style of monastic life even 
as he remained a monk at Gethsemani Abbey demonstrates something of a deepening of 
his connection to his Catholic monastic grounding rather than a distancing. That Merton 
was able to sink his roots ever deeper into solitude and his own tradition even as his 
apostolate of friendship kept his attention all over the world seems to have rested on two 
points. First, he realized that he would not be able to enter into meaningful dialogue with 
the other if he himself did not occupy particular intellectual ground. Second, the 
centrality of Christ in the Catholic worldview was crucial to Merton’s unique brand of 
intellectual hospitality. He was able to develop his idea of the point vierge because of his 
conviction that God could be found at the center of all people, and because he also 
perceived the world as being permeated by Christ as the Word of God. 
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Lonergan 
 
A watershed moment in Bernard Lonergan’s intellectual development was his 
early reading of John Henry Newman. Newman’s lesson that one should take all 
difficulties head on was of immense significance to the man who would tackle such a 
heady topic as human cognition (to say nothing of his other projects). Though neo- 
Scholasticism’s shortcomings are fully appreciated here, it is interesting to remember that 
Lonergan learned his Aquinas while neo-Scholasticism was at its peak. While Lonergan 
himself was aware of the limitations of that school of thought as it functioned at the time, 
he clearly saw the value of having a philosophical framework that might synthesize all 
knowledge. Rather than starting with the first principles of the Thomists, however, 
Lonergan would work from the process of human knowing first, and only reason from 
there to any metaphysical conclusions that might be articulated. While Lonergan’s work 
required that he consider a wide range of academic disciplines and even non-academic 
paths to knowledge, the goal of a synthesis of knowledge apparently made any risks 
worth taking in Lonergan’s mind. Indeed, the very writing of Insight was a majestic 
demonstration of intellectual hospitality in that Lonergan could not do justice to the topic 
while working within the confines of how a theologian might think, or a philosopher, or 
any member of any single discipline. 
Dunne 
 
John S. Dunne was well on his way to being a stylistically typical Thomistic 
theologian when his thirtieth birthday led him to consider death with an intensity that 
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drove the remainder of his theological reflections. Even before that, though, the roots of 
his intellectual hospitality can be seen in his recollections of intending, as a young man, 
to do with modern knowledge what Aquinas had done in his own time. To put it simply, 
Dunne saw early on that he would have to make room in his thinking for the insights of 
someone like Albert Einstein if his thinking were to be as expansive as he wanted it to be. 
Though Dunne never wrote his modern Summa, he did have an illustrious career as a 
teacher and author, in no small part because of his unique theological method of passing 
over and coming back. In order to undertake this method, Dunne needed to be someone 
to come back to. That Dunne was, like Merton, rooted in his Catholic worldview is clear. 
Whatever difficulties there may have been in specific instances of passing over, Dunne 
found strength in the way that passing over reflected the mission of Jesus insofar as 
passing over required him to empty himself in order to enter into the perspective of the 
other. 
Recommendations 
 
Intellectual hospitality certainly requires the practitioner to make room where the 
other can become friend and the insights of the other can be critically appropriated into 
one’s own perspective. The legacy of all three Catholic practitioners of Catholic 
intellectual hospitality seems also to suggest that this hospitality must also include an 
appreciation of the potential sacramentality of one’s conversation partners. Rather than 
looking at the other simply as, say, a non-Catholic or even a potential Catholic, Merton, 
Lonergan and Dunne each appear to have recognized the manner in which the other 
might help them advance in their awareness of God’s presence in all that is true, 
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beautiful, and good. Such hospitality has a number of applications on a Catholic 
university campus. Scholars ought to be hospitable to those working in other disciplines, 
as well as to the new ideas in their own fields that drive the academic realm forward. 
Students ought to be hospitable to what will likely be a wide range of new ideas, whether 
those ideas come from professors, classmates, or guest speakers. These people may very 
well see the world similarly to how a particular student does, but they may not. Indeed, 
some of them may even be antagonistic toward a student’s Catholic worldview, but this is 
not necessarily a reason to deny them a hospitable welcome. It also does not mean that 
Catholics on campus may not learn something valuable from engagement with their 
ideas. The Catholic university must be hospitable to these same people, as well as to 
those other members of the Church who have real questions about what a Catholic 
university should be like. That devout Catholics of various sensibilities have different 
notions of how a Catholic university should function is a real blessing in that it shows a 
degree of vitality in contemporary Catholicism. Relatedly, the Catholic university must 
also be hospitable to the local bishop, who will be uniquely well placed both to help the 
university maintain its connection to the broader Church as well as communicate to that 
broader Catholic community the ways in which the Church benefits from a particular 
university’s work. 
None of that should sound objectionable. The real difficulty comes, of course, in 
cultivating this kind of intellectual hospitality on a Catholic university campus. As has 
been seen, the Church has long been aware—and especially so since Vatican II—that it 
needs to straddle the twin dynamics of identity and mission. The Church needs to protect 
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the integrity of the Gospel, but it also needs to boldly carry that Good News into new and 
potentially ever-changing contexts. Hospitality, as it has been described here, is precisely 
the virtue needed to help the Church fulfill these two obligations. Catholic universities, 
often on the front lines of the Church’s engagement with the world, seem to have begun 
realizing this. Hospitality is often given as a justification for the presence of controversial 
speakers on campus, which certainly makes sense. It is hard to imagine a strong rationale 
for inviting controversial speakers without any mention of hospitality. As I have tried to 
make clear, however, hospitality is, like all virtues, a difficult undertaking. To simply 
throw open the doors and let whatever happens happen is not hospitality. To use 
hospitality simply as an excuse for maintaining the status quo is not necessarily 
legitimate, either. I have explored the work of three notable practitioners of Catholic 
intellectual hospitality. In all three cases, there was clear boldness in their willingness to 
engage the other, but in all three cases there was a corresponding grounding in the 
Catholic tradition that made that engagement both possible and meaningful. If a Catholic 
university is going to truly strive to be hospitable in a manner consistent with what 
hospitality has entailed throughout Christian history, any use of the term hospitality must 
imply not only an openness, but also a rootedness. Conversations cannot take place 
between someone and no one. 
The most basic recommendation that could be made at this point would no doubt 
be for a Catholic university to ensure that students read the works of thinkers like Merton, 
Lonergan, and Dunne, so that they might be given clear examples of what kind of 
hospitable posture ought to characterize their own intellectual journeys during their time 
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on campus. And certainly, while basic, this recommendation could certainly do 
something to stimulate discussions on intellectual hospitality amongst the faculty as well. 
This dissertation cannot be content to rest on this very modest suggestion, however. 
Catholic universities, presumably like other institutions of higher learning, exist 
for a number of reasons. At least one of those reasons is the conviction that the world 
needs Catholic insights. This is comparable to Thomas Merton’s belief that the world 
needed to hear the insights of a Christian contemplative. One would be hard-pressed to 
produce a lengthy list of Catholic intellectuals more deeply engaged in dialogue with 
non-Catholics than Merton. It is interesting and important to emphasize, then, that 
Merton’s apostolate of friendship did not have its origin primarily in a desire to learn, but 
rather in a desire to teach. As any Catholic educator—at any level—will no doubt echo, 
however, no matter how focused one is on teaching, one will always find herself learning 
from her students. For a Catholic scholar on a Catholic university campus to invite 
students into a vigorous engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition need not 
imply a covert form of proselytizing. Students, even at the undergraduate level, need the 
kind of intellectual formation that will enable them to find an intellectual home. The core 
curriculum of a Catholic university is where this formation should happen. Certainly, the 
theology department plays a key role in this engagement with the Catholic tradition, but 
other departments are also responsible for leading students in an engagement with the 
best of Catholic thought. An interesting place to begin this process might be in instituting, 
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for all theology majors, a required course in catechetics.5 To develop such a course on the 
methods and practice of catechesis would require faculty in the theology department to 
give serious thought to what well-formed Catholics ought to know, or at least to have 
thought about. This could easily lead to any necessary development in the theology 
department’s general education course offerings. The Catholic university, in order to be 
hospitable, needs a means of ensuring that all students know the basic vocabulary of 
Catholic discourse, as well as some way for students to see how that vocabulary gives 
structure to the matrix of ideas that makes the Catholic tradition something distinctive. 
The goal, of course, does not have to be to make all students Catholic. What must 
happen, rather, is that all students see the manner in which an intellectual tradition 
functions. It is not outrageous to think that, say, a Muslim student could leave a Catholic 
university as a better Muslim because he has been both hospitably invited into 
conversation with Catholicism as well as exposed to a detailed glimpse into how an 
intellectual tradition benefits those who work and think within it. If all students on 
campus are entering into a substantial engagement with the Catholic tradition, there is far 
less reason to fear the presence of controversial speakers on campus, just as Merton’s 
formation left him confident enough to engage meaningfully with his various dialogue 
partners. The professor’s task may well demand a willingness to see students of all 
backgrounds as potential friends. Given Wadell’s understanding of a circular relationship 
between friendship and hospitality, this posture of openness to friendship with students 
 
 
5. A similar suggestion is made in Berard L. Marthaler, O.F.M.Conv, “Catechesis Isn’t Just for 
Children Anymore,” in Theological Education in the Catholic Tradition, ed. Patrick W. Carey and Earl C. 
Muller (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997), 62-66. 
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will sharpen the professor’s ability to be hospitable to both ideas and the people who 
propose them. Students will notice this hospitality on the part of their professors and will 
seek to appropriate it to the extent they can. In this time that many sense to be 
characterized by alienation and loneliness, to be recognized by an educator as someone 
possessing dignity and capable of making valuable contributions to classroom discourse 
could be a potent antidote to feelings of desperation and disenfranchisement, or even of 
pessimism regarding the very possibility of truth. 
Educators at all levels are routinely trained to always make students aware of the 
goals of a given task or lesson. Catholic universities would do well to extend the wisdom 
of this training to the general institutional mission to be a place of learning. Students 
come to learn, but might benefit greatly if they are encouraged to think about what it 
means for them to learn, what it means for them to know, in the first place. Lonergan’s 
work on human cognition suggests that all humans, regardless of specialty or expertise, 
follow a predictable pattern in coming to know what they know. It is not uncommon for 
Catholic universities to require students to take an introductory philosophy course as a 
part of the general education requirements. Could such a course be adapted to include a 
section on knowing? If so, that might do a great deal to help students see an underlying 
unity in what they learn across the disciplines. Perhaps each year the faculty in the 
various academic departments could collaborate with upperclassmen majors to contribute 
a unit on their particular path to knowing for the freshmen to consider with all the others 
amidst an introductory course of some kind. Such interdisciplinary collaboration could 
involve all on campus in a vigorous discussion on how the various disciplines fit together 
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into the university’s search for knowledge. Haughey has written about the importance of 
catholicity as a name for the university’s task of helping students to see how the things 
they learn fit together into a whole. Haughey has suggested that, if a university, 
characterized as it is by its various departments and disciplines, is to “have the plural 
efforts converge into a more coherent whole,” it will be possible only if faculty 
themselves “can better understand their own understandings and see that the operations of 
consciousness are universal.”6 
Furthermore, this is a venture that could be repeated consistently, if not each year, 
especially given the constant expansion of knowledge in the modern world.7 For the 
Catholic university, in particular, dedicated as it must be to highlighting the belief in the 
one Source of all that is true, the fruits of such a venture could be central to how it, as 
well as the professors and students who labor within it, go about loving God with all of 
their minds.  To have achieved the self-appropriation that Lonergan describes, to be 
aware of their own knowing, will enable students to better practice intellectual 
hospitality. Students will be able to more clearly articulate what they know and how they 
know it, and they will also be better able to appreciate what others know, even as they 
might still disagree. For modern students, accustomed as they are to talk of tolerance and 
inclusion, to be invited into a university where their education will allow them such an 
awareness of their own perspectives without an expectation that they must sacrifice their 
 
 
 
 
6. John C. Haughey, SJ, Where is Knowing Going? (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 
2009), 54. 
7. As such, Catholic universities have been called to a “continuous renewal.” John Paul II, 7. 
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own particularity in the interest of conversation with the other could be extremely 
appealing. 
I also strongly endorse the presence of interdisciplinary programs and courses on 
Catholic university campuses. While such projects may not be able to fully take the place 
of a synthesis of knowledge8, they can help to encourage intellectual hospitality on the 
part of students, who will be asked to understand and even appreciate the insights that 
come with different methods and disciplines. Additionally, interdisciplinary collaboration 
of various kinds can help to foster the kind of personal relationships across disciplinary 
lines that can make a university faculty a real community of thinkers and educators. As 
was seen perhaps most clearly in the case of Thomas Merton, community life in general 
and specifically teaching in the midst of that community life can have a tremendous 
impact on an individual’s ability to look beyond the self to engage the other in substantial 
ways. This willingness to engage is a beginning of hospitality and a path to potential 
friendship. 
It also seems that the Catholic university needs to give reflection on questions of 
morality a key place in the core curriculum. While many might agree that this would be 
important so as to lead students to reckon with Catholic notions of morality, it is also 
likely in questions of morality that students will most clearly be led to see and appreciate 
the manner in which all knowledge is tradition-bound. While this lesson could be learned 
in discussion of perhaps any topic, topics pertaining to morality will likely make this 
 
 
 
 
8. Which remains a goal of a Catholic University. See John Paul II, 16. 
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clearer because of the sheer diversity of moral perspectives past and present.9 Regardless 
of which discipline plays host to such lessons, students engaging in reflection on morality 
and its implications will see the way that knowledge is mediated by traditions. This 
should serve as a cornerstone of the Catholic university’s invitation to all students to 
consider their own intellectual homes, Catholic or otherwise. 
If the Catholic tradition is presented to students or faculty as a static reality that 
has been accomplished once and for all, it will no doubt stifle inquiry and crush any real 
hospitality. This was ultimately the problem with the neo-Scholastic revival of the last 
century. It failed to express the full richness of the Catholic tradition in a manner capable 
of engaging modern thought and incorporating critically the insights found therein. The 
passing over of John Dunne is a potent reminder that to be rooted does not need to imply 
an apathy toward the other or a lack of intellectual dynamism. Every standpoint is only 
temporary, and we can advance from one standpoint to the next by entering into the 
perspectives of others and then coming back, enriched, to our own perspective. Dunne’s 
passing over represents a powerful example of how students of all backgrounds might go 
through their university studies. Just as a Catholic student might find her understanding 
and appreciation of the Gospel enhanced by an exploration of Hinduism or her 
understanding of Catholic social teaching enhanced by a reading of Marx, so too might 
the agnostic student find her worldview enhanced by discovering the manner in which the 
Scriptural authors pursued some of the same questions about life that she may also be 
asking. Relatedly, to be an authentically Catholic university does not mean that students 
9. For commentary on the impact of history and context on moral decision-making, see Daniel C. 
Maguire, The Moral Choice, (New York: Doubleday, 1978), 309-342. 
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are never tasked with reading the Talmud, the Qur’an, Marx, Nietzsche, or Freud. 
Instead, the hospitality of the Catholic university welcomes all into a dialogue with 
Catholic thought while also modeling the importance of occupying an intellectual home. 
Unlike Merton, Dunne’s hospitality proceeded primarily from a desire to learn from those 
to whom he passed over. As his lengthy tenure at Notre Dame attests, however, Dunne 
clearly found that this desire to learn lent itself to teaching, as well. This corresponds, of 
course, to the very nature of hospitality as a Christian virtue as it has been understood and 
practiced down through the ages. If hidden within my hospitality is a desire only to give 
and re-form, I am not so much a host as an aspiring invader. If my hospitality is an 
extension only of a desire to receive, true hospitality will be impossible because I am not 
functioning as a person occupying any real space. Dialogue with me will be impossible. 
For any of this to happen, it does seem necessary that a Catholic university have a 
critical mass of faculty who are willing to champion the identity and mission of their 
particular institution.10 It seems likely that, within that critical mass, there will need to be 
a cadre of Catholic scholars who themselves are able and willing to practice Catholic 
intellectual hospitality so as to model it to students and colleagues. For a Catholic 
university to fulfill its obligations to the Church, the world, and its faculty and students, it 
must be a community characterized by hospitality. Thomas Merton believed that if he 
could unite within himself the perspectives of East and West, then a lasting unity of 
peoples would ultimately be possible.11 In the same way, I suggest that a Catholic 
 
10. Charles E. Curran, “The Catholic Identity of Catholic Institutions,” Theological Studies, 58 
(1997), 108. 
11. Michael Mott, The Seven Mountains of Thomas Merton, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984), 
306. 
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university can only be a place of hospitality toward ideas and people if it is home to 
scholars who are themselves able to practice Christian hospitality. The practice of 
intellectual hospitality will give Catholic universities the language they need to function 
as high-quality institutions while also witnessing to the Gospel the Christian’s vocation to 
perfect love. Though some, or even many, on a Catholic university campus may not 
subscribe to this vocation for themselves or their university, they may nevertheless 
contribute to the university’s work simply by carrying out their regular work of teaching, 
learning, or research. Just as Merton was convinced that Christ permeated the cosmos as 
the Word or Wisdom of God, the Catholics on campus will know that all truth discovered 
can ultimately be traced back to God. 
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